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Abstract 
This thesis is a survey of metaphysical theories of persistence through time. 
For each of the theories considered, I concisely state the theory, describe the 
positive arguments in its favour, suggest ways in which that theory could re- 
ply to positive arguments for other theories, discuss some outstanding prob- 
lems for that theory as stated, and describe some variants on it. In the 
course of this, I stake out my own distinctive view about persistence, which 
is a version of endurantism. 
I also argue for some preliminary results that are needed for the discussion of 
persistence. These involve issues in metaphysics that I regard as foundation- 
al with regard to the debates over persistence: intrinsic properties and the 
part -whole relation. I take the views: that the distinction between intrin- 
sic and extrinsic properties is orthogonal to that between non - relational and 
relational properties; that, strictly speaking, properties are neither relation- 
al nor non -relational; and that intrinsicality is unanalysable. In discussing 
part -whole, I defend a certain attitude to mereology, which I call "mereolog- 
ical realism" ; and assuming mereological realism, I defend the controversial 
features of classical mereology. 
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Epigram 
"Master," I said to him, "I understand nothing." 
"About what, Adso ?" 
"First about the differences among heretical groups. But I'll ask 
you about that later. Now I am tormented by the problem of 
difference itself. When you were speaking with Ubertino, I had 
the impression you were trying to prove to him that all are the 
same, saints and heretics. But then, speaking with the abbot, you 
were doing your best to explain to him the different between one 
heretic and another, and between the heretical and the orthodox." 
"When I say to Ubertino that human nature itself, in the com- 
plexity of its operations, governs both the love of good and the 
love of evil, I am trying to convince Ubertino of the identity of 
human nature. When I say to the abbot, however, that there is 
a difference between a Catharist and a Waldensian, I am insist- 
ing on the variety of their accidents. And I insist on it because 
a Waldensian may be burned after the accidents of a Catharist 
have been attributed to him, and vice versa. And when you burn 
a man you burn his individual substance and reduce to nothing 
that which was a concrete act of existing, hence in itself good, at 
least in the eyes of God, who kept him in existence. Does this 
seem a good reason for insisting on the differences ?" 
"The trouble is," I said, " I can no longer distinguish the ac- 
cidental difference among Waldensians, Catharists, the poor of 
Lyons, the Umiliati, the Beghards, Joachimites, Patarines, Apos- 
tles, Poor Lombardists, Arnoldists, Williamites, Followers of the 
Free Spirit, and Luciferines. What am Ito do ?" 
- Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose, (Eco 1984, pp. 196 -197) 
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Part I 
Preliminaries 

Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis is a survey of metaphysical theories of persistence through time. 
For each of the theories I consider, I concisely state the theory, I describe 
the positive arguments in its favour, suggest ways in which that theory could 
reply to positive arguments for other theories, discuss some outstanding prob- 
lems for that theory as stated, and describe some variants on it. This all takes 
place in part II. Part I discusses some preliminary material. 
Some of the issues discussed in this thesis receive more detailed treatment 
in the freestanding papers included as appendices. I will refer to these as 
appropriate. 
1.1 Outline of Parts I and II 
In part I, I argue for some preliminary results that are needed for the ar- 
guments of part II. These involve issues in metaphysics that I regard as 
foundational with regard to the debates over persistence: intrinsic properties 
(discussed in chapter 2) and the part -whole relation (discussed in chapter 3). 
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Chapter 2: Intrinsic properties 
The first section of this chapter simply describes what I take to be those 
features of intrinsicality which should be independent of any attempt to give 
a theory of properties or an analysis of intrinsicality. In it, I describe the 
important concept of intrinsicality that plays a large role in the arguments 
of chapters 4 and 5. I argue for a distinction among extrinsic properties 
between, as I put it, `mongrel' properties versus `extrinsic *' properties (sec- 
tion 2.1.2); that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties is 
orthogonal to that between non -relational, and relational properties; that, 
strictly speaking, properties are neither relational nor non -relational (section 
2.1.6); and that it is possible to classify impure, or "haecceitistic" proper- 
ties with regards to intrinsicality (section 2.1.7). I also suggest a connection 
between truthmakers and intrinsicality (section 2.1.3) which is argued for in 
more detail in appendices A and B. 
The second section deals with attempts to analyse intrinsic. I offer an argu- 
ment that no analysis is possible in purely modal terms (section 2.2.1); and 
discuss a counterexample to an analysis in terms of modality and naturalness 
(section 2.2.2). This counterexample was first described in a paper by myself 
and Dan Marshall, which is reproduced as appendix D. Finally, I conclude 
that it is not problematic to regard intrinsic as unanalysable (section 2.2.3). 
Chapter 3: Parts and wholes 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the type of mereology, or metaphys- 
ical theory of the part -whole relation, that I will be relying on in arguments 
in later chapters. This is the so- called "classical" mereology of Goodman and 
Leonard, described in section 3.1. 
I also defend a certain attitude to mereology, which I call "mereological real- 
ism" (section 3.2). Assuming mereological realism, I defend the controversial 
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features of classical mereology (section 3.3). I discuss an alternative way of 
defending classical mereology, which I do not think works (section 3.4). 
Finally, I discuss some mereological and quasi -mereological proposals con- 
cerning atomism that are left undecided by classical mereology (section 3.5). 
Among these is the doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts, or DAUP. I reject 
DAUP, but not for the usual reasons, which turn on a rejection of classi- 
cal mereology. In fact DAUP is independent of classical mereology (section 
3.5.3). 
Part II: Theories of Persistence 
In this part I discuss three theories of persistence. Each theory has its own 
chapter, and the chapters all have a similar structure: they are broken into 
the following sections: 
The Theory: contains a concise statement of the theory under dis- 
cussion in each chapter. 
Arguments: contains positive arguments for that theory. 
Problems: contains problems specific to the theory under considera- 
tion. 
Replies: contains replies to the positive arguments of previous chap- 
ters; or to problems from previous chapters. 
Variants: contains discussion of variants on the theory under consid- 
eration; often these will be motivated by the need to reply to arguments 
considered under "Problems" . 
Chapter 4: Perdurantism 
This chapter discusses perdurantism, or the temporal parts theory of persis- 
tence. There are three main types of argument for it: arguments from an 
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analogy between space and time particularly between extension in space, 
and persistence through time (section 4.2.1); arguments concerning the possi- 
bility of intrinsic change (section 4.2.2); and an argument from the possibility 
of a scenario very like perdura.nce - the sucessive creation and annihilation 
argument (section 4.2.3). 
T consider three problems for perdurantism. The first is not really a problem, 
but more of a clarification - perdurantism is often confused with another 
theory of persistence that is really more closely related to presentism (section 
4.3.1). This theory itself is discussed later, in section 6.5.2. The second 
is a problem about the strange scattered objects that a perdurantist who 
also accepts classical mereology is committed to (section 4.3.2). The third 
problem is the `problem of the many' - the problem that the perdurantist 
seems committed to many more ordinary objects than we ordinarily take 
there to be (section 4.3.3). 
I describe two variants on perdurantism. The first are those theories that 
consider perduring to be a necessary, but not sufficient condition of persisting, 
which I call "strong perdurantism" (section 4.4.1). The second concerns the 
issue of whether a perdurantist should believe that there are instantaneous 
temporal parts (section 4.4.2). 
Chapter 5: Endurantism 
This chapter discusses endurantism, or the multiple location theory of per- 
sistence. 
The positive arguments for endurantism are mostly reactive - they argue 
against perdurantism by claiming that perduring objects cannot change (sec- 
tion 5.3.1); or that, if it is possible to defuse the positive arguments for 
perdurantism, endurantism appears to be a reasonable generalisation of per- 
durantism (section 5.3.2). 
Both these arguments require that those positive arguments for perdurantism 
that appear to rule out the possibility of endurance be answered, and I survey 
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attempts to do that in section 5.2. I consider two replies to the argument 
from analogy: one which denies the analogy between space and time (section 
5.2.1), and one which denies that objects always extend through space in a 
manner analogous to perdurance (section 5.2.2). I consider three replies to 
the problem of change: a reply that involves indexing properties to times 
(section 5.2.3); my own version of this reply, which draws on my earlier 
comments about intrinsic properties in chapter 2 to show that the indexed 
properties may be intrinsic (section 5.2.4) this solution to the problem of 
change is discussed in more detail in appendix C; and a reply that involves 
`adverbial modification' (section 5.2.5). 
I discuss one outstanding problem for endurantism, to do with temporary 
parts (section 5.4.1); and a variant on endurantism that claims that some 
objects endure while others perdure (section 5.5.1). 
Chapter 6: Presentism 
This chapter discusses presentism, a metaphysical theory of time of which 
the most important part is the doctrine that there is only that which exists 
now - there is no past or future. Presentism also involves distinctive claims 
about tensed language (section 6.1.1) and about persistence (section 6.1.3). 
The main argument for presentism that is independent of its treatment of 
puzzles concerning persistence consists of a series of analogies that presentists 
draw between time and modality (section 6.3.1), and between aspects of the 
Ianguage of time, and modal language (sections 6.3.2 -6.3.3). Another part 
of the appeal of presentism is the simple answers it can give to the problems 
raised by arguments for perdurantism: the analogy with space (section 6.2.1) 
and the problem of change (section 6.2.2). 
But presentism has its own problems in reconstructing ordinary truths about 
the past and future. I consider these in section 6.4. Among them is a 
problem concerning truthmakers for past and future tense truths (section 
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6.4.4) which draws on my earlier comments about truthmakers in chapter 2, 
and in appendices A and B 
Finally, 1 argue that the presentist theory of persistence is really independent 
of the other parts of presentism by considering two variants on presentism. 
The first combines the presentist's doctrines about the unreality of the past 
and future with endurantism (section 6.5.1); the second combines the pre - 
sentist theory of persistence with realism about the past and future, and a 
temporal parts ontology (section 6.5.2). 
1.2 Textual Conventions 
Displayed propositions are given unique boldfaced numbers, like this: 
1 This is a displayed proposition. 
Sometimes a displayed proposition may he given a name instead, like this: 
Def< x <y -df (Vz)(zox7 zoy) 
Where I wish to enumerate a list for other purposes, I use circled numbers, 
like this: 
CD Just one thing, 
C?) and then another. 
These circled numbers are not unique, and will not be referred to in the text. 
Citations are given in author -date format, like this: (ARMSTRONG 1968). 
Full details for each cited work may be found in the bibliography. 
1.2 Textual Conventions 9 
I hope my usage of logical symbolism will be self -explanatory. The only 
points were it might not be is in chapter 3, where additional symbolism is 
introduced for formal mereological systems (this is explained in section 3.1), 
and in chapter 6, where P and F are used as sentential tense operators. 
These operators are always rendered in boldface to prevent confusion with 
predicate symbols. 
I use greek letters d, ç',... as schematic variables ranging over predicates. 
When naming properties, I sometimes abbreviate "the property of being 0" 
to "being 0" , where the latter are always rendered in italics. 
Double inverted commas ( " "), I use for mention and quotation; single invert- 
ed commas ( ") I use for nested quotation, and `scare quotes'. 
I use boldface to highlight technical terms and neologisms at the point that 
they are defined. Page references for these points can be found in the index. 
i-L
 0 
Chapter 2 
Intrinsic Properties 
2.1 Concepts of Intrinsicality 
Several of the arguments connected with perdurantism, especially the prob- 
lem of change (see section 4.2.2) involve the notion of an intrinsic property. 
Intuitively, a property is intrinsic if whether an object has it is dependent 
on how that object is, and not on how the object's surroundings are. An ex- 
trinsic property is one that is not intrinsic. Examples of intrinsic properties 
of those of being 6 feet tall and being made of stone. The properties of being 
10 km away from Canberra and being next to a tree are, on the other hand, 
extrinsic. 
It is extremely difficult to cash out this intuitive characterisation in a way 
that does not seem circular. To see why, notice that "how an object is" in the 
intuitive characterisation of intrinsic has to be understood as "how an object 
is, intrinsically" . Being next to a tree is a way that someone is, and, of course, 
whether someone has the extrinsic property being next to a tree is dependent 
on whether they are that way. The intuitive characterisation, then, does not 
suffice to distinguish, among say, sets of possible individuals, as to which 
correspond to intrinsic properties, and which do not. It does however seem 
to suffice to teach philosophically unsophisticated persons the meaning of the 
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term "intrinsic" and to enable them to make the usual judgements about the 
example properties given in the previous paragraph. 
There are a number of important concepts that I will refer to from time to 
time that are related to intrinsic /extrinsic. In this section, I'll briefly discuss 
them. In section 2.2 I discuss some attempts to analyse "intrinsic" in terms 
of other concepts. 
2.1.1 Local intrinsicality 
It is normally repeatable properties that are said to be intrinsic or extrinsic. 
However, people sometimes use the terms as verbs or adverbs, for example: 
"This lump of lead is intrinsically massive" or "The property of being such 
that someone is snub -nosed is intrinsic to Socrates, but extrinsic to Plato - 
Plato is such that someone is snub -nosed, but only extrinsically." 
When "intrinsic" is used in this way, we are talking about local intrinsical - 
ity. By comparison when we say "mass is an intrinsic property" or "being 
such that someone is snubnosed is an extrinsic property ", we are talking 
about global intrinsicality. (HUMBERSTONE 1996) 
We can also speak of an object's failing to have a property intrinsically. Plato 
extrinsically fails to have the property being such that noone is snub- nosed, 
while Socrates intrinsically fails to have it. 
For the sake of generality, I will say that a property 0 is intrinsic to an object 
x if either x intrinsically has 0, or x intrinsically fails to have ¢) 
. 
Similarly, 0 
is extrinsic to x if either x extrinsically has 0, or x extrinsically fails to have 
0. Note that in this usage, it does not follow from the fact that a property 
is intrinsic to an object that that object has that property. 
The local and global concepts of intrinsic are connected by the fact that the 
(global) intrinsic properties are all and only those that are (local) intrinsic 
to all possible objects. The analogous definition, however, does not hold 
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for extrinsic - some extrinsic properties (like being such that someone is 
snubnosed) are intrinsic to some objects, and extrinsic to others. So, the 
(global) extrinsic properties are all and only those that are (local) extrinsic 
to some possible object. 
2.1.2 Intrinsic* and extrinsic* properties 
What about the properties that are extrinsic to all possible objects? These 
are an elite group among the extrinsic properties, which I call the extrinsic* 
properties. A property is intrinsic* if it is not extrinsic *. The intrinsic* 
properties are also all and only those that are intrinsic to some possible 
object. 
Intuitively, extrinsic* properties are those that depend just on how the object 
that has them's surroundings are, and not on how that object itself is. 
Examples of extrinsic* properties include properties of the form of being an 
x such that something wholly distinct from x is snub -nosed and being 10 km 
from a capital city. The former of these two properties is often described (foI- 
lowing (LEWIS 1983A)) as being accompanied by something snub -nosed, a 
usage that I will follow. 
The set of intrinsic* properties include both properties that are intrinsic, and 
properties that are extrinsic (just as the set of extrinsic properties include 
both extrinsic* and intrinsic* properties). This may be made clearer by 
figure 2.1, which shows three properties: an intrinsic property, an extrinsic* 
property and a property that is extrinsic without being extrinsic *, together 
with the categories into which they fall. 
The category of intrinsic* is not a very useful one - it seems odd to group 
together properties that are intrinsic and those that are intrinsic to some 
instances and not others. But the distinction between extrinsic* properties 
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intrinsic - being 1 kg in mass 
being such that something is 1 kg 
extrinsic { being accompanied by something 1 kg 
} intrinsic* 
- extrinsic* 
Figure 2.1: Comparison between intrinsicality and intrinsicality* 
and merely extrinsic properties shows up an important piece of conceptu- 
al space that is missing from the straightforward global intrinsic /extrinsic 
distinction. 
Really we should think of the global intrinsic /extrinsic distinction as a three 
way distinction, between intrinsic properties, extrinsic* properties, and those 
properties that, intuitively speaking, can be realised in an intrinsic way, as 
well as in an extrinsic way. These last properties, which are extrinsic, but not 
extrinsic *, I call mongrel properties. This three -way distinction is displayed 
in figure 2.2. 
intrinsic - being 1 kg in mass 
mongrel - being such that something is 1 kg in mass 
extrinsic* - being accompanied by something 1 kg in mass 
Figure 2.2: Three -way global intrinsicality 
It is tempting to say that the mongrel properties are all disjunctive properties, 
disjoining some intrinsic property with some extrinsic* property. However, to 
say this would be to beg some important questions in the theory of properties, 
as it is not clear whether it is possible to distinguish between disjunctive and 
non -disjunctive properties in advance of a substantive ontological theories of 
properties (see appendix D for more on this point). 
Being a cube and accompanied by a cube is a difficult example. You might 
think that this is extrinsic* because it can only be had extrinsically. It can 
however, be lacked intrinsically - cubes intrinsically fail to have this prop- 
erty, and so it is a mongrel. Since this is an intuitively conjunctive mongrel, 
it is also a counterexample to the conjecture of the previous paragraph.' 
'If I were to define extrinsic* so that being a cube and accompanied by a cube came out 
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2.1.3 Truthmaking 
For any proposition, p, there is a property of being such that p is the case. If 
there is anything to which has that property intrinsically, I say that that thing 
makes p true (see appendices A and B). So, for example the proposition that 
Socrates is snub -nosed is made true by Socrates and not by Plato, because 
being such that Socrates is snub -nosed is intrinsic to Socrates, and not to 
Plato (though both have the property). 
It is slightly contentious to identify this relationship between things and 
propositions as truthmaking. Whether we call it that doesn't matter greatly 
for my present purposes. What I would call the truthmaker for a proposi- 
tion might instead, nncontentiously, be called the intrinsic ground of that 
proposition. 
2.1.4 Duplicates and natures 
An intrinsic duplicate of some object x is anything that is intrinsically just 
like x - that has all and only x's intrinsic properties. The definition can 
also go the other way: an intrinsic property is one that is shared between all 
possible intrinsic duplicates. 
Switching to talk of duplication is sometimes helpful in deciding whether a 
property is intuitively intrinsic. We might not know whether being either a 
cube or 1 kg in mass is intrinsic, but we can satisfy ourselves by thinking about 
whether, for each of the different kinds of things that have this property, any 
duplicate of those things must have it. 
Another reason that the definition in terms of intrinsic duplication is at- 
tractive is that recasting talk of intrinsic properties in terms of duplication 
allows us to satisfy nominalistic inclinations by eliminating quantification 
over properties. 
extrinsic *, extrinsic* would no longer be closed under boolean negation, which, given the 
intuitive characterisation of extrinsic* above, it ought to be. 
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The intrinsic nature of something is the property of being a duplicate of 
that thing; or of having all of its intrinsic properties. Again, intrinsic can 
be defined in terms of intrinsic nature: an intrinsic property is one that is 
conveyed by the nature of all of its possible instances. Here, conveyance 
is to properties what entailment is is propositions: a property 0 conveys 
another 0, iff all possible instances of 0 are also instances of 0. 
By way of analogy, we can also talk about an extrinsic* duplicate of x 
as something that shares all of x's extrinsic* properties, and the extrinsic* 
nature of x as the property of being an extrinsic* duplicate of .z. For 
reasons of brevity, however, when I speak of a duplicate x, or of the nature 
of x, I'll mean an intrinsic duplicate, and the intrinsic nature, respectively. 
It is possible to define local intrinsicality in terms of duplication. The defi- 
nition is: x has 0 intrinsically iff every possible duplicate of x has 0. x fails 
to have 0 intrinsically iff every possible duplicate of .r. fails to have 0. As 
before, 0 is intrinsic to x iff x either has 0 intrinsically, or fails to have 0 
intrinsically. 
Since duplication is definable in terms of global intrinsicality - in terms 
of which properties are intrinsic - and we have already seen that global 
intrinsicality is definable in terms of local intrinsicality, this shows that local 
and global intrinsicality are interdefinable, via duplication (as shown in figure 
2.3). 
2.1.5 Intrinsicality and logic 
It is intuitively plausible that the set of intrinsic properties is closed under 
all Boolean operations - that is, the following conditions hold: 
If 0 and are intrinsic, then being either 0 or 0 is intrinsic. 
if 0 and 0 are intrinsic, then being both 0 and z(i is intrinsic. 
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Global 
Intrinsicality 
Local Intrinsicality 
Duplication 
Figure 2.3: Interdefinition of global and local intrinsicality 
If 0 is intrinsic, then being not 0 is intrinsic. 
For example, being either cubical or massive is intrinsic because being cubical 
and being massive are both intrinsic. 
The same seems to be true for extrinsic* properties: 
If 0 and 0 are extrinsic *, then being either 0 or 0 is extrinsic *. 
If 0 and 0 are extrinsic *, then being both 0 and zG is extrinsic *. 
If 0 is extrinsic *, then being not 0 is extrinsic *. 
Conveniently, these results follow from the characterisation of intrinsic in 
terms of intrinsic duplication (and of extrinsic* in terms of extrinsic* dupli- 
cation) given above. 
There is a problem, or rather, an exception to these principles, though. If 
properties are individuated extensionally, so that there is precisely one prop- 
erty for each set of objects, then there is a single property, the ubiquitous 
property which is instantiated by every object, and another, the empty 
property which is instantiated by none. These can both be expressed as 
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boolean combinations of intrinsic properties, as well as boolean combinations 
of extrinsic* properties. 
For example, the ubiquitous property is the property of being both a cube 
and a non -cube, but also the property of being both accompanied by, and 
unaccompanied by, a cube. The empty property is both the property of 
being either a cube and a non -cube, and being either accompanied by, or 
unaccompanied by, a cube. 
Since intuition seems silent on the status of these properties, I think it fair 
to regard them as neither intrinsic nor extrinsic. 
2.1 .6 Relational and non -relational properties 
Intrinsic properties are often contrasted with relational properties, but this 
is a mistake. The label "relational" should reserved for properties that, as 
it were, ascribe a relation between the thing that has the property, and 
something. For example, being 10 km from a capital city is a relational 
property.2 
Not all relational properties are intuitively extrinsic. Take the property of 
having a nose for example. Apply the duplication test: must any duplicate 
of me have a nose? The answer seems to be yes. Anything that didn't have 
a nose would be unlike me in several intrinsic respects. But having a nose is, 
plausibly, a matter of bearing a certain relation, the part -whole relation, to 
some other thing, namely, a nose. So having a nose is an intrinsic relational 
property, If duplication is a relation in the relevant sense, it also provides 
examples of intrinsic relational properties. Being a duplicate of me would be 
one such. 
There can also be extrinsic non- relational properties. Being such that there 
are no unicorns is an extrinsic property (if you doubt this, note that, had 
2The word "ascribe" may seem inapposite here; however, it is hard to find a substitute 
that does not lead to problems - see below. 
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there been unicorns, there could have been a duplicate of me that lacks this 
property) - but it does not involve my being related to anything. 
intrinsic extrinsic 
non -relational being 5 kg in mass being such that there are 
no unicorns 
relational having a nose being 10 km from a capital 
city 
Figure 2.4: The orthogonality of relational and intrinsic 
Relational and intrinsic are thus completely orthogonal, as shown in figure 
2.4. It is a mistake indeed to conflate intrinsic with non -relational properties 
or extrinsic with relational ones. 
I have thus far been assuming the intuitive characterisation of "relational" 
which I stated above, and have depended for my argument on examples of re- 
lational properties that strike most people as intuitively relational. However, 
the definition is problematic. 
An initial problem concerns the word "ascribe ". What is it for a property to 
"ascribe a relation between the thing that has the property, and somethingJ9. 
We could cash this out modally: a property .0 is relational iff there is a relation 
i/ and an individual x such that all possible instances of fi hear 1p to x. 
But this will not do, as it is painfuIIy dependent on how many relations 
there are. If there are as many dyadic relations as there are sets of ordered 
pairs of individuals, for example, then every property is relational. Take any 
property ¢: any relation corresponding to a set of ordered pairs where the 
set of all the first members of the pairs has the extension of 0 as a subset 
will satisfy our condition. Of course there is such a set of ordered pairs 
for any property you care to mention (subject to nominalistic worries about 
the ontology of mathematics) - so if we think of relations this way, every 
property is relational. 
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On the other hand, suppose there are only those relations that correspond to 
the fundamental polyadic predicates of completed physics. In that case, it is 
unlikely that any of the properties that we are acquainted with are relational. 
There may be other proposals about the individuation of relations that more - 
or -less satisfy our intuitions about which properties are relational, but in any 
case the dependence of the distinction on such highly theoretical concerns 
gives us grounds for scepticism. It is unlikely that our pre- theoretic judge- 
ments of properties as relational or non -relational could be sensitive to the 
one true ontological theory of relations. 
It seems to me that what our intuitive judgements of relationality are tracking 
is not to do with properties, but to do with the concepts and predicates that 
express them. It is an easy matter to say what it is for a predicate to "ascribe 
a relation": a relational predicate is simply a monadic predicate that includes 
a polyadic predicate as a part. So, "is identical to some chair" is relational, 
because it contains the dyadic predicate "is identical to "; while "is heavy" is 
non -relational because it contains no polyadic predicate. If concepts can be 
thought of as predicates in a language of thought, then the same criteria will 
apply to them. 
You may have some lingering desire to say that "is heavy" is relational. There 
are, I think, two reasons for this. First, heaviness is extrinsic, and it is com- 
mon to conflate extrinsicality and relationality. But, as I have shown above, 
that is a mistake, even on the assumption which I deny, that relationality is 
a feature of properties rather than predicates. 
Second, ordinary language has a tendency to speak as if the world were 
language -like in structure. That is why it is so natural to us to reify properties 
corresponding to every predicate of ordinary language, and to call properties 
conjunctive, disjunctive, negative, relational, and so on. But in this, I take 
it, ordinary language is mistaken. It is just that mistake that we make both 
when we conflate the intrinsic / extrinsic distinction with the relational / non - 
relational one, and when we think of relationality as a feature of properties 
at all. 
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In the following, I will sometimes write of relational properties. This is 
simply to improve readability, and to secure terminological agreement with 
other authors. Since I believe that there is no difference between relational 
and non -relational properties, in every such case, the word "relational" may 
be deleted without harm. 
2.1.7 Pure and impure properties 
An impure property is one that, intuitively speaking, makes mention of 
some particular individual, while a pure property is one that is not impure. 
(KHAMARA 1988) (HUMBERSTONE 1996) 
More precisely, a property 0 is impure iff there is some individual r, such 
that, either it is impossible that something be 0 and r not exist, or, it is 
impossible that something be 0 and r exist. To put this another way, iff ql 
is impure, "¢y" will always entail "r exists" or its negation. For example, 
being Howard, having Howard's nose, and being such that Howard does not 
exist are all distinct impure properties. Being prime minster, having a prime 
minister's nose and being such that noone is prime minister, on the other 
hand, are pure. 
Intuitively, the distinctions between intrinsic and extrinsic (and even intrin- 
sic* and extrinsic *) seem to apply to impure properties. Being Howard and 
having Howard's nose seem intrinsic, while being such that Howard exists is 
extrinsic (but not extrinsic *), and being accompanied by Howard is extrinsic *. 
Admitting such properties to our existing taxonomy causes problems, how- 
ever. A duplicate of Howard need not be Howard, so being Howard is not 
necessarily shared between duplicates. Nor need a duplicate of Howard have 
Howard's own nose - he might instead have a intrinsic duplicate of Howard's 
nose. Using our existing techniques, it seems that all impure properties come 
out extrinsic. This has led some people to doubt the connection between du- 
plication and intrinsicality that I described earlier. 
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Such radical measures are, I hope, not necessary. One way of patching the 
problem is simply to deny that the intrinsic / extrinsic distinction applies 
to pure properties; or to deny that it applies in the same way as to pure 
ones. Another is to distinguish between mere intrinsic duplicates, and intrin- 
sic super -duplicates, where a super- duplicate of x is an object that shares not 
only all of x's pure intrinsic properties, but also x's impure intrinsic prop- 
erties. It suffices to consider only duplicates when deciding whether a pure 
property is intrinsic, but to test whether an impure property is intrinsic, we 
need to use super -duplicates instead. 
A problem with this idea is that among x's impure properties is the property 
of being x, so that it would appear that each thing can have only one super - 
duplicate: itself. This is not yet a killer problem, but it forces us to beg 
some contentious questions in the philosophy of modality. The definition 
of intrinsic in terms of duplication involved possibilist quantification: an 
intrinsic property is one that is shared between all possible duplicates. The 
super -duplication proposal can only work if the domain of quantification here 
contains objects that exist at more than one possible world, so that objects 
that have different extrinsic properties from those actually had by x can 
nonetheless have the property being z. Otherwise extrinsic properties will be 
shared between super -duplicates, and will count as intrinsic. 
On the alternative view about modality, that that possible objects each exist 
at only one world, we need to say something else. On this view, it is usual 
to talk about objects' counterparts at other possible worlds. But if we are 
going to do that, we need to be careful to distinguish being Howard from 
being a counterpart of Howard. The actual extension of these properties is 
the same, so it is easy to get them confused. 
Consider the transformation that maps being Howard to being a counter- 
part of Howard, having Howard's nose to having the nose of a counterpart 
of Howard, and being such that Howard exists to being such that a counter- 
part of Howard exists. Let us call this transformation counterpartisation. 
An impure property that only makes reference to particular objects to say 
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something about their counterparts, we will call counterpartised. 
If we restricted ourselves to counterpartised properties, it is easy to get the 
super -duplication proposal to work. A super -duplicate of x is an object that 
shares all and only the properties of x that are either pure and intrinsic, or 
counterpartised and intrinsic. There is no problem with treating counterpar- 
tised impure properties just as if they were pure properties. 
Indeed, on some accounts of the counterpart relation, the counterpartised 
properties will turn out to be extensionally equivalent to pure properties. 
For example, if the counterpart relation is any kind of qualitative similarity 
relation, the counterpartised properties would be the same as pure properties 
that replace "counterpart of x" with a specification of the pure properties of 
r that an object must have in order to qualify as a counterpart of x. 
Of the remaining impure properties, the counterpart theorist should say that 
they are like the ubiquitous property and the empty property: neither in- 
trinsic nor extrinsic. 
Another problem concerns the status of properties such as being Howard or 
Clark. Intuitively speaking, this property "makes mention of" a particular 
individual (of two such individuals, in fact). However, on the precisified 
definition given above, it will not come out impure. This is because there 
is no one individual that must exist (or fail to exist) if anything has the 
property. Rather, there are two individuals, that one of which must exist if 
anything has the property. 
A corollary of this is that the impure properties, on the precisified definition 
above, are not closed under disjunction, as intuitively they ought to be. 
We might try re- writing the definition in order to deal with this. This is, 
however, problematic. If we are allowed to freely disjoin impure properties, 
then there is an impure property that is co- extensional with every pure prop- 
erty (if the extension of the pure property is {Charlie, Sharon, Shane, or... }, 
then the problematic impure property is the property of being Charlie, or 
Sharon, or Shane, or...). 
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Naturally, this wreaks havoc with theories that individuate properties exten- 
sionally. Since I don't wish to foreclose against those theories, I won't try to 
solve this problem. 
2.1.8 Internal / external relations 
An internal relation, in my usage, is one that supervenes on the intrinsic 
nature of its relata. An external relation is one that is not internal. 
An alternative usage due to G.E. Moore, connects internal relations, not with 
intrinsicality, but with essentiality. In the Moorean usage, "a relation is said 
to be external if it need not relate the entities it does relate" (KIM AND 
SOSA 1995, p. 246). I regard this usage as illegitimate since it appears to 
have its origins in a confusion between intrinsic and essential properties - 
Moore moves from one usage to another by assuming that an object cannot 
fail to have its intrinsic properties (MOORE 1959). 
Resemblance, and the various kinds of resemblance -in -a- respect (e. g. resem- 
blance in the respect of colour, or in the respect of shape) are the paradig- 
matic internal relations: if my banana bears the same - colour relation to your 
lemon, it is in virtue of the fact that my banana is yellow and your lemon 
is yellow. Another common example of internal relations are comparative 
relations, such as being larger than. To use what Keith Campbell calls "the 
intuitive picture of divine creation: if God makes an island A with so much 
rock, soil, etc. as to amount to 20 hectares, and subsequently, an island B 
of 15 hectares extent, there is nothing more needing to be done to make A 
larger than B." (CAMPBELL 1990, p. 103) 
The best known examples of external relations are spatio -temporal relations. 
If I am 5 meters from you, that is not in virtue of any intrinsic properties 
that you or I have. Another, less well -discussed type of external relation 
is typified by the relation of being equally well thought of by our mutual 
friends. The fact that you and I bear that relation to one another does not 
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entail anything about our intrinsic properties all that is required is that 
some other persons (our friends) have certain properties. 
2.1.9 Intrinsic relations 
Among the external relations, we may distinguish two kinds. The intrinsic 
relations supervene on the nature of their relata, as it were, taken as a 
whole, and not on the surroundings of that whole. The extrinsic relations, 
on the other hand, are in some way dependent on something that is wholly 
distinct from all of its relata. 
For example, being 5 meters away from is an intrinsic relation. It does not 
supervene on the respective natures of its relata, but, it is often claimed, it 
does supervene on the nature of whole of them taken together (and usually 
identified with the mereological fusion of them, see section 3.1). Being equally 
well thought of by our mutual friends is an extrinsic relation - whether you 
bear it to me depends not on how we are, but on how our friends think of 
us. 
The internal relations are usually included with the intrinsic relations, so 
that every relation is either intrinsic or extrinsic. As we saw with extrinsic* 
relations, really what we have here is a three -way distinction, as displayed in 
figure 2.5:3 
Often, it is said that an intrinsic relation supervenes on the intrinsic nature of 
its relata, together with the perfectly natural relations holding between them 
(MENZiES 1996, p. 99 -100). This definition, however, assumes two elements 
3This distinction among external relations is not the extrinsic* / mongrel distinction 
recapitulated, however. The extrinsic* relations, analogously to extrinsic* properties, are 
a proper subset of the extrinsic relations that supervene only on the intrinsic nature of 
things wholly distinct from all of their relata. The example already given, being equally 
well thought of by our mutual friends, is an extrinsic* relation, while being closer to the 
local pub than to is a mongrel. 
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internal - 
external { 
being the same mass as 
being 5 meters away from 
being equally well thought of by our 
mutual friends 
} intrinsic 
- extrinsic 
Figure 2.5: Comparison between intrinsicality and internality 
of a particular theory of intrinsic properties, namely that 1) all perfectly 
natural properties or relations are intrinsic and 2) all intrinsic properties and 
relations supervene on the perfectly natural properties and relations. 
There are comparatively few intrinsic relations. Those usually cited are 
spatio -temporal relations; and sometimes, according to some non -Humean 
theories of causation, the causal relation (MaNzrEs 1996, p. 98). 
2.2 Analysing "Intrinsic" 
In the foregoing sections, I have restricted myself to making claims that are 
either uncontentiously part of the intuitive notion of "intrinsic" that is in 
use in metaphyusical circles, or definable in terms of "intrinsic" together 
with neutral logical machinery such as the concept of supervenience. 
Is it possible to do more? It would be nice to analyse "intrinsic" in terms 
of better understood metaphysical theories - in modal terms, for example. 
G.E. Moore once proposed that the test of whether a thing is intrinsically 
valuable should be whether that thing would be valuable even if nothing else 
existed. Gold is certainly a valuable commodity -- but it is not intrinsically 
valuable on Moore's test because there is nothing good about gold nuggets 
floating in the void. Moore's test is a modal one because in order to decide 
whether a value (or, more generally, a property of any kind) is intrinsic, we 
have to evaluate a certain counterfactual conditional: "Were there gold, but 
nothing else in the world, would gold be valuable ?" 
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2.2.1 Modal analyses 
Variants on Moore's test have a long history of counterexamples (LEWIS 
1983A) (LANGTON AND LEWIS 1998) (MARSHALL AND PARSONS 2001). 
Rather than recapitulate them here, I offer an argument that no modal anal- 
ysis of "intrinsic" is possible. 
Imagine a god who is omniscient with regard to all modal and logical matters 
of fact - of which possible objects there are, which are in each possible 
world, which worlds are accessible to each other and so on - but ignorant 
with regard to all else. This god is acquainted with the extensions of the 
properties being a positron and being an electron, and knows, for example, 
that these sets are disjoint. But he does not know which set is the extension 
of which property, or equivalently, which things are positrons and which are 
electrons, because that is not a modal or logical matter of fact. 
This shows, unexcitingly, that the positron /electron distinction is not defin- 
able in modal terms, because the god is ignorant of it. What I am going to 
show now is that the god is ignorant of the distinction between two proper- 
ties, one of which is intrinsic, and the other extrinsic. That is, though the 
god is acquainted with the extensions of these properties, he does not know 
which extension belongs to which property, because that would require him 
to have knowledge of which objects are positrons and which electrons. 
There is a possible electron that is the only thing that exists at its world - 
it is, as I will say, lonely. Call that electron el. And there is also a possible 
lonely positron; call it pi. The only difference between el and pi is that one 
is a positron, and the other an electron. So there is no difference between 
them that is knowable to the god. Imagine the set E, containing all the 
electrons, and the set, E* that contains all electrons except el, and contains 
pi, and nothing else. The god should be unable to distinguish E from E *. 
If he could distinguish them, then he would be able to distinguish el and pi, 
because el is in E, but not E *, and pi is in E* but not E. And if el and pi 
were distinguishable to the god, then he would be able to tell the difference 
between positrons and electrons, which is no matter of merely modal fact. 
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Now E is the extension of the property being an electron, which, we may 
assume, is intrinsic. E* is the extension of being either an accompanied 
electron, or a lonely positron, which, intuitively, is extrinsic. If the god could 
tell the difference between the extension of an intrinsic property and that 
of an extrinsic one, then he would know of a difference between E and E *, 
which, as we have seen, he does not. All that the god knows about properties 
is their extensions. So the god cannot tell the difference between intrinsic 
and extrinsic properties. 
Since the god is omniscient with regard to all modal and logical matters 
of fact, it follows that modality and logic alone do not suffice to analyse 
"intrinsic ". If they did, then they would suffice to analyse "electron ", which 
would be absurd. 
2.2.2 Analyses involving naturalness 
Another tradition, mostly carried out by David Lewis, attempts to analyse 
"intrinsic" with the resources of a theory of natural properties. (LEWIS 
1983B, pp. 25 29) (LEWIS 1986, p. 62) (SIDER 1996B) 
The Lewis analysis 
Lewis claims that 
there exists a class of perfectly natural properties, which 
are all intrinsic, and 
serve as a supervenience basis for all the intrinsic properties. 
With these claims Lewis is able to define duplication and then intrìnsicality. 
Two things are duplicates iff they have exactly the same perfectly natural 
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properties, and, their parts can be put into correspondence in such a way 
that corresponding parts have exactly the same perfectly natural properties, 
and stand in the same perfectly natural relations. 
Lewis's three claims, however, may seem controversial. Perhaps there are no 
perfectly natural properties, or perfectly fundamental objects, but ever more 
levels of being waiting to be discovered `turtles all the way down'. If this 
were the case, all that we could say would be that the property of being an 
up quark is more natural than being a proton, and whatever properties of 
even finer grained matter turn out to be responsible for some object's being 
an up quark would be more natural yet, but none of these properties is the 
most natural. 
Or perhaps there might be extrinsic perfectly natural properties, or intrinsic 
properties that do not supervene on the perfectly natural ones. It is hard to 
imagine what sorts of properties either could be, but it does not seem to be 
part of the concept of intrinsic that there are none (more likely, it is part of 
the concept of a natural property). 
The Langton /Lewis analysis 
A different analysis in this tradition, by Rae Langton and David Lewis, offers 
to deal with the first of these problems, and at the same time, accomodate 
the ideas that attracted people to the Moorean test. Their key idea, drawing 
on earlier work by Jaegwon Kim, was that an intrinsic property is one that 
is independent of accompaniment, which is to say that P is intrinsic iff the 
following four conditions are all met: 
O It is possible for a lonely object to have P. 
© It is possible for an accompanied object to have P. 
® It is possible for a lonely object to lack P. 
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® It is possible for an accompanied object to lack P. 
This works very nicely for the obvious examples. It works for being cubical, 
being 50 km from a capital city, and being lonely (intrinsic, extrinsic, extrin- 
sic, respectively). But it doesn't work for every property. Langton and Lewis 
note that disjunctive properties cause trouble: they give the example of being 
cubical and lonely, or else non - cubical and accompanied. This property is in- 
dependent of accompaniment, but intuitively is extrinsic. Other disjunctive 
properties are intuitively intrinsic (the property of being cubical or spherical, 
for example), so a new test must be prescribed for them. 
And that is, indeed, what Langton and Lewis do: they call the intrinsic prop- 
erties that are not disjunctive "basic intrinsic ", and apply the independent 
of accompaniment test to them. So, a property is basic intrinsic iff it is: 
not a disjunctive property, and, 
not the negation of a disjunctive property, and, 
independent of accompaniment 
They then define the relation of intrinsic duplication as the relation that holds 
between two objects iff they share all their basic intrinsic properties, and an 
intrinsic property as one that can never differ between intrinsic duplicates 
(actual or possible). Equivalently, one could say that an intrinsic property is 
one that supervenes on the basic intrinsic properties of its object. Intrinsic 
in this sense is applicable to even disjunctive properties. 
The Marshall /Parsons counterexample 
In (MARSHALL AND PARSONS 2001) (reproduced as appendix D), Dan Mar- 
shall and I described a counterexample to the Langton /Lewis analysis. Our 
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counterexample was the property being such that there is a cube (on the as- 
sumption that being a cube is intrinsic). Or, strictly speaking, it is the family 
of such properties of being such that there is something that is 0, where 0 
is an intrinsic property; also relational- seeming properties that convey these 
properties, such as being within 5 meters of a cube. 
Our complaint was two -fold. First, that the Langton /Lewis analysis might 
well mis- identify these properties as intrinsic, when, intuitively, they are 
extrinsic. The problem properties are, nevertheless, independent of accom- 
paniment. All the required possibilities are there, realised by the following 
possible worlds (for the original example of a problematic property): 
O A world containing nothing but two cubes. 
O A world containing nothing but one cube. 
2 A world containing nothing but two non -cubes. 
® A world containing nothing but one non -cube. 
Because of this, if the problematic property is not to be a straight counterex- 
ample to Langton and Lewis, then it must be disjunctive, or the negation of 
a disjunctive property. We thought that it was neither, even by the lights of 
Langton and Lewis's own theory. For the problem property to be disjunc- 
tive, according to the Langton /Lewis analysis, it must be less natural than 
its own disjuncts. These disjuncts could either of the following pairs: 
being a cube or being accompanied by a cube 
being a cube or being a non -cube accompanied by a cube4 
4The first of these pairs are the "disjuncts" we assumed in (MARSHALL AND PARSONS 
2001); the second are an alternative suggested by ( LANGTON AND LEWIS 2001) which 
they say are "worse" than ours. 
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On the Langton /Lewis analysis, both of the disjuncts of one of these pairs 
must be more natural than the problem property. We granted that being a 
cube is, but saw no reason to suppose that either being accompanied by a 
cube or being a non -cube accompanied by a cube are any more natural than 
being such that there is a cube. 
In a reply to our paper, Langton and Lewis reported that they have an 
intuition to the effect that both being accompanied by a cube and (worse, they 
say) being a non -cube accompanied by a cube are more natural than being such 
that there is a cube. (LANGTON AND LEWIS 2001) So, a stalemate has been 
reached with regard to our first complaint. If all we had to go on, in deciding 
the facts of relative naturalness, were the brute intuitions of philosophers, it 
would be our word against theirs. 
This brings us to the second complaint. Marshall and I also argued that the 
types of theory of naturalness of properties that are advanced to explain the 
brute intuitions of philosophers do not predict the intuitions that Langton 
and Lewis now report. For that reason we concluded that "Tf the Lang- 
ton /Lewis analysis of "intrinsic" is to resist our counterexample, it will need 
supplementation with a theory of naturalness that is, as yet, unarticulated." 
(MARSHALL AND PARSONS 2001, final paragraph) 
The best way to adjudicate between the Langton /Lewis intuitions and ours 
is to consult theories of naturalness. But there is no developed theory of 
relative naturalness, in the way that there are highly developed theories of 
absolute naturalness, such those of D.M. Armstrong (ARMSTRONG 1978B), 
Barry Taylor (TAYLOR 1993), or Lewis himself ( LEWIS 1983E). These 
are the theories that we concluded would not predict the facts of relative 
naturalness that Langton and Lewis need. So our conclusion still stands. 
2.2.3 Why do we need an analysis? 
For the reasons given above, it seems that intrinsìcality is unanalysable; or 
at least, it is not possible to give an enlightening analysis an analysis that 
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doesn't feel circular in the way that analysis in terms of duplication or local 
intrinsicality does (see sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.4). Should we be worried? 
The only way to answer this, I think, is to compare the metaphysical theory 
of intrinsicality to other areas in which metaphysicians have attempted to 
employ analysis. Take, for example, the analysis of mental states typified 
by analytic behaviourism, and its successor analytic functionalism. These 
analyses are designed to answer the challenge of dualism: the several ways 
in which our experience of ourselves as objects with mental states seems 
incompatible with physicalism. Analytic behaviourists and functionalists 
want to show that there is no such incompatibility by showing how mental 
states can he analysed in physical terms. The analysis of mental states is 
a way of establishing reductionism about mental states, in order to protect 
physicalism from refutation. 
In contrast, neither physicalism, nor any other comparable doctrine is up for 
grabs in the debate over the analysis of "intrinsic" . So far as I know, no -one 
in the literature has made explicit why we might prefer reductionism rather 
than anti -reductionism about intrinsicality to be true, or vice versa. I can't 
think of any reasons for preferring one doctrine over the other, and in view 
of the lack of success of analysis, I take anti- reductionism about intrinsicality 
as a working hypothesis. It is simply a brute fact about some properties that 
they are intrinsic (or, more nominalistically, about some pairs of objects that 
they are duplicates). 
How we discovered that weight is extrinsic 
From time to time, we discover these brute facts. This seems to have hap - 
penned about the time of transition from Aristotelean physics to Newtonian. 
It is fair to describe Aristotelean physics as endorsing the doctrine that weight 
is an intrinsic property. Aristotle and his followers explained the motion of 
inanimate matter in terms of weight. Earth is heavy, and so tends to move 
towards the center of the universe (i.e. to fall). Water is also heavy, though 
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less heavy than earth, and will move towards the center, insofar as its path is 
not blocked by earth. Fire and air, on the other hand, are light (if Aristotle's 
physics had been more mathematical, he would have said they had negative 
weight) and move away from the center of the universe. (TORRETTI 1999, 
pp. 8 -13) 
According to Aristotelean physics, the lightness or heaviness of a lump of 
matter depends only on its constitution - the relative amounts of the basic 
elements contained in it, and not on anything else. Not, for example, on 
how far it is from the center of the universe, or what type of matter is there 
already. 
By contrast, the Newtonian concept of weight as the force due to gravity 
is extrinsic. It depends not only on the intrinsic mass of an object, but 
also on the mass of the Earth (I am thinking here of Newtonian weight as 
weight -on- Earth) .5 
It is tempting to say "Aristotelean weight is intrinsic, Newtonia.n weight is 
extrinsic ". We should be careful: I have thus far been assuming that intrin- 
sicality is a feature of properties. If we carry on with that assumption, to 
say "Aristotelean weight is intrinsic" would require that Aristotelean weight 
be a property. But there is no such property - Aristotelean physics was 
false. What we should say instead of "Aristotelean weight is intrinsic" is 
"according to Aristotelean physics, weight is intrinsic ". 
Part of what went on, therefore, when Newtonian physics displaced Aristote- 
lean, is that natural philosophers stopped believing that weight was intrinsic, 
and came to believe that it was extrinsic. 
This probably happened in late medieval times. In a 14th Century thought 
experiment due to Albert of Saxony, an object falls into a hole that penetrates 
right through the center of the earth. According to Aristotle, this object 
5Subject to my doubts about the propriety of talking about relational properties (see 
section 2.1.6), Newtonian weight also appears to he relational, since having a weight seems 
to involve bearing a distance relation to Earth. 
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should accelerate towards the center, and then stop dead on reaching it. 
This seems strange to us, and to Albert, who thought that instead the object 
should zip past the center, slow down, and return. (TORRETTI 1999, p. 1On) 
Albert's suggestion requires the very un- Aristotelean idea that falling objects 
are being pulled towards the center of the universe, rather than moving there 
out of their own natural motion. From here it is only a small step to the 
idea that weight is not an intrinsic property, but rather the strength of that 
external pull. 
Scepticism about "intrinsic" 
There is one other advantage (other than establishing reductionism) to find- 
ing an analysis of intrinsic. This is to refute scepticism about intrinsicality 
- the view that there is no distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic prop- 
erties. For some reason, this seems to have been the orthodoxy in modern 
philosophy between about the time of Leibniz and the beginning of the 20th 
Century, in spite of the obviously counterintuitive results that it produced. 
A good example of this is the weird things that were said about change: 
Leibniz's view that a man in India undergoes a change when his wife dies in 
Europe (MATES 1986, p. 214), which was echoed as if it were obvious as 
late as McTaggart (MGTAGGART 1927, s. 309). 
There are thought to be reasonable arguments against the sceptic about 
modality (LEwis 1986, pp. 5 -20) and naturalness (ARMSTRONG 1978A) 
(ARMSTRONG 1978B) (LEWIS 1983B) - if we could analyse "intrinsic" 
in terms of modality and/or naturalness, we could recruit those arguments 
against the sceptic about intrinsicality. But scepticism about intrinsicality is 
in such bad shape, that it is no loss to be unable to appeal to that argument. 

Chapter 3 
Parts and Wholes 
Since one of the important theories of persistence involves claims about tem- 
poral parts (see chapter 4), and the important criticism of this theory call 
into question the tenability of this idea, it is helpful to review the background 
theory of parts that I will be dealing with. 
In this chapter, I will follow the traditional approach of exploring the part - 
whole relationship by discussing certain formal systems called "mereologies ". 
These formal systems are usually modeled after formal logics, with an addi- 
tional primitive predicate, and a number of additional axioms making use of 
that predicate. 
Among these systems, one has pre- eminence - this is the so- called classical 
mereology. Since I believe that classical mereology is, in a sense to be 
explained in section 3.3, the one true mereology, it is that system that I will 
describe. However, I'll also describe the features of classical mereology that 
some find doubtful, and explain why I accept them. 
Finally, I discuss some mereological and quasi -mereological proposals con- 
cerning atomism that are left undecided by classical mereology (section 3.5). 
Among these is the doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts, or DAUP. I reject 
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DAUP, but not for the usual reasons, which turn on a rejection of classi- 
cal mereology. In fact DAUP is independent of classical mereology (section 
3.5.3). 
3.1 Classical Axiomatic Mereology 
The language of mereology is usually borrowed from the first order predicate 
calculus, including the usual truth -functional logical connectives, quantifiers, 
and an identity predicate. To this is added a primitive predicate, usually 
either "<" or "o ", the intended interpretations of which are "is a part of" 
and "overlaps" (or, "has a part in common with "). Whichever is not taken 
as primitive can be defined in terms of the other:1 
Def, x< y=df (`z) (z o x D z o y) 
Def, x o y=df (3z)(z <.r, n z< y) 
Note that the definition of < in terms of o has the result that everything is 
a part of itself. This is intentional. There is a notion of parthood, called 
"proper parthood" that excludes things from being their own parts. Hence- 
forth, when I say "part" I'll always mean proper or improper part that is, 
the sense of parthood that is reflexive, that makes each thing its own part. 
Proper parthood is definable in terms of parthood: 
Def« x«y=dfx<yn y<x 
The definitions below are taken from (G000mAN 1951, pp.. 44 -46) and (SIMONS 
1987, p. 37). Strictly speaking, the formulae of classical mereology that I present are 
schemae: lower -case letters x, y,... are placeholders for individual denoting expressions, 
uppercase letters F, G, ... are placeholders for predicates. This usage makes many of the 
expressions easier to read, and also makes It possible to give an axiomatic basis for classical 
mereology without second order quantification (by making it possible to state formulae 
such as GSP, for example). 
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It will also be handy to have a symbol for two things being mereologically 
disjoint, or not sharing any common parts: 
Deft xly =df ^x0 
Our next definition is more than a convenience. It is the often contentious 
concept of mereological fusion, or summation. The summation operator, "a" 
is used in a similar way to the definite description operator, in terms of which 
it is defined: 
Defo (gx)(Fx) =df (Lx)(dy)(x o y (3z)(Fz A zo y)) 
Intuitively, the sum of the Fs is the whole that, taken together, the Fs exactly 
compose. So, for example, we can speak of the fusion of all the states and 
territories of Australia. We have another name for this fusion: Australia. 
The contentious issue about fusion is the question of whether (ax)(Fx) is 
well- defined for any non -empty predicate F. Is there a fusion of all the green 
things? All the grue things? Everything that is either one of the queen's 
earrings or the oldest rabbit in Australia? 
Though Def, does not presuppose any answer to these questions, Classical 
Mereology answers `yes" to all of them. That is, it affirms what Simons 
(1987) calls the General Sum Principle, or GSP: 
GSP Px)(Fx) D (3x)(dy)(x o y = (3z)(Fz A z o y)) 
We can make two more convenience definitions in terms of the fusion oper- 
ator. The first is binary fusion, " +" , x + y being the fusion of x and y; the 
second is mereological difference, " -" x - y being, intuitively, the part of x 
that remains after y is removed: 
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Deft x + y =df (o-z) (z < x V z < y) 
Def_ x-y=df (oz)(z <xnz2x) 
With all these definitions, the only axioms that need to be added to first 
order predicate logic with identity and definite descriptions in order to get 
Classical Mereology are: 
Asym x«yD -y«x 
Trans x«yny«zDx«z 
WSP x«y (3z)(z«yAzlx) 
GSP (3x)(Fx) D (3x)(b'y)(x o y = (3z)(Fz A z o y)) 
Asym and Trans ensure that the part -whole relation is asymetrical and transi- 
tive, respectively. WSP, the Weak Supplementation Principle, expresses 
a weak extensionality constraint: nothing can have precisely one proper part 
anything that has a proper part must, have another, disjoint from the first. 
Finally, there is the already mentioned General Sum Principle. 
3.2 The Project of Axiomatic Mereology 
fly itself, an axiomatic system such as that presented in 3.1 tells us nothing 
about the part -whole relation. We need to know how we should interpret it. 
Let us start with the idea that formulae of mereology are valid iff they are 
conceptual truths when interpreted so that < means the same as "is a part 
of ". This way of thinking, mereological analyticism, takes mereology to 
be a kind of conceptual analysis. 
Aside from general scepticism about the possibility or value of conceptual 
analysis, there are two problems with this idea. 
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3.2.1 Regimentation in mereology 
First, the conceptual analysis, if any, embodied by formal mereology is obvi- 
ously regimented in various ways. There are ordinary language counterexam- 
ples to the most basic theorems of classical mereology, if they are construed 
as a formalisation of ordinary usage. For example, from a list compiled by 
Nicholas Rescher: 
1. Many legimate uses of "part" are nonreflexive, and do not coun- 
tenance saying that a whole is a part (in the sense in question) of 
itself. The biologists' use of "part" for the functional sub -units of an 
organism are a case in point. 
2. There are various nontransitive senses of "part." In military 
usage, for example, persons can be parts of small units, and small 
units parts of larger ones; but persons are never parts of large units. 
Other examples are given by the various hierarchical uses of "part." 
A part (i.e., biological sub -unit) of a cell is not said to be a part of 
the organ of which that cell is a part. 
(RESCHER 1955, pp. 9-11) 
Little would remain of formal mereology if these types of criticism had to 
be accepted. That is not to say that they should be ignored. Rescher's 
counterexample (1) is best answered by pointing out that all mereologies 
have the resources for both a reflexive predicate (such as my <) and an 
anti- reflexive one (my «), between which ordinary language's "is part of" 
may be ambiguous. (2) is best answered by the suggestion that in ordinary 
language, quantification is often implicitly restricted to a sub -domain that is 
relevant to the topic at hand. When I say truly "All the students are here", 
I mean all the students in my tutorial, not all the students there are. The 
non -transitive ordinary uses of "part" are implicitly restricting quantification 
to parts of a certain kind. 
The force of Rescher's counterexamples is to show that formal mereology is 
trying to track something other than mere ordinary usage. 
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3.2.2 Ontological significance in mereology 
Second, mereology is taken to be ontologically significant in a way that no 
conceptual analysis can be. For example, it is a contestable, and often con- 
tested, consequence of classical mereology that there is a scattered object 
which has all of the Queen's earings, and the oldest rabbit in Australia as 
its parts.2 It is not just that "we would not say" that such an object exists 
- that type of objection can be answered by the same answer we gave to 
Rescher's doubts about transitivity. 
Objections to scattered objects have to he understood as ontological ob- 
jections, akin to nominalistic objections to properties, numbers, or classes. 
Otherwise it would he legitimate to respond to them as Nelson Goodman 
does: 
The usual objection [to GSPI is to name some two very different and 
widely seperated individuals and ask if it is reasonable to suppose 
that they have a sum which is an individual. Such an objection 
misses the point. If the Arctic Sea and a speck of dust in the Sahara 
are individuals, then their sum is an individual... The supposition 
that bizarre instances demonstrate that two individuals can fail to 
have a sum betrays a misunderstanding of the range of our variables. 
(GOODMAN 1951, p. 46) 
Goodman's response to the doubter of scattered objects is unsatisfying be- 
cause the objection was not that formal mereology has made a mistake about 
what falls under the concept of an individual - rather, it is that there might 
be no such things as the individuals in question.' 
2More precisely, the object I have in mind is the one that overlaps all and only those 
things that overlap either one of the earings or the rabbit. 
'That Goodman gives this response does not show that he does not take mereology 
"realistically" in the sense given below, Goodman appears to take the ontological com- 
mitments of mereology quite seriously - insofar as this is compatible with his relativism 
(see the quote given on page 45). 
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In order to make sense of this objection, and the fact that it is not han- 
dled as easily as Goodman makes out, we need to understand mereology as 
a substantive metaphysical theory, rather than a mere piece of conceptual 
analysis. 
To put this point another way, mereology is normally interpreted in a realistic 
way. In believing a certain mereological system to be the correct one, we are 
believing mereological realism with regard to it: that there is a domain of 
objects which satisfies the theorems of that mereology, when < is interpreted 
as "is part of ", in that phrase's most general sense, and when the quantifiers 
are taken to be unrestricted. 
3.3 Classicalism 
The mereological theory I believe is mereological realism with regard to clas- 
sical mereology, or as I will call it for short, classicalism.¢ Classicalism has 
two important features: extensionality and unrestricted composition, which 
I will now describe. 
3.3.1 Extensionality 
To put it intuitively, the extensionality of mereology lies in the fact that no 
two things can be made of the same parts. This seems to be an important 
truth. Suppose I have a collection of electronic parts that could be used 
entirely to make either a computer or a video recorder. If the parts would 
be entirely used up making either of these things, then I cannot make both 
a computer and a distinct video recorder (though perhaps I could make a 
single device that does the jobs of both). 
4I use the name "classicalism" rather than "classicism" because the name is derived 
from "classical mereology ", not "classic mereology. 
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To translate this into the formal language of mereology is non -trivial; how- 
ever, there are several theorems of classical mereology that come close to the 
idea. One of these is the axiom WSP (see section 3.1): 
WSP a: « yD(az)(z «,y n z i x) 
This says that nothing can have precisely one proper part; moreover, any- 
thing that has any proper parts at all has two disjoint proper parts. Perhaps 
I could build my computer into a video recorder by making it a proper part 
of the video recorder. But I can only do that by adding something else. 
I call this feature of classical mereology "vertical extensionality ". Vertical, 
because it concerns the relationship between relatively fundamental objects 
and their proper wholes. 
But this is not the only extensional feature of classical mereology. WSP 
leaves it open whether, supposing that I have built a computer out of a 
certain hunch of parts, there is not also a video recorder built out of those 
parts that is neither a proper part of the computer, nor has the computer as 
a proper part. The computer and the video recorder, perhaps, are two things 
that just have all the same proper parts. Something seems wrong with this 
scenario, and it is worth stating a formula of classical mereology that rules 
just this type of situation out: 
PPP (Pz)(z«x)n(Vz)(z«x z«y)) Dx<y 
This theorem, which Simons (1987, pp. 28 - -29) calls the Proper Parts 
Principle, or PPP, is a tidied up version of the principle that informal 
mereologists cite by saying "No two things have the same parts ". The tidying 
up that is required is, first, that "parts" must be understood as meaning 
"proper parts" in order to avoid triviality; and, second, that the principle 
only applies to complex objects, as all atoms have entirely the same proper 
parts, namely, none. 
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PPP is not an independent axiom of classical mereology, but follows from 
the much stronger, and independently controversial GSP (see section 3.3.2). 
PPP expresses what I call "horizontal extensionality ", because it concerns 
the relationship between things that are, as it were, competing for the same 
parts. 
A good way to explain the difference between horizontal and vertical exten- 
sionality is to contrast the part -whole relation with other types of compo- 
sition relation, for example, the relationships that hold between classes and 
their members, on the one hand, and ordered pairs (more, generally, ordered 
n- tuples) and their members on the other (figure 3.1). 
wholes classes n- tuples 
vertical extensionality X X 
horizontal extensionality X 
Figure 3.1: Comparison of vertical and horizontal extensionality 
Classes, like mereological wholes, are horizontally extensional, because there 
is only one class of any given collection of members. But the classes are not 
vertically extensional, because the singleton class of an individual is distinct 
from the individual; and the singleton class of that class is distinct from 
both. n- tuples, like classes, and unlike mereological wholes, are not vertically 
extensional: the pair (a, b) is distinct from the pair ((a, b), a). Unlike classes, 
however, they are also not horizontally extensional, as (a, b) is distinct from 
(b, a). 
Goodman seems to have described this distinction under the labels "exten- 
sionalism" (his name for my horizontal extensionality) and "nominalism." (his 
name for my vertical extensionality): 
[T]he relationship between nominalism and extensionalism... springs 
from a common aversion to the unwonted multiplication of entities. 
Extensionalism precludes the composition of more than one entity out 
46 Parts and Wholes 
of exactly the same entities by membership; nominalism goes further, 
precluding the composition of more than one entity out of the same 
entities by any chains of membership. For the extensionalist, two 
entities are identical if they break down into the same members; 
for the nominalist, two entities are identical if they break down in 
any way into the same entities. The extensionalist's restriction upon 
the generation of entities is a special case of the nominalist's more 
thoroughgoing restriction. (GoonMAN 1972, p. 159) 
However, this use of "nominalism" is non -standard, so I retain my usage. 
Also, Goodman's way of making the distinction assumes atomism: by "mem- 
bers" here, he means "atoms ". The principles WSP and PPP do not assume 
atomism, and it is to these that T tie the distinction. 
Objections 
Extensionality is often attacked on the grounds that it identifies objects that 
are in fact distinct. The distinctness, it is alleged, can be demonstrated by 
means of appealing to predicates that apply to one complex object, and not 
another, where these objects have all and only the same proper parts. 
The predicates involved come in two varieties, those containing either tense, 
or a specification of a time; and those containing a modal operator. These 
two types of predicates correspond to two types of argument against exten- 
sionality. I state each briefly here: 
Temporal argument against extensionality Consider the relationship 
between Josh and Josh's body (or to give it a proper name, Body). Josh and 
Body share all their proper parts. But at some time in the future, suppose, 
Josh's personality will be transferred into a robot body, in such a way that 
Josh will still exist, but Body will not. But that means we can say truly 
of Josh "... will be a robot ", while we cannot of Body. Since we cannot 
substitute "Josh" and "Body" in a seemingly transparent context within a 
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sentence without changing the truth value of that sentence, Josh and Body 
are not identical. 
Modal argument against extensionality Consider Josh and Body a- 
gain. This time suppose that Josh will not actually inhabit a robot body, 
but is given an opportunity to do so, which he turns down. We can say truly 
of Josh "... he might have been a robot" But we cannot of Body. Since 
we cannot substitute "Josh" and "Body" in a seemingly transparent context 
within a sentence without changing the truth value of that sentence, Josh 
and Body are not identical. 
The relationship between Josh and Body that makes these arguments possible 
is one that occurs in many contexts, so that it is possible to multiply these 
arguments indefinitely. The arguments can be run, for example, with persons 
and their bodies; social collectivities (i.e. associations, nations, classes, etc.) 
and their members (Cope 1984); artifacts such as statues and ships, and 
the material out of which they are made (GIBBARD 1975); properties and 
their extensions. This relationship is called "constitution" 
When we believe that one thing (like a body, or a collection of individuals) 
constitutes another (like a person, or an association) we are very apt to think, 
pre -theoretically, that both things share all the same parts, while nonetheless 
also wanting to hold that those things differ in tensed, time -indexed, or 
essential properties. 
It would be getting ahead of myself to reply immediately to these arguments 
- especially the temporal argument, a variant of which we will meet again 
in section 5.4.1. I will, however, say something about the arguments more 
generally. I would like to hold that constitution is identity. That is, if x 
constitutes y, then x is y. I believe this principally because no opposing view 
seems really tenable. If the doctrine that constitution is identity is defensible, 
then no constitution argument can threaten extensionality. Of course, the 
constitution arguments themselves attack the doctrine; but by themselves, 
they give us no rival account of constitution. 
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3.3.2 Unrestricted Composition 
Unrestricted composition is the feature of classical mereology enshrined in 
the axiom GSP: 
GSP (3x)(Fx) Px)(t1y)(x o y = (3z)(Ñ'z n z o y)) 
According to GSP, for any predicate P, if F is satified at all, there is some- 
thing that overlaps all and only those things that overlap the Fers. This 
thing is often known as the fusion, or sum of the Fers. GSP is sometimes 
stated with regard to sets, rather than predicates. It entails, as mentioned 
before, that there are such things as the sum of all the grue things, the sum 
of all the queen's earrings and the oldest rabbit in Australia, and so on. 
The plausibility of unrestricted composition is connected with the generality 
of mereological concepts. We do not often talk of the arbitrary sums men- 
tioned above because in the different contexts in which we use the part -whole 
concept, we are interested in various somewhat restricted types' of part. But 
according to mereological realism, mereology attempts to describe the reality 
which underlies part -whole talk in all contexts. 
There are many contexts in which we would like to talk about objects that 
in other contexts would seem strange, arbitrary, or scattered. To give an 
example, supposing we accept the doctrine that constitution is identity men- 
tioned in the previous section. If we do that, then we think of associations 
as sums of the individuals that make them up. There does not seem to be 
any metaphysically necessary limit to what collections of individual agents 
can make up an association, though of course not every such collection does 
make up an association. 
Should we think that when, as it were, a new association is formed - when 
its charter is signed, perhaps an entirely new material object has come 
into being? Surely not, I think. That object, which is the sum of those 
individuals was there all along, though it was not an association until that 
moment. 
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3.4 Partial Identity 
Donald Baxter and David Lewis have urged that mereological relations are a 
kind of identity relation (or, perhaps, are relevantly like identity) so that GSP 
is unproblematic. The idea is that, in talking about identity, we never doubt 
that if one thing exists, then anything identical to it exists too. Similarly for 
fusion: if two (or more) things exist, we should never doubt that their fusion 
exists. Thus Lewis writes: 
If Possum exists, then automatically something identical to Possum 
exists; likewise if Possum and Magpie exists, then automatically their 
fusion exists. Just as Possum needn't satisfy any special conditions 
in order to have something identical to him, so Possum and Magpie 
needn't satisfy any special conditions in order to have a fusion. 
(LEwis 1991, p. 85) 
There is something tempting and intuitive about the idea that the parts of 
an object just are that object. But we need to he careful here. Of course, the 
fusion of the parts of an object is that object - but this is a triviality that 
gives us no reason to believe in arbitrary fusions. What Baxter and Lewis 
need is a sense in which the parts themselves are the object, and it's not clear 
that there is anything tempting or intuitive about this. 
Baxter tries it to make it, so by means of an intuition pump: 
Suppose a man owned some land which he divides into six parcels. 
Overcome by enthusiasm for the Non -Identity view, he might try 
to perpetrate the following scam. He sells off the six parcels while 
retaining ownership of the whole. That way he gets some cash while 
hanging onto his land. Suppose the six buyers of the parcels argue 
that they jointly own the whole and the original owner now owns 
nothing. Their argument seems right. But it suggests that the 
whole was not a seventh thing. (BAXTER 1988, p. 579) 
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Baxter is right that, believing that wholes are identical to their parts, he has 
a neat explanation of why the original owner is in the wrong. But is this the 
only possible explanation? 
One reason for thinking so is some form or other of Hume's Principle that 
there can be no necessary connections between distinct existences. The point 
of the example is that the ownership of the whole seems to go necessarily with 
the ownership of the parts. This appears to constitute a counter- example to 
Hume's Principle, unless the whole is not distinct from the parts; and if it is 
not distinct from the parts, it is identical to them. 
It's hard to know how to understand Hume's Principle. We might think that 
it rules out any necessary connection between x's being F and y's being G, 
where x and y are distinct. But in order for any such formulation to work, we 
need to restrict F and G. Perhaps x is Socrates, y is me, F is wisdom, and 
G is the property of being such that Socrates is wise - it ought not to follow 
that I am identical, in any sense, to Socrates. A restriction in the spirit of 
Hume himself would be that the principle only applies where x's being F and 
y's being C are distinct ideas. The idea here is that the principle should allow 
necessity where it reduces to analyticity, and deny any necessary connections 
that do not so reduce. 
In this formulation, Hume's Principle is still a very strong metaphysical con- 
straint. The trouble with Baxter's argument, understood this way, is that, 
precisely because we can say a priori that something is wrong with the s- 
cam, it looks as though the the necessary connection between the ownership 
of the whole of the land and the ownership of its parts is conceptual, not 
metaphysical. That is, it is our concept of ownership that makes the neces- 
sary connection, not any spooky connection between distinct existences out 
there in the world. 
This point can be made vivid with an intuition pump similar to Baxter's own: 
suppose that ownership of a piece of land was equivalent in law to ownership 
of a title deed. Overcome with enthusiasm for Hume's principle, the owner 
of this land attempts to sell the land, while retaining the deed. He then 
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insists that his deed gives him rights over the land. The purchaser argues 
that having bought the land, she now owns the deed as well, her argument 
seems right. Does this suggest that the deed is identical to the land? 
I should hope not. But this case seems quite analogous with Baxter's. In 
either case, it is the legal concept of ownership that is responsible for our a 
priori conviction that the original owner is in the wrong. Hume's principle 
may show that ownership of the parts, or of the deed, is not distinct from 
ownership of the whole, but it does not show that the parts themselves, or 
the deed itself, is not distinct from the whole block of land. 
Thus, while I agree with Lewis and Baxter about GSP, I disagree with their 
method of argument. An unsound argument can have a true conclusion and, 
in my view, theirs is an example. 
3.5 Principles of Partition 
There is an interesting asymetry in the way that mereological classicalism 
treats parts and wholes. Classicalism accepts arbitrary fusions of objects; 
would it not also seem equally reasonable to accept arbitrary partitions? 
In fact, classicalism has nothing to say about partition: classical mereology is 
satisfied in a universe containing just one atom, and in universes containing 
no atoms at all. Many mereologists have been tempted to say something one 
way or the other about how many and what types of parts things have, but 
it seems to me that all such hypotheses are empirically up for grabs, and 
therefore not suitable to include in a metaphysical theory of part -whole. 
I will now discuss some of the hypotheses that have been suggested, and say 
why I do not accept them. 
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3.5.1 Atomism and anatomism 
A mereological atom is an individual that has no proper parts. In my usage, 
atomism is the view that everthing is composed of atoms, or equivalently, 
that everything has an atom as a part; anatomism is the view that there 
are no atoms. Materials of which anatomism is true are sometimes described 
as "gunk ", a usage derived from Lewis (1991, p. 20). 
These doctrines can be expressed in the language of mereology, if we define 
a predicate A, "is atomic" as 
De fA Ax =df « r) 
then, following Simons (1987, p. 42), we can state atomism and anatomism 
with the following formulae: 
Atom (Vx) (3y) (Ay A y < x) 
Anatom (Vr)(3y) (y K x) 
Notice that anatomism is not simply the denial of atomism, and that it is 
possible to formulate a middle position, that denies both. This would be the 
view that there are atoms, but not everything has any atomic parts: 
Hybrid Hx)(Ax) A (3.x)(Vy)(y < x 1 Pz)(z «y)) 
According to Simons, this "hybrid position... has rarely been seriously en- 
tertained" (SiMONs 1987, p. 42). However, it is not so weird as might 
appear. There are two positions from which it might seem plausible. Both 
are connected with the topology of matter and space. 
First, we might think that all extension is owed to non -atomistic matter - 
that no sum of spatial atoms has an extension - but also think that things 
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are touching when they have part of their boundaries in common. Since 
things can touch even at a single point a single spatial atom objects 
boundaries must be atomistic. So objects are made of non - atomistic extended 
matter, bounded by atomistic, but unextended boundaries, as if all objects 
were covered by a kind of cosmic talcum powder in order to allow that they 
touch one another in the required sense. Apparently Francisco Suarez and 
Franz Brentano held this view. (ZI.MMERMAN 1996, p. 158) 
Second, we might hold that there are two types of mereological object in 
the world, one type of which is atomistic, and the other anatomistic. For 
example, we might think that material objects are made of atoms (perhaps 
finitely many atoms), while substantival space is atomless gunk. Or vice 
versa. 
All of these views, atomism, anatomism, and the Suarez /Brentano hybrid 
view seem to me not clearly false, but at best metaphysical speculations that 
are outside the scope of mereology itself. This fact is reflected in classical 
mereology in that none of the formulae Atom, Anatom, Hybrid, or their 
negations are theorems of classical mereology. Classicalism is neutral on all 
of them. 
3.5.2 More on Atomism 
Of the three positions about partition discussed in the previous section, I 
look with most favour on atomism. It seems to me that there is a good 
argument for atomism on empirical grounds. 
The argument is from the premises that 1) we have discovered that all matter 
has atomic parts, namely, quarks and leptons, and 2) everything that exists is 
matter. If both these premises are granted, clearly it follows that everything 
has atomic parts. 
The justification of these premises unfortunately goes a little beyond the 
scope of the present work, (2) is a form of materialism, though, unlike 
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many formulations of materialism, it also implies relationalism about space - 
time. (1) should follow from scientific realism, construed in a certain way, 
together with certain discoveries about the nature of matter, especially those 
of quantum chromodynamics.5 
While the defence of materialism, the details of physical science, and scientific 
realism per se are definitely beyond scope here, I will say a little about how 
the type of scientific realism needed by by argument differs from some related 
ways of formulating scientific realism. 
I think of scientific realism as the doctrine that current total science is nearly 
right about the ontology of the world. There are, to a close approximation, 
tokens of the types of thing spoken of in current total science, and nothing 
else. 
It is an ontological formulation of realism. Following Devitt (1984), I 
take realism to be an issue about what there is, rather than say, whether 
certain sentences have truth conditions, or about the interpretation of 
science. 
Scientific realism is tied to current science, rather than an ideally com- 
pleted science. Realism about ideal science is a toothless doctrine, since 
unless we also believe scientific realism in my sense, we have no way of 
knowing what ideal science will be like. 
Scientific realism excludes things, as well as including them: there is an 
and nothing else" clause. Again, this is to ensure that the resulting 
doctrine has teeth: it ought to be the case that believing scientific 
realism is incompatible with interactionist dualism, owing to problems 
about the conservation of energy. But if scientific realism cannot ever 
rule out the existence of something, then this would be impossible. 
Scientific realism is tied to total science, rather than, say, the most 
fundamental, or most reductive, parts of physical science. This is partly 
'For accessible summaries, see (DoDD 1984), (FRITZSCH 1984), and (TREFIL 1980). 
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because I don't wish to foreclose against there being some non -reducible 
high level science. More importantly however, in the light about the 
exclusivity of my formulation, fundamental physics doesn't say much 
about chairs, persons, nation states, or moral values. Science should be 
taken to include social science, naturalistic metaphysics, and our folk 
understanding of the world (where not superceded by more developed 
sciences). 
Scientific realism taken in this form entails that atomism is true of material 
things. This issue will be taken up further in section 5.2.2. 
Notice that, given my mereological realism, I could abandon my endorsement 
of classical mereology, in favour of a mereological system in which Atom 
follows as a theorem. An important reason for not doing this is cut off from 
me. It is commonly said that atomism is a "substantive" mereological or 
metaphysical doctrine, which makes it inappropriate to include as part of a 
mereological system. This idea is associated with mereological analyticism, 
according to which the theorems of mereology should only be those formulae 
that come out analytic when translated into ordinary language. However, I 
deny mereological analyticism, for the reasons given in section 3.2. 
Nevertheless, it does seem to me that atomism is a lot closer to the fringes of 
our web of belief than principles such as WSP and Trans, which perhaps do 
come close to being analytic; or even GSP and PPP. For that reason, I have 
not included Atom among the axioms of the mereological system I propose 
to use, even though such a system would be perfectly adequate by my lights. 
3.5.3 Arbitrary Spatio -temporal Parts 
Peter van Inwagen has described the Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts 
(DAUP) as the view that 
[flor every material object M, if R is the region of space occupied by 
M at time t, and if sub -R is any occupiable sub -region of R whatever, 
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there exists a material object that occupies the region sub -R at t. 
(VAN 1NWAGEN 1981, p. 123) 
there is a.n obvious generalisation of this claim to include not just spatial 
parts, but spatio - temporal parts. We might call this doctrine DASTP: 
For every material object M, if R. is the region of space -time 
occupied by M, and if sub -R is any occupiable sub -region of R 
whatever, there exists a material object that occupies the region 
su h-R. 
DAUP and DASTP both offer principles about the parts of objects, but unlike 
Atom, Anatom, and Hybrid, they are not mereological principles, because 
they make mention of spatial predicates such as "is region of space[- time] ", 
"occupies ", and "is a subregion of ". "Subregion" could perhaps be given 
a mereological reading (and in fact, I think it is a very plausible reading) 
as "part ", but "occupies" and "is a region of space[- time]" cannot. I call 
principles of this kind "quasi -mereological principles ", by contrast with 
mereological principles such as WSP, GSP, and PPP. 
DAUP and DASTP doen't actually tell us anything about what sorts of parts 
material things have in the absence of a theory about what sorts of subregions 
regions of space -time have. If we accept the reading of "is a subregion of" 
as "is a part of" , then what they say is that the mereological structure of 
material things is isomorphic at any given time to the mereological structure 
of occupied space at that time (DAUP), or that the mereological structure 
of material things is isomorphic to the mereological structure of occupied 
space -time (DASTP). In the absense of a theory about what the mereological 
structure of space -time is, DAUP and DASTP say very little. 
Van Inwagen's argument 
Even so, van Inwagen thinks he can argue against DAUP and DASTP on 
a priori grounds. The argument is a reductio that turns on a move that 
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van Inwagen supposes to be licensed by DAUP: suppose a person has a foot, 
then there is something which is the object occupying the intersection of the 
region of space occupied by the person, and the region of space that is the 
complement of that occupied by the foot. Call the person Dion, and the 
foot Foot, then there is such an object as Dion minus his foot (according to 
DAUP). 
This is the only role DAUP plays in van Inwagen's reductio. Interestingly, 
however, though DAUP cannot be stated in merelogical language, we can 
state the principle which licenses this inference in mereological language. It 
is the Remainder Principle, or RP: (SiMON5 1987 p. 88) 
(Remainder Principle) For any object O, having a proper part P, 
there is an object O -P which is the mereological fusion of all 
parts of O that do not overlap P. 
Or in the formal language of mereology: 
RP -x <y (tíz)(3w)(w <z-w <xnwty) 
In effect, van Inwagen takes himself to have an argument against a principle 
like RP. (Elsewhere, he has denied RP explicitly (vAN INWAGEN 1990B, pp. 
52 -55)). Let us suppose that argument is sound. If so, then van Inwagen 
has refuted mereological classicalism, because RP is a theorem of classical 
mereology. But does RP follow from DAUP? When van Inwagen makes 
the move from the existence of Dion and Foot to the existence of Dion - 
Foot, he assumes that spatial regions are sets of spatial points. He says 
"By DAUP there is an object that occupies just that region of space that is 
the set -theoretic difference between the region occupied by O and the region 
occupied by P." (VAN INWAGEN 1981, pp. 124 -125) 
This way of thinking about space entails that the mereological structure of 
space (allowing that the sub -region relation is the part -whole relation) is 
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classical (and atomistic, for that matter). The non -empty sets of space -time 
points satisfy the axioms of classical mereology, when < is interpreted as set - 
inclusion. If we thought that the mereology of space itself was non- classical, 
then the set -theoretic treatment of space that van Inwagen employs would 
be inappropriate. 
So, van Inwagen's argument is a bit like this: 
2 The mereological structure of material things is like that of space (For 
reductio). 
3 The mereology of space is classical. (Suppressed premise), 
4 RP holds for material things (from 2 and 3). 
5 But, RP leads to absurdity! 
6 (Therefore) The mereological structure of material things is unlike that 
of space. 
Once the argument is stated in this way, it is very hard to see why someone 
who accepted premise 5 (which I have accepted only for the sake of argument 
here) would prefer to reject 2 rather than 3. 
One possible reason might have to do with reasons for rejecting RP (i.e. 
accepting premise 5). Van Inwagen's reasons have to do with the possibility 
of objects persisting through the loss of parts (which I will discuss later, see 
section 5.4.1). Now, we don't normally think of the ability to persist through 
change in parts as an essential feature of space. So van Inwagen's reasons for 
rejecting BP mightn't seem to be an appealing reason for rejecting 3. But 
in conjunction with the argument above, they should be - at least if we are 
prepared to hang onto DA[JP. 
This is all by way of saying why I reject van Inwagen's a priori argument 
against DAIJP and DASTP. But I think its conclusion is true. 
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Why I reject DAUP and DASTP 
It follows from the type of atomism I endorsed in section 3.5.2 that there are 
only finitely many atoms. On the other hand, I don't wish to beg the question 
against the continuity of space; or indeed against the hypothesis that space 
is discrete, but infinitely divisible. Certainly, space might be divisible to a 
greater extent than matter. So I reject DAUP. This argument will get more 
attention in section 5.2.2. 
3.5.4 Mereological Pluralism 
Some metaphysicians are troubled by the type of reasoning I have given 
against DAUP that, but still want to hold that DAUP is something like a 
conceptual truth. This leads them to hold that there are, in fact, multiple 
part -whole relations (or, perhaps, multiple concepts of a part -whole relations) 
for some of which DAUP is true, and others of which it is not. 
This view seems to be due to Denis Robinson: 
[T]he use I propose of this notion [part -whole] requires moving from 
the idea of physical to the idea of purely conceptual partition. But 
common sense finds no difficulty with the spatial analogue of this 
shift (as when we advance from talk of the parts of the watch' to 'the 
part of Africa north of the equator). (ROBINSON 1982, p. 322) 
Ned Markosian makes the connection with DAUP explicit. He considers an 
argument for DAUP from the premises 
(i) If any object has some extension, then it has two halves. 
(ii) If any object has two halves, then it has at least two proper parts. 
Let us call this the halves argument. Markosian says: 
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[lit is apparent that anything with some extension will have con- 
ceptual parts, even if it doesn't have metaphysical parts. That is, 
premise (i) seems true because we understand 'half' to mean concep- 
tual half But premise (i) does not seem so obviously true if we take 
it to be talking about metaphysical parts; for it is not obviously true 
that every object with some extension must have metaphysical parts. 
Meanwhile, premise (ii) seems clearly true when we understand 'half 
to mean metaphysical half but not when we understand 'half' to 
mean conceptual half; for it is not obviously true that any object 
with conceptual halves must have at least two proper (metaphysical) 
parts. And of course if we combine the obviously true readings of the 
premises into a single argument, then that argument will be invalid. 
(MARKOSIAN 1998, p. 224) 
Robinson accepts DAUP, while Markosian denies it, but they both agree on 
why it is appealing. There is a "conceptual" sense of "part ", they say, about 
which it is natural to believe DAUP; and a "physical" or "metaphysical" 
sense, about which it is not natural to believe DAUP. They differ on which 
they take to be the sense of "part" which is of interest to metaphysicians. 
They also agree that certain arguments about DAUP go wrong because of 
equivocation: Robinson thinks that arguments (such as mine) against DAUP 
equivocate when I move from empirical discoveries of science (about "physi- 
cal parts" on his view) to the rejection of DAUP (about "conceptual parts" 
on his view). Markosian thinks that arguments such as the halves argumen- 
t equivocate in moving from premises like (i) and (ii) (true, according to 
him, if "part" and "halves" are understood "conceptually ") to DAUP (false, 
according to him, because it should be understood "metaphysically "). 
T call this view "mereological pluralism ". 
Against mereological pluralism 
There are two things wrong with mereological pluralism. 
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The first problem is that the concept of a part is a very general univocal one. 
The reason for thinking this is that we can introduce it in all sorts of new 
contexts, without having to make up a new concept. When Locke says that 
the idea of the power of motion is a part of the idea of a man, you know what 
he means without his having to tell you what he means by "part" . When 
David Lewis says that subsets are parts of supersets, or when Plato considers 
(in the Parmenides) whether or not the forms have parts, again, we know 
what is going on. I think that this is evidence that in these cases, a concept 
we are already familiar with - the concept simply of a part - is being used. 
So it seems to me that "part" is not ambiguous in the sense required. 
The second problem concerns mereological realism. If the mark of "concep- 
tual parthood" is that it is the concept that makes arguments such as the 
halves argument sound, then it seems to be a good question whether such 
a concept is well- suited to fit the world. And that is just the question of 
whether the metaphysical parts satisfy all that's alleged to be true of the 
conceptual parts. If DAUP is true of conceptual parts, but not of metaphysi- 
cal parts, then they don't so, the concept of a conceptual part is defective 
and should be discarded or revised. 
To make this clearer, an analogy might be in order. Arguments like the 
halves argument seem to me to be a bit like the ontological argument for the 
existence of God. Anselm and Descartes might well have had a concept of 
God such that they could not logically escape the conclusion that God exists. 
Similarly, Robinson and 1VIarkosian seem to be alleging that the concept of 
a conceptual part is such that one cannot Iogically escape the conclusion 
that extended objects have distinct conceptual parts. In both such cases, it's 
still a perfectly good question to ask about whether the world matches the 
concept. 
The halves argument 
Since I have introduced the halves argument for DAUP in discussing mereo- 
logical pluralism, I should say something about what I think is wrong with 
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it, since T have cut myself off from Markosian's reasons for thinking that it 
is invalid. 
I think that the argument does not equivocate at all. Rather it is unsound 
because (i) is false. We are apt to be fooled into thinking (i) is true because 
of observations like this: 
(i') If any object has some extension then it has a left half and a right half.6 
(i') is true, but (i) does not follow from it. For (i) adds the claim that the two 
halves are not numerically identical. In my view, the relationship between 
the left and the right half of some extended object before me is like the more 
famous relationship between the morning star and the evening star. Just as, 
in a certain sense, it is an open question - not to be decided by mere analysis 
- whether the morning star and the evening star are the same object, it is 
an open question whether the two halves of any extended thing are, in fact, 
one and the same. 
Even the hypothesis of absolute monism - the view that there is only one 
thing is an open question in this sense. It is possible, I think, that the 
world might be superficially just as it is, and there be only one thing, just as 
the British idealists believed. Of course, they believed falsely, but it was not 
for want of a priori reflection. This provides good evidence that absolute 
monism is not to be refuted on a priori or analytic grounds alone. 
There is a further argument to made here. The morning star and the evening 
star are very similar. In fact, given that they are one and the same, they are 
duplicates. The same goes for the two halves of, say, a perfectly homogeneous 
sphere. But many of the things that there appear to be are intrinsically very 
different: could a strawberry and a potato turn out to be identical? To make 
the argument a bit more explicit, suppose all strawberries are sweet, while 
6 "Left" and "right" here mean left or right with respect to the observer who is saying 
"If any object..." 
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all potatoes are not. If there is anything that is both a strawberry and a 
potato, as the Absolute is supposed to be, it would have to be both sweet and 
not sweet. So it seems we can deduce a contradiction from absolute monism 
together with some very ordinary empirical observations, if not quite on 
prior% grounds. 
I will discuss this problem of difference (so- called because the crucial 
premise is that there are things that are qualitatively different from each 
other) at further length later (see section 5.2.4). For now, I just want to make 
it clear that it is distinct from the halves argument, for that argument would 
have whatever force it has even if the universe were completely homogeneous, 
provided it were extended. 
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Part II 
Theories of Persistence 

Chapter 4 
Perdurantism 
4.1 The Theory 
The simplest and most orthodox theory of persistence is what is often called 
the theory of temporal parts, space -time worms, or perduring objects. I will 
call this theory "perdurantism ". According to perdurantism, every persist- 
ing object is located at multiple times, having a distinct proper part located 
at each of every time at which the persisting object is located. Objects that 
persist in this way are said to "perdure ". Perdurantism holds that to persist 
is to perdure. 
By "proper part" of an object, I mean a part that is not identical to the 
object of which it is said to be a part. It follows that perduring objects 
have many many parts, more than we would perhaps have thought, prior to 
accepting the theory. Parts of an object that are located at some but not all 
of the places at which the object is located are that object's spatial parts. 
Parts of an object that are located at some but not all of the times at which 
the object is located are that object's temporal parts. For terminological 
nicety, we'll say that every object is both a temporal and spatial part of 
itself. Finally, temporal parts of an object which are located in all and only 
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the same spatial locations as the object itself is, during the lifetime of that 
temporal part, are cross -sectional temporal parts. 
In this usage, every object in time is a temporal part (in fact, a cross -sectional 
temporal part) of itself. So it is a triviality that if there are objects in time 
(as we will say, "temporal objects ") then there are temporal parts. It is not 
trivial, on the other hand, that if there are persisting objects, then there are 
proper temporal parts. This non -trivial claim is one of the implications of 
perdurantism. However, not everyone who believes in proper temporal parts 
is a perdurantist. It's possible to believe in proper temporal parts without 
believing that having such parts is necessary for persistence. 
Tn order to state some of the arguments given for perdurantism, I will some- 
times have to use the term "endure" to mean (at this stage) persisting with- 
out perduring. Many of the arguments for perdurantism take the form of 
reductio arguments against endurance. (For more on endurance, see chapter 
5.) 
4.2 Arguments 
There are three main types of argument for perdurantism: arguments from 
an analogy between space and time - particularly between extension in 
space, and persistence through time (section 4.2.1); arguments concerning 
the possibility of intrinsic change (section 4.2.2); and an argument from the 
possibility of a scenario very like perdurante -- the sucessive creation and 
annihilation argument (section 4.2.3). 
4.2.1 The Analogy with Space 
It is very often claimed that our concept of persistence through time is im- 
portantly similar, or analogous to, our concept of extension through space. 
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This idea received an early and influential mention in Richard TayIor's classic 
collection of analogies between space and time: 
[T]he concept of length or extension has a place in both [spatial 
and temporal] contexts, though this is easily overlooked. Things 
can be spatially long or short, but so too they can have a long or 
brief duration, i. e., be temporally long or short.... The notion of 
length in turn leads to that of parts, both spatial and temporal. 
(TAYLOR 1964, p. 382) 
The claim that there is such an analogy is often identified with perdurantism, 
for example by Theodore Sider: 
Persistence through time is much like extension through space. A 
road has spatial parts in the subregions of the region of space it 
occupies; likewise, an object that exists in time has temporal parts 
in the various subregions of the total region it occupies. 
(SIDER 1997, p. 197) 
Or with 'four-dimensionalism': Mark Heller writes of 
minimal four -dimensionalism - the view that persisting objects ex- 
tend over time in the same way they extend over space 
(HELLER 1993, p. 49) 
Peter van Inwagen of 
"four -dimensionalism," according to which persisting objects are ex- 
tended not only in the three spatial dimensions, but also in a fourth, 
temporal, dimension, and persist simply by being temporally extend- 
ed. (VAN INWAGEN 1990A, p. 245) 
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Strictly speaking, however, this analogy is not equivalent to perdurantism. 
Perdurantism is the doctrine that objects persist by having distinct temporal 
parts located at each time at which the persisting object is located. The 
analogy in question is the doctrine that persistence, whatever it may be, is 
the temporal case of extension. 
The analogy does however suggest an argument for perdurantism. Given 
that objects do extend by having distinct spatial parts located at each place 
at which the extended object is located, if the analogy is correct, objects 
should persist by perduring. 
Thus, 
7 Persisting objects extend over time in the same way they extend over 
space. 
8 All extended objects extend in virtue of distinct parts at distinct places. 
9 Therefore, All persisting objects persist in virtue of having distinct 
parts at distinct times. 
Premise 7 is simple the analogy between persistence and extension that we are 
discussing. Premise 8 is the observation that macroscopic objects typically 
do have spatial parts: I fill this bit of space to my left by having my left arm 
there, and this distinct bit of space, to my right, by having a distinct part, 
my right arm, there. Each arm extends through its region of space by having 
many distinct cells as parts, each filling a distinct, smaller region of space, 
and so on down to the subatomic level. Hence, 9, those objects fill up time 
just the same way - by perduring, that is. 
Spatial analogies and special relativity 
The quoted versions of the analogy between persistence and extension given 
above appeal to common sense for the analogy between these concepts. Such 
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a reading of common sense is controversial. But another important source 
for the analogy is physics. This point has been urged by J.J.C. Smart: 
[Elven common sense can be construed as having an underlying four - 
dimensional view of the world,... But if I am wrong about this then 
common sense should yield to science, because the notion of space - 
time is absolutely central to the special and general theories of rela- 
tivity. (SMART 1989, p. 21) 
(I will restrict my discussion here to special relativity (as does Smart). Gen- 
eral relativity complicates the presentation of the following argument without 
affecting the conclusions.) 
According to special relativity (SR), the world is a four -dimensional non- 
Euclidean manifold called a Minkowski space. These four dimensions are not 
the familiar three spatial dimensions plus a temporal one. No dimension is 
any more temporal than any other (except relative to objects in the mani- 
fold). In Minkowski space, material objects are represented by curves called 
world lines. 
Rather than having a distinction between time and space, SR has a distinc- 
tion between time -like separation and space -like seperation. This distinction 
is connected with the famous speed limit of SR c, the speed of light, which 
cannot be exceeded by any moving object. Imagine a point, 0, momentarily 
emitting light in all directions. The light would form an expanding sphere, 
speeding away from 0, the point of origin, at its center. In Minkowski space, 
the surface of this sphere forms a hypercone, which is caIIed 0's Iight cone. 
Points inside the light cone are time -like seperated from q5, and those outside 
are space -Iike seperated from 0. 
The point of all this is that the distinction between time and space in SR 
is a matter of the geometrical relationships between points in space -time, 
and not a matter of how material objects occupy those points. A persisting 
object intersects at least two points time -like seperated from each other. An 
extended object intersects two points space -like seperated from each other. 
There is an obvious analogy here. 
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4.2.2 The Problem of Change 
The problem of change comes about because of a tension between two things 
we would like to believe about change. We'd like to believe, on the one hand, 
that a changing thing must be the same thing before and after the change 
(otherwise no change has occurred, merely a difference between two things). 
On the other hand, we'd like to believe that a changing thing is qualitatively 
different after the change from the way it was before (otherwise no change 
has occured, because our putatively changing thing has stayed just the way 
it was). These two intuitive necessary conditions for change are, however, 
hardly compatible. 
For example, suppose that a certain thing, a poker, say, is hot at one time, 
ti, and later, at t2, cold. And suppose that we have one standard of heat 
and coldness in mind here, so that it would be contradictory to say of one 
thing that it is both hot and cold. 
The problem is that it's supposed to be the very same poker at t1 and at t2. 
No -one has come along and switched pokers on us. But yet this one object is 
supposed to be both hot and cold. If I told you that I had a poker that was 
both hot and cold, I would be contradicting myself. We know that there are 
no such pokers, nor could there he. But if we believe that things can change, 
then we must believe that one thing can be both hot (at one time) and cold 
(at another), and we can say so without fear of contradiction. 
The perdurantist solution is simple: the incompatible properties do not be- 
long to the same thing, the poker, rather they belong to distinct temporal 
parts of the poker. When we say that the poker is hot at 11, all that's needed 
to make what we say true is that the poker have a hot part at ti. This is not 
incompatible with the poker's having a cold part at t2, provided they are not 
the same parts. 
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The semantic problem of change 
Here is another way of glossing the problem. When things persist, they are 
located at multiple times; and when they change, they are different ways 
at some of those times. Take a poker cooling down, for example: it makes 
sense to say of the poker, before it changes, that it was one way, and after it 
changes, that it is another way. So, we might say "the poker is hot at t1" and 
«'the poker is cold at t2 ". It's an interesting question what the logical forms 
of these sentences are. In particular, we need an account of those logical 
forms that doesn't make the two statements "the poker is hot at ti" and 
"the poker is cold at t2" contradict one another. 
This is what E.J. Lowe calls the semantic problem of change: 
The semantic problem of intrinsic change is the problem of specifying 
the logical form of sentences ascribing temporary intrinsic properties 
to persisting objects, in such a way that we do not run into contra- 
diction in describing such an object (LowE 1988, pp. 72 -73) 
The problem is then, how do we analyse a statement of the form displayed 
below? 
10 a is F at t 
The point about avoiding contradiction is that a simple minded analysis such 
as 
11 a is F and a is at t 
won't work, because we want to assert pairs of propositions like "the poker 
is hot at ti" and "the poker is cold at t2 ". On analysis 11, these come out 
contradicting each other, and can't consistently be asserted together. 
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Lowe goes on to offers three alternative analyses, by binding the modifier "at 
t" to each, in turn, of the remaining parts of the English schema "a is F at 
t ": 
12 a-at-t is F 
13 a is F-at-t 
14 a is-at-t F 
These analyses are each supposed to correspond to a possible solution to the 
problem of change. 12 allegedly corresponds to the perdurantist solution un- 
der consideration in this chapter; 13 to endurantism with temporally indexed 
properties and 14 to adverbialism (both of which will be discussed in chapter 
5). 
We might add a fourth possible analysis that Lowe does not consider: 
15 ot (a is F) 
in this analysis, "at t" modifies a sentential operator on the entire sentence. 
This analysis is intended to correspond to presentist solutions to the problem 
of change, which we will meet in chapter 6. 
Lowe does not intend his version of the problem of change as an argument for 
perdurantism - quite the reverse, he is a committed endurantist, and rejects 
perdurantism. He does however intend this formulation of the argument to be 
a clarification of the problem of change as it has been used by perdurantìsts 
(especially by Lewis). Lowe's claim is that we should think of the problem 
of change as a question of which of 12 -15 offers the best explanation of the 
semantics of 10. 
We cannot well assess the soundness or cogency of this argument at this 
stage, because we have not presented all of the theories of persistence that 
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correspond to the different analyses, and we are being asked to choose which 
of these is the best. For the moment, note that perdurantism seems to have 
a solution to the semantic problem of change. We will return to this version 
of the problem later. 
Also note that this version of the problem of change makes the crucial ques- 
tion a matter of the semantic analysis of ordinary language sentences 
sentences of the form of 10. 
The problem of temporary intrinsics 
Another influential way of formulating the problem of change concerns the 
possibility of temporary properties (especially intrinsic properties). A 
much -quoted section of David Lewis's On the Plurality of Worlds states the 
argument nicely: 
The principal and decisive objection against endurance, as an account 
of the persistence of ordinary things such as people or puddles, is 
the problem of temporary intrinsics. Persisting things change their 
intrinsic properties. For instance shape: when I sit, I have a bent 
shape; when I stand, I have a straightened shape. Both shapes are 
temporary intrinsic properties; I have them only some of the time. 
How is such change possible? I know of only three solutions. 
First solution: contrary to what we might think, shapes are not 
gtenuine intrinsic properties. They are disguised relations, which an 
enduring thingmay bear to times... And likewise for all other seeming 
temporary intrinsics; all of them must be reinterpreted as relations 
that something with an absolutely unchanging intrinsic nature bears 
to different times... This is simply incredible if we are speaking of 
the persistence of ordinary things... If we know what shape is, we 
know that it is a property, not a relation. 
Second solution: the only intrinsic properties of a thing are those it 
has at the present moment. Other times are like false stories; they 
are abstract representations, composed out of the materials of the 
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present, which represent or misrepresent the way things are... This 
is a solution that rejects endurance; because it rejects persistence 
altogether... 
Third solution: the different shapes, and the different temporary 
intrinsics generally, belong to different things. Endurance is to be 
rejected in favour of perdurance. We perdure; we are made up of 
temporal parts, and out temporary intrinsics are properties of these 
parts, wherein they differ one from another. There is no problem at 
all about how different things can differ in their intrinsic properties. 
(Lawis 1986, p. 203 -204) 
A very similar formulation puts the problem in terms of intrinsic duplication 
rather than intrinsic properties. Two things are duplicates if and only if they 
are intrinsically just alike (see section 2.1.4). Two identical twins are near 
duplicates, but not quite. Probably the only uncontested instance of genuine 
duplication that we will ever find is of one thing with itself. For everything 
is just like itself, nothing can ever be unlike itself. 
But it is precisely that one uncontested and uncontestable case that creates 
problems for us in the case of change. It seems to be essential to intrinsic 
change, change in temperature for example (or shape, or mass), that the 
poker of t2 not be a duplicate of the poker of t1. If the poker of t2 was a 
duplicate of the poker of t1, then one way in which it must duplicate it is 
the way of temperature. But, by hypothesis, that is not the case. Hence the 
poker of ti is not a duplicate of the poker of t2. Hence, since everything must 
be a duplicate of itself, the poker of ti is not the same poker as that of t2. 
To summarise: 
16 The poker of ti (P- of -ti) is hot and the poker of t2 (P- of -t2) is cold. 
17 hence, P -of -t1 is not a duplicate of P -of -t2 
18 henre, P -of -t, is not identical to P -of -t2 
19 hence, The poker has not endured from t1 to t2 
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20 hence, The poker has perdured. 
4.2.3 The Sucessive Creation and Annihilation 
Argument 
The argument I am about to describe originates with an example given by 
D.M. Armstrong: 
Suppose that there are two very powerful deities, each able to an- 
nihilate and create, who operate quite independently of each other. 
The first deity decides to annihilate Richard Taylor and does so that 
place p, time t. The second deity has not been watching what was 
happening. He decides to create a man at p and t. By a coincidence 
that can only be described as cosmic, he decides to give this man 
exactly the same physical and mental characteristics that Taylor had 
at p and t. Life goes on as usual. (ARMSTRONG 1980B, p. 76) 
Armstrong believed that in this case, the two Richard Taylors, Taylor" and 
Taylor2 were just like two temporal parts of the actual Richard Taylor (except 
for the fact that Taylor" and TayIor2 are not causally related). 
This example, if coherent, shows that there is nothing suspect about the 
concept of a temporal part, as has often been alleged by non -perdurantists. 
Anyone who accepts the metaphysical possibility of the two deities of Arm- 
strong's example should accept the metaphysical possibility of the object we 
take to be Richard Taylor's turning out to have the temporal proper parts 
Taylor" and Taylor2; and, therefore, the metaphysical possibility of temporal 
proper parts. 
That is not to say that Richard Taylor actually has temporal parts, or that 
to persist is to perdure. In fact, by my definition, Armstrong is not a perdu - 
rantist, because he holds that perduring alone is not sufficient for persisting 
(see section 4.4.1). 
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But there is a way of beefing up Armstrong's argument so that it becomes a 
way of arguing for full -blown perdurantism. This beefed up version has been 
given by David Lewis: 
First: it is possible that a person -stage might exist. Suppose it to 
appear out of thin air and then vanish again. Never mind whether it 
is a stage of any person... 
Second: it is possible that two person- stages might exist in sucession, 
one right after the other but without overlap. Further, the qualities 
and location of the second at its appearance might exactly match 
those of the second at its disappearance... 
Third: extending the previous point, it is possible that there might 
also be a world of stages that is exactly like our own world in its 
point -by -point distribution of intrinsic local qualities over space and 
time. 
Fourth: further, such a world of stages would also be exactly like 
our own in its causal relations between local matters of particular 
fact. For nothing but the distribution of local qualities constrains 
the pattern of causal relations... 
Fifth: then such a world of stages would be exactly like our own 
simpliciter. There are no features of our world except those that 
supervene on the distribution of local qualities and their causal rela- 
tions. 
Sixth: then our own world is a world of stages. 
(LEWIS 1983c, p. 76 77) 
Lewis goes on to say that of course, stages are not suited to he persons, 
because they do not persist long enough. So we should think of persons as 
composite objects made up of stages. And of course similar arguments will 
go through for non -persons as well. 
This argument has a number of contentious premises that it is worth teasing 
out. The premises represented by the first and second steps are the point 
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made by Armstrong's argument - that anyone who believes that it is meta- 
physically possible for objects to be abruptly created and destroyed should 
believe that it is metaphysically possible that some object have temporal 
parts. 
As Lewis says, the third point merely extends this idea. The third point 
shows merely that it is metaphysically possible that there be a perdurance 
world, and that such a world could be much like our own. This is an inter- 
esting result, but to establish perdurantism, Lewis also needs to show that 
this world is actual. 
The fourth and fifth steps are supposed to bridge that gap. But here Lewis 
is forced to appeal to more controversial metaphysical principles: in the 
fourth step, a Humean -like constraint on the facts of causation, and in the 
fifth step, a version of what he has called "Humean Supervenience". These 
doctrines about causation and supervenience however, are often held to be 
refuted precisely by the result Lewis aims to get - that there is no difference 
between the actual world, and a world in which Richard Taylor suffers the 
malicious intervention of the deities. (For more, see section 4.4.1). 
4.3 Problems and Misunderstandings 
I consider three problems for perdurantism. The first is not really a problem, 
but more of a clarification - perdurantism is often confused with another 
theory of persistence that is really more closely related to presentism (section 
4.3.1). This theory itself is discussed later, in section 6.5.2. The second 
is a problem about the strange scattered objects that a perdurantist who 
also accepts classical mereology is committed to (section 4.3.2). The third 
problem is the 'problem of the many' - the problem that the perdurantist 
seems committed to many more ordinary objects than we ordinarily take 
there to be (section 4.3.3). 
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4.3.1 Funny identity 
Perdurantism is sometimes characterised as "the relational view of identity" ; 
or described as the doctrine that objects are not "strictly identical" over time, 
but only "loosely identical ". These characterisations are then followed up by 
table- thumping in favour of strict identity: we should not care about what 
will happen to our future selves if they are not really identical to us! Doesn't 
the "loose identity" between stages violate Leibniz's law of indiscernability 
of identicals? And so on.... 
While these sorts of objections have their place, they are not objections to 
perdurantism. These are all objections to any view which rejects the idea that 
persisting things are multiply located in time. Even perdurantists sometimes 
mischaracterise their views in this way', which perhaps accounts for the 
frequency with which these types of objection are heard. But perdurantism, 
as I understand it, accepts that persisting things are multiply located. The 
relationship between myself of now, and myself of 1980 is strict identity 
according to perdurantism - T am am just as much located in 1980 as I am 
located now. Nor is there any problem about why I care for the welfare of 
my future self - we are just as identical as the objector demands. 
These are not problems for perdurantism, but for a related theory, stage 
theory, which will be discussed in section 6.5.2. The ontology of stage theory 
is very similar to that of perdurantism, but it denies that persisting things 
are multiply located. 
4.3.2 Strange objects 
A common objection to the belief in temporal parts when combined with 
mereological classicalism (see section 3.1) is that on this view there would 
'Armstrong, for example, writes of a "relational view [of identity through time]" (ARM- 
STRONG 1980e, p. 67), when he clearly means perdurantism - or rather his causal variant 
of perdurantism. 
4.3 Problems and Misunderstandings BI 
be many more ordinary objects than we ordinarily suppose. If persons are 
nothing more than mereological fusions of person- stages, and fusion is un- 
restricted (as classicalism would have it), then is there not a person who 
consists of the person stages of Richard Taylor up until 1980, and the stages 
of David Armstrong thereafter? 
This is not a difficult problem to solve, but it is instructive to see it done 
- in part because there are two ways of solving it. The most mainstream 
way, which I will discuss here, consists in pointing out that perdurantism 
offers a theory of persistence, but not a theory of personhood. Yes, there is 
something which is the mereological fusion of the stages of Richard Taylor 
up until 1980, and the stages of David Armstrong thereafter; but it is not a 
person, and no -one need mistake it for one. 
This way of treating the problem is in the spirit of Locke's dictum that "to 
find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands 
for" (LOCKE 1976, II.xxvii.9). The problem about the Taylor- Armstrong 
fusion can be phrased as a problem about personal identity: why is it that 
we think of today's Taylor as a continuation of the author of Metaphysics, 
and not of the author of A Materialist Theory of the Mind? Once we accept 
the ontology of temporal parts and classical mereology, there is no question 
that there is something whose parts wrote both books - no surprise here, 
as the universe is such a thing but it remains true that there is no person 
who wrote both books, or who wrote Materialist Theory and is now called 
"Taylor". 
The alternative solution holds that not only is there no person who wrote 
Materialist Theory and is now called "Taylor ", but that nothing, person or 
otherwise, persisted from writing Materialist Theory to being called "Taylor". 
That is a slightly rough way of putting it, but I think it bears out the intuition 
that is in play. We might cash out talk of "persisting from a to b" in terms 
of being a thing that persists, does a, and does b. So the solution in question 
is that not only is there no person who who wrote Materialist Theory and 
is now called "Taylor" , but no persisting object. This view is not strictly 
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compatible with perdnrantism on my definition, but is closely related to it, 
and will be further discussed in section 4.4.1 
4.3.3 The Problem of the Many 
A followup to the problem of strange objects discussed above hears further 
attention. Let us accept the mainstream answer to the problem of strange 
objects, and shift the lump under the rug away from persistence, and over 
to personhood. It is clear enough that the strange Taylor- Armstrong fusion 
is not a person, but there are many other more ` persony' ways of putting 
together the stages - which one is Taylor? 
Suppose that the time tb is the instant of Taylor's birth, and td the instant 
of his death. The mereological fusion of all of the Taylor stages, including 
those stages located at tb and td is one object, and the fusion of all the Taylor 
stages excluding that located at td is another. Which one is Taylor? Which 
one is the author of Metaphysics? 
It won't do any good to say that Taylor, the one who starts at precisely tb 
and ends at precisely td, is the only person, because clipping an instant off 
the end of someone's life doesn't make them not a person. If Taylor had been 
horn an only instant later than he actually was, or were he to die an instant 
later than than he actually will, he would not be any less a person. 
Another way of putting this problem is to point out that birth and death 
take time, and are not instantaneous. In fact it is a vague matter exactly 
which time marks the start of any given person, and which the finish; and 
that is the point of the problem. Persons have vague boundaries; there are 
an infinite number of instants at which Taylor might reasonably be said to 
have been born, and another infinite number of instants at which it may be 
reasonably said that he will die; and there is a corresponding infinite number 
of ways of putting together persons out of Taylor stages that are born when 
Taylor is born and die when he dies. 
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So it seems that there are an infinite number of overlapping persons who 
deserve to be called Taylor. But this is absurd - we had better go back and 
find a premise to reject. Insofar as this is an argument against perdurantism, 
it may be the ontology of temporal parts - of Taylor stages - that is to be 
rejected; and with them goes perdurantism. 
Solutions 
There are a number of ways of dealing with this problem, and it would go 
beyond the scope of the present work to discuss them aII. (For an opinion- 
ated survey, see (LEwis 1993)). I will focus on a common feature of some 
solutions, which Theodore Sider has called attention to. 
Sider suggests that many of the sortais whose objects seem to have vague 
boundaries (sortais such as "person" , in our example) express maximal 
properties, where 
[a] property, F, is maximal if, roughly, large parts of an F are not 
themselves Fs. 
...Consider, for example, the mereological difference between a house 
and one of its windows. Linguistic intuition assures us that this 
entity, call it House -minus, is not a house. I own a single house, 
not thousands. House -minus is a very large part of a thing that is a 
house, and so it itself is not a house. Being a house is a maximal 
property. (SIDER 2001) 
Similarly, we might think that being a person is a maximal property. Suppose 
Taylor is a person, and that being a person is a maximal property. Since 
Taylor minus his time slice at td - Taylor -minus for short - is a large part 
of Taylor, Taylor -minus is not a person. 
This solves our problem to the extent that it explains why there is only one 
person called Taylor. I gave a reason above for believing that Taylor -minus 
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is a person: "If Taylor had been born only an instant later than he actually 
was, or were he to die an instant later than than he actually will, he would 
not be any less a person." But if being a person is a maximal property, it 
does not follow from this that Taylor -minus is not a person. Taylor -minus 
would have been a person, were he not a large part of the person Taylor. 
There is still one part of the problem left to solve, however. Even supposing 
we accept that Taylor the person is the maximal Taylor -like object, which 
one is the maximal one, given that persons have vague boundaries? What is 
it about tb and to that makes them the boundaries of Taylor, and the instant 
before tb, and the instant after to not the boundaries? 
This is an ordinary problem of vagueness, and can be solved in familiar 
ways. For example, we might take an epistemic -flavoured solution: there is a 
unknowable fact of the matter of what Taylor's boundaries are. Even though 
we don't know where they are, we do know they are somewhere, and that 
the fusions of Taylor slices that don't have those boundaries are not persons 
(because of maximality). 
Or, we might take a supervaluation- flavoured solution (LEWIS 1993, p. 171): 
there is no fact of the matter which fusion of Taylor -slices is Taylor, or which 
of them are persons. We can correctly use "Taylor' to pick one of an infinite 
number of fusions, and we can correctly use "person" to say of any of those 
fusions that it is a person. However we use "Taylor" and "person ", however, 
we can only use them in such a way that only one person wrote Metaphysics. 
On all precisifications of "Taylor" and "person ", Taylor minus or plus only 
a single time -slice is not a person. 
4.4 Variants 
I describe two variants on perdurantism. The first are those theories that 
consider perduring to be a necessary, but not sufficient condition of persisting, 
which I call "strong perdurantism" (section 4.4.1). The second concerns the 
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issue of whether a perdurantist should believe that there are instantaneous 
temporal parts (section 4.4.2). 
4.4.1 Strong Perdurantism 
Perdurantism, as I have defined it, takes perduring to be necessary and suffi- 
cient for persisting: to persist is to perdure. In chapter 5 I consider theories of 
persistence that drop the necessary condition (and perhaps also the sufficient 
one). But what about theories that drop the sufficient condition while retain- 
ing the necessary one? Such a theory of persistence would hold that, while 
everything that persists perdures, not everything that perdures persists. 
I call this position "strong perdurantism ". The strong perdurantist holds 
that a further condition needs to be satisfied by perduring objects before they 
qualify as persisting: perhaps they need to be spatio -temporally continuous, 
or causally unified in some way. 
The best known version of this view is Armstrong's: 
We do not normally speak of an earlier phase of an object as being the 
cause of a succeeding phase. But, in general at least, the earlier phase 
will be one of the nomically necessary conditions for the existence of 
the latter phase.... Given the concrete situation, the recent existence 
of this desk I write on is nomically necessary for the current existence 
of this desk. For consider the concrete situation which obtained in 
this room a few minutes ago, but subtract from it the desk. It is 
nomically impossible that in that situation a desk should come to be 
in my room now having the same properties as the original desk. 
...So we seem justified in saying that, for the vast majority of cases 
at least, preceding phases of a thing are a necessary part of the total 
cause which brings the succeeding phases to be... All this paves 
ther way for the suggestion, for most sorts of things at least, this 
causal relation between phases is a logically necessary condition for 
the identity of that thing through time. 
(ARMSTRONG 1980B, p. 75) 
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This gives us an alternative answer to the problem of strange objects from 
section 4.3.2. Among such strange objects are arbitrary fusions of time -slices 
from Richard Taylor and from Armstrong himself. On Armstrong's view, not 
only are such things not persons, but they are not "identical through time" 
- they do not persist. They do perdure, being partially located at each of 
several times; but on the view presently under consideration, this satisfies 
only one of two conditions necessary for persistence. 
We also get a principled reason for saying that the Taylor- Armstrong fusion 
is not a person. For plausibly, persons must persist. In the terminology, they 
must be continuants rather than occurants (like events). Perdurantism 
is often held to erode this distinction in part, Armstrong's view is an 
attempt to draw the distinction within a perdurantist framework. 
An example of this is his treatment of the two -gods case described in section 
4.2.3. He admits to an intuition that he "hope[s] the reader will agree with" 
(ARMSTRONG 1980B, p. 76) that if a person is destroyed and instantaneous- 
ly replaced with an intrinsic duplicate, they do not survive the experience. 
This is a type of intuition that is often produced by people who are opposed 
to perdurantism.2 Armstrong's causal version of strong perdurantism can 
satisfy the intuitions while also satisfying arguments for perdurantism such 
as the problem of change (see section 4.2.2). 
All this comes at a cost however. Armstrong's theory of persistence is depen- 
dent on his non -Humeanism about causation. Apart from the two deities, 
the world of Armstrong's thought experiment is just like the actual world. In 
particular, the constant sucession of Taylor- stages by later Taylor -stages is 
just as it is actually. On a Humean account of causation, there is no reason 
to deny that the earlier part of Taylor's life is appropriately causally related 
to the later part, in spite of the deities' meddling. 
2For example, Douglas Ehring makes use of a related "trope smasher" thought experi- 
ment (EHRING 1997, p. 94) to argue for endurantism with regard to properties. 
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4.4.2 Discrete versus Continuous Perdurance 
I have thus far been supposing that if perdurantism is the right theory of 
persistence, then persisting things have temporal proper parts that do not, 
themselves, persist. I don't think any of my conclusions so far have depended 
on this, but it has made it easier to describe many of the arguments. 
The view I have been assuming, continuous perdurantism, holds that 
persisting things are entirely made up of durationless slices. There must be 
continuum many such slices in any persisting, if they are to have a temporal 
measure -a duration. 
The rival view, discrete perdurantism, holds that all persisting things 
are entirely made up of temporal parts which themselves persist, by being 
entirely made up temporal parts which themselves persist... and so on to 
infinity. On this view, there may be nothing which does not persist. It 
is important to realise that discrete perdurantism is distinct from a more 
common, non -perdurantist doctrine, that perduring things can be made of 
persisting things which themselves do not perdure. According to discrete 
perdurantism, everything that persists perdures. 
A third possibility is that some thing perdure by having durationless tempo- 
ral parts, and others perdure by having only perduring temporal parts. 
It is hard to know how to choose between these three. Perhaps some of the 
considerations mentioned in connection with mereological atomism in section 
3.5.1 could help? We might prefer temporally discrete, or `gunky" objects 
because of objections to the concept of continua. We might prefer a mixture 
because of a combination of such objections with topological considerations, 
such as those that motivated Suarez and Brentano. 
In any case, I do not know of any considerations internal to the study of 
persistence that could help, so I will leave this distinction noted without 
deciding on which form of perdurance is preferable. 
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Chapter 5 
Endurantism 
5.1 The Theory 
Endurantists agree with perdurantists that persisting objects are located at 
multiple times. However, they reject the further claim that persisting objects 
have distinct proper parts at each time at which they are located. According 
to endurantism, at least some persisting objects are wholly located at each 
of multiple times. An object that persists in this way is said to "endure ". 
Notice the distinction between saying that an object is wholly (as opposed 
to partially) located somewhere, and saying that it is singly (as opposed to 
multiply) located somewhere. To say that x is wholly located at t is to say 
that x is located at t, and there is no proper part of x that is located outside 
t. To say that x is singly located at t is to say that x is located at t, and 
there is no region outside t at which x is located. 
According to endurantism, these two come apart for enduring objects. An 
enduring object may be located at t1 and t2, without having a part located 
at t1 and not at t2, or a part located at t2 and not at t1. Enduring objects 
have no proper temporal parts. 
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5.1.1 Strong endurantism 
The way I've defined endurantism introduces an asymetry between it and 
perdurantism. Perdurantism is the doctrine that perdurance is necessary 
for persistence. Endurantism, on the other hand, is not the doctrine that 
endurance is necessary for persistence, but rather that it is sufficient. Perdu 
- 
rantists believe that every persisting thing must perdure; endurantists that 
some persisting thing might endure. The reason for this is to arrange things 
so that these two options exhaust the possibilities for theories according to 
which multiple location is necessary for persistence. There is, however, a po- 
sition, which I will call "strong endurantism ", according to which endurance 
is sufficient and necessary for persistence. 
5.2 Replies 
5.2.1 The Analogy with Space: Rejecting the analogy 
Recall that the argument from the analogy with space purported to establish 
perdurantism by appealling to an analogy between persistence and extension, 
where the latter is imagined to involve objects being partly located at each 
spatial location they occupy. For example, I fill up the space I do by having 
an arm here, a leg there, a torso there, and so on (see section 4.2.1). 
One endurantist response to this is: so much the worse for the analogy be- 
tween space and time! Judith Jarvis Thomson, having condemned the belief 
in temporal parts as a "crazy metaphysic", goes on to say that "its full crazy - 
ness comes out only if we take the spatial analogy seriously." (THOMSON 
1983, p. 213) According to Thomson, the strange results which flow from 
the acceptance of temporal parts (especially cross- sectional temporal parts) 
undermine the analogy between space and time that is supposed to be used 
to argue for perdurantism. If there were any cross -sectional temporal parts, 
they would be different from spatial parts in important ways that show the 
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disanalogy between space and time. In effect, Thomson's strategy is to take 
the argument from the analogy with space as a modus tollens against its first 
premise, 7. (See page 70). 
Thomson offers two main points of disanalogy between spatial and temporal 
parts: 
First, extended objects are often breakable into their spatial parts. Take 
the example of breaking a piece of chalk into a left half and a right half. 
"[I]t could hardly be said that [the right half] will come into existence at 
breaking -time surely [the right half] does exist before I break it... off" 
(THOMSON 1983, pp. 211 -212) So the breakability of the chalk gives us 
a reason for believing that it has spatial parts, even before the chalk was 
broken; or, presumably, even if it were never broken at all. By contrast, it is 
not possible to break a persisting piece of chalk into two temporal halves. 
Second, suppose I pick up a piece of chalk at ti, and hold onto it for 2 hours. 
Consider its temporal part beginning at t2, which is an hour later than ti. 
Suppose it is now t2. "[T]hen there is something in my hand which is white, 
roughly cylindrical in shape, and dusty,... which also has a weight,... which 
is chalk, which was not in my hand three minutes ago, and indeed, such that 
no part of it was in my hand three minutes ago. As I hold the bit of chalk 
in my hand, new stuff, new chalk keeps constantly coming into existence ex 
nihilo. That strikes me as obviously false." (THOMSON 1983, p. 213) 
Comment on Thomson's arguments 
I am not very impressed with Thomson's first argument. The possibility of 
breaking an object gives us a reason to believe that it has at least two spatial 
proper parts because it gives us a reason to believe that the object might 
have been mereologically just the way it actually is (that is, having the very 
same parts) while the parts were spatially discontinuous, which actually they 
are not. 
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That is, Thomson's argument is directed towards someone who holds that we 
need a special reason to regard objects that are continuous as having parts (I 
am moderately sympathetic to this see sections 3.5.3, 5.2.2). This special 
reason (the possibility of discontinuity) is always available for spatial parts 
because it is always possible that an object's spatial parts be seperated. 
Thomson assumes that an analogous reason is not always available for tem- 
poral parts, but I disagree: it is possible that the chalk's temporal part 
beginning at t2 be seperated from its earlier part ending at t2. It might have 
been that the earlier part ended, not at t2, but an hour earlier, at t1 - in 
that case we would have one bit of chalk being destroyed at t1, followed by 
another, being created ex nihilo at t2. Not the sort of thing that happens 
in the actual world, to he sure, but by no means metaphysically impossible. 
That is what it is like for a piece of chalk to be broken into two discontinuous 
temporal proper parts. 
Thomson's second argument highlights a genuine problem with perduran- 
tism. But it is not quite a killer problem. It is open to the perdurantist to 
bite the bullet and accept that any persisting object has temporal parts com- 
ing into existence ex nihilo at every moment. Indeed, an argument commonly 
given for perdurantism - the Armstrong -Lewis sucessive creation argument 
(see section 4.2.3) seems to require that we think of temporal parts in just 
this way. 
Tt could be said that though it is surprising that there is a new lump of chalk 
being created in my hand at every instant, this is because we do not ordinarily 
think about those lumps of chalk As Thomson acknowledges, the temporal 
parts are not what we would ordinarily call "a bit or piece or chunk of chalk." 
(THOMSON 1983, p. 212) Perhaps even calling the temporal proper parts 
of a piece of chalk "lumps of chalk" is inapposite. If that is so, then it, is 
not a problem that it is contrary to common sense for lumps of chalk to he 
popping into existence in my hand at every moment that I am carrying a 
piece of chalk. Common sense has no words for the things that are popping 
into existence in my hand at every moment, so it has nothing to say one way 
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or the other about them. 
But some puzzle still remains, I think. We would like some reason for believ- 
ing in the temporal parts of pieces of chalk that are constantly popping into 
existence some reason to add them to our ontology. It is not enough to 
say that common sense gives us no reason not to. No reason not to believe 
in temporal parts is not a reason to believe. 
5.2.2 The Analogy with Space: Entension 
I am now going to consider another response to the analogy with space. 
Suppose that, for whatever reason, we accept premise 7 in as strong a form 
as the perdurantist wants. (I am here referring to the formulation of this 
argument on page 70). Now the argument's weak point is premise 8. 
Just as there is a debate to be had between endurantists and perdurantists 
about how things persist through time, there should be an analogous debate 
to be had about how things extend through space. Analogous to perdurance, 
we have pertension, filling space by having distinct parts in distinct places; 
analogous to endurance, we have entension, filling space by being wholly 
located in each of several places. The defence against the argument from 
analogy is that just as things might endure through time, they might (and 
perhaps do) entend through space. 
i begin by arguing that, as a matter of empirical fact, some things do entend. 
I then address a number of objections to this proposal. 
The Argument from Avogadro 
Our world is a finite material object; and such things are only finitely mere - 
ologically complex. So there are only a finite number of mereological atoms. 
If there is no entension in the world, those atoms are all extensionless. Fa- 
mously, however, a finite (or even a countable) number of extensionless points 
94 Endurantism 
don't add up to anything extended. So unless something entends, or there 
are in fact continuum many atoms, nothing is really extended at all. 
I call this argument the Argument from Avogadro, because its key premise - 
that finite things have only finitely many constituents - is connected with 
the 19th Century Italian chemist, Amedeo Avogadro.' I described it first in 
(PARSONS 2000) (reproduced as appendix C). 
21 All mereological simples are extensionless. 
22 There are only finitely many simples. 
23 All objects are mereological sums of simples. 
24 All objects are sums of finitely many extensionless things. (from 21, 
22, and 23.) 
25 All sums of only finitely many extensionless things are extensionless. 
26 Therefore, All objects are extensionless. (from 24 and 25) 
26 is absurd if it was true, we wouldn't have a problem about whether 
things entend or pertend! I take this argument as a reductio against 21. Tt 
only remains to draw the contradiction explicitly: 
27 But of course some objects are extended! 
28 Therefore, Some simples have extension; they entend. (reductio against 
21) 
So the upshot of this argument is that if we accept that there are only finitely 
many things, and that some of then are extended, we must hold that some, 
'For a summary of Avogadro's scientific work, see Coley (1964). It is Avogadro's 
"molecular hypothesis" of 1811, discussed by Coley on pages 197 -199 that is of particular 
interest to us. 
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at least, entend. If you reject entension, the only alternative is that extended 
things be divisible into infinite numbers of parts. 
The most important premise in this argument is 22. I take it that 22 is 
a discovery of physical science the discovery of Avogadro's number, the 
number of hydrogen atoms in a gram of hydrogen. Armed with Avogadro's 
number, and a theory of the subatomic constitution of matter, we can arrive 
at a finite total number of the simple objects that make up any ordinary 
finitely massive material object, like a chair or a table or the universe, for 
that matter). 
The other independent premises, 23 and 25, do not require too much discus- 
sion. 23 might be rejected by someone who accepted some kind of abstract 
objects to which mereological concepts might not apply. However, there is no 
barrier to such a person accepting a weakened version of 23 which quantifies 
over only "all material objects ", or "all concrete objects ", or "all mereologi- 
cal objects "; and such a formulation would still produce the same conclusion, 
since the spatial concepts (such as extension) will surely not apply to any of 
the non- mereological objects anyway. 
25 denies that extension might emerge from the fusion of extensionless ob- 
jects. It will presumably be accepted by anyone who denies that there are 
extended simples but nevertheless, there is a coherent position with re- 
spect to this argument that denies 25 while accepting 21. This position seems 
to have little to recommend it, though. 
Another important question with respect to 25 is, should one continue to 
accept it after denying 21? There seem to be two coherent `entensionist' 
positions, the weaker of which holds that objects either entend or pertend 
throughout the space they occupy, and the stronger of which holds that 
one and the same thing may locally entend through some regions of space 
and locally extend through others. It is only the stronger entensionism that 
rejects 25 along with 21. 
As I have only an argument against 21 or 25, and not against both, I will 
restrict myself to the weaker entensionism. However, the stronger version 
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does not seem as implausible as the combination of the denial of 25 with the 
acceptance of 21, and it would be interesting to explore the kinds of consider- 
ations that might lead one to decide between strong and weak entensionism. 
[topology ?] 
In the remainder of this section, I discuss a series of objections to either the 
premise 22, or to the very possibility of entension. 
What are the simples? 
Avogadro's number only tells us the number of physical atoms in an object; 
these are not of course, the most fundamental objects of physics. Contem- 
porary physics' most fundamental objects are leptons and quarks. It regards 
them as mereologically simple (unlike nucleons, such as protons, which are 
made of quarks), and is silent on whether they are extended - they are, 
at largest, too small to be practically measurable.2 There are only finitely 
many of these objects as parts of each of the finitely many atoms, so it is 
these things that we ought to expect to entend. 
It might be objected that the fundamental material things are not the only 
mereologically simple objects. In particular, substantivalists might object 
to 22 on the grounds that it counts only the material objects, and not the 
continuum many point- instants of space -time. 
In order to reply to this, I need to distinguish two kinds of substantivalism: 
reductionist substantivalism, which holds that material objects are to be on- 
tologically reduced to points and regions of space -time (loci, for short), and 
anti- reductionist substantivalism, which accepts both loci and material ob- 
jects, while denying that either is to be reduced to the other. Both positions 
are to be opposed to anti -substantivalism, which holds either that there are 
no loci, or that they reduce to material objects. 
2For a readable introductions to the particle physics I am relying on here, see (DoDD 
1984), Fritzsch (1984), and (TREFIL 1980). On the radius of electrons, and the practical 
difficulties of measuring it, see Ridley (1995, pp. 133- -138). 
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I need have no debate with the anti -reductionist substantivalist. I am only 
interested in the manner in which material objects like chairs and tables 
extend (or persist) and not in the manner in which regions of space -time do 
so. Plausibly, space -time, if it exists, extends by pertending, and persists by 
perduring but that's not the issue here. The argument from Avogadro is 
intended to be restricted to material objects and material simples, and anti - 
reductionist substantivalist objectors are welcome to substitute throughout 
`material simple' for `simple' and `material object' for `object' throughout. 
Replying to the reductionist substantivalist is harder. It seems to me that 
reductionist substantivalism is implausible precisely because regions of space - 
time do seem to be arbitrarily divisible into parts, in ways that material ob- 
jects are not. The reductionist substantivalist therefore owes us an argument 
either that all material things are, afterall, divisible into parts corresponding 
to the subregions of the region they occupy, or that regions, are not, afterall, 
arbitrarily divisible into subregions. In the former case, it would be question 
begging to offer the truth of substantivalism as that argument, and in the 
latter, there is no problem for entension, as it is accepted that some regions 
may entend. 
Tile trouble? 
Let us turn now to the anti -substantivalist version of the view I am defending. 
Suppose that there are only finitely many extended material objects, and no 
other extended objects. There is a classic argument due to Hermann Weyl, 
that has been claimed to "hopelessly vitiate" (ZimIvIERmAN 1996, p. 152) 
this kind of theory- 
How should one understand the metric relations in space on the basis 
of this idea? If a square is built up of miniature tiles, then there are 
as many tiles along the diagonal as there are along the side; thus the 
diagonal should be equal in length to the side. 
(WEYL 1949, p. 43) 
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Weyl's idea seems to have been that if lines in this kind of space is measured, 
as seems intuitive to do, perhaps, by counting the numbers of tiles a line 
passes through, the space seems radically non -Euclidean; in particular, the 
Pythagorean Theorem does not hold. 
Figure 5.1: The Tile Argument 
Suppose that the squares of figure 5.1 represent entending "space atoms ". 
The triangle ABC's hypotenuse, AB, should be f the length of AC and 
BC, but it will be observed that in fact it passes through only as many tiles 
as AC and BC. 
A particularly subtle part of this argument is that, as Wesley Salmon points 
out, changing the size of the tiles, in particular, shrinking them, does not 
reduce the error. Imagine dividing each tile in half; now AC and BC cover 
twice the number of tiles they used to. So does AB: it is still out by a factor 
of f. (SALMON 1975, p. 65 66) 
The weakness of the Tile Argument, at least in this form, is the premise that 
the length of a line should, on the "tile theory of space" be proportional to 
the number of tiles it crosses (for convenient reference, call this the Length 
Premise). Having stated the argument, Weyl goes on immediately to say 
that this premise is rejected by his principal target, David Hume: 
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Hume, consequently, is forced to admit that the `just as well as 
obvious" principle of comparing the measures of curves and surfaces 
by means of the number of component elements, is, in fact, useless.' 
(WEYL 1949, p. 43) 
If Hume admits this, how can the argument "hopelessly vitiate" his theory? 
Moreover, the Length Premise must not only denied by Hume (or those 
who hold, like Hume, that there are entending atoms of space) but even by 
those who hold the orthodox view that space is made of uncountably many 
unextended points. This is because, on this view, every line contains precisely 
the same number of points. There is a simple geometrical proof of this: 
P 
r 
Gr 
I' `J 
Figure 5.2: Every line contains the same number of points. 
In figure 5.2, each of the lines from the point P to each point in the line IJ 
passes through only one point on GH, showing that there are no fewer points 
on GH than ÏJ. (SALMON 1975, p. 55 -56) 
The point of the Tile Argument, then, cannot be that it poses a straight 
counterexample to the proposal that the length of a line is proportional to 
the number of tiles it crosses. The real force of the argument is in Weyl's 
challenge: "How should one understand the metric relations ?" "What is 
3The citation to Hume is to book I, part 2, section 4 of the Treatise. (HUME 1978, p. 
45) The word "just" is italicised in Hume; Weyl omits to do so in his quotation. 
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the length of a line?" The tile theory of space owes us a geometry, and 
Weyl is sceptical that one will be forthcoming. On this construal the Tile 
Argument is certainly food for thought, but not the knockdown affair that 
its proponents represent it as. 
In fact, it is perhaps asking too much that an empirical theory of the consti- 
tution of the universe provide an adequate ontology for a branch of mathe- 
matics. It is famously difficult to find natural objects corresponding to the 
ontology of number theory, or set theory: why should geometry be any dif- 
ferent? The ontology of mathematics is a hard topic, to which there are no 
easy answers; until more progress has been made on that front, I think it is 
fair for an anti -substantivalist about space -time to put the Tile Argument to 
one side. 
Is science in the business of doing mereology? 
I have assumed that the nature and disposition of the smallest parts of ma- 
terial things is an empirical question. This may seem obvious, but it is not 
so to everyone. 
Some will say, especially if the fundamental objects of physics turn out to 
be extended, that physics is just not in the business of discovering which 
objects are the real mereologìcal atoms. Rather, it discovers which things 
are, in practice, divisible, given the methods at our disposal. In moving from 
the in- practice indivisibility of fundamental objects to the view that they are 
mereologically simple, we cross the boundary from science to metaphysics. 
This objection makes sense, I think, against the background of a broader 
scientific anti -realism. If you thought that, in general, that science does 
not discover how the world is, but merely what is, in practice, possible in a 
laboratory, you would be completely justified in making this objection. Of 
course, such a scientific anti -realist will be unmoved by the Argument from 
Avogadro in any case, and to argue against that position would be beyond 
the scope of this thesis. So let us set aside the general anti -realist objection, 
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and consider whether the particular objection that science is just not in. the 
business of finding the mereological atoms can work against a scientific realist 
background. 
It is a truth familiar to scientific realists that theory is underdetermined 
by data. Scientific theories, understood as realists understand them, are 
not the sorts of things that can be conclusively verified, but we believe one 
such theory rather than another, on the grounds of arguments to the best 
explanation. 
Now consider an experiment that attempts to break apart some putatively 
fundamental object, an electron, say, into its parts. The experiment fails, 
and there are two candidate theories available to explain this: 
29 The electron has no proper parts. 
30 The electron is in practice indivisible. 
While both theories predict our result, it seems clear that only the first ex- 
plains the result. The second only restates the result, and restatements are 
not ever explanations. To try to explain the fact that we did not split the 
electron by saying that it's unsplittable is like trying to explain a person's be- 
ing put to sleep as a result of ingesting opium by appeal to opium's dormative 
virtue. 
Perhaps though, 30 was not the theory that the objector had in mind. Per- 
haps the candidate theories are more Iike this: 
29 The electron has no proper parts. 
30' The electron has proper parts, and they are indivisible. 
Now both theories do both predict and explain the data; but we should 
still prefer theory 29. That is because 30' introduces unobservable objects 
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that do not aid us in the explanation of the phenomenon under consideration. 
Scientific realism is not a licence to believe in gratuitous unobservable entities 
- just as in the case of unverifiable theories, we should believe in them where 
and only where, 
[b]y supposing they exist we can give good explanations of the be- 
haviour and characteristics of observed entities, behaviour and char- 
acteristics which would otherwise remain completely inexplicable. 
(DEViTT 1984, p. 104 -105) 
Failing to believe in the proper parts of the electron does not leave anything 
"completely inexplicable ". There is a perfectly good explanation available, 
in fact; and that is theory 29. 
To summarise: There is a logical gap, to be sure, between on the one hand, 
the data that we have empirically available to us, about which things are 
divisible into their proper parts in a laboratory, and on the other, the theories 
we concoct about which things have proper parts to be divided. But that is 
no big news: the underdetermination of theory by evidence is ubiquitous in. 
science. If that alone means that science can say nothing about whether an 
object has parts, then science can say very little. 
Different concepts of parthood? 
It might be objected here that I'm not really disagreeing with anyone who 
uses the Argument from Analogy, as I'm working with a different concept of 
parthood. This objection thus turns on the idea that I have earlier called 
mereological pluralism (see section 3.5.4). However, there seems to me to 
be no good reason to accept pluralism. 
I have throughout assumed (or at least, nothing I've said is in conflict with) 
the standard framework of "classical" mereology of Goodman and Leonard 
(GOODMAN 1951, pp. 42 -51) (see also 3.1), This is also the mereology that 
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is standardly used by perdurantists; so if there is something different about 
the concept of parthood I'm using, it's not to do with the purely mereological 
features of that concept. 
There is, however, one important quasi -mereological principle that might 
capture the difference between me and many perdurantists the principle 
that Peter van Inwagen has called the Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached 
Parts, or DAUP (see section 3.5.3): 
For every material object M, if R is the region of space occupied by 
M at time t, and if sub -R is any occupiable sub -region of R whatever, 
there exists a material object that occupies the region sub -R at t. 
(VAN INWAGEN 1981, p. 123) 
DAUP is, in effect, the second premise of the argument from analogy. It 
asserts that every material object pertends. Naturally, a believer in entension 
must deny it. Naturally, too, those who wish to use the argument from 
analogy will affirm it. 
Our question here is not whether DAUP is true or false (I have given an 
argument that it is false the argument from Avogadro is such an argument) 
but whether someone who denies DAUP must have a different concept of 
parthood from someone who affirms it. The answer to this, I will argue, is 
clearly no. 
The reason for this is that DAUP is only a quasi -mereological principle, not 
a mereological one. What I mean by this is that it essentially involves use of 
non -mereological concepts; namely, spatial ones: the concepts of regions and 
subregions of space. This why DAUP cannot either entail or be entailed by 
a formal axiomatic mereology like Leonard and Goodman's system, which 
makes use of only mereological and logical concepts. 
It might still be the case, though, that our concept of part requires more 
than the merely formal requirements placed on it by axiomatic mereology. 
104 Endurantism 
DAUP is not, however, a plausible candidate for such a requirement. This is 
because spatial concepts in particular seem to be independent of mereological 
ones: we are able to apply mereological concepts in non -spatial cases. For 
example: idealism might have been true - in that case it might have been 
that case that there was a non -spatial world. But it would still make sense 
to say of such a world that some spirits are parts of a certain community of 
spirits, or that some of their ideas, perhaps, are parts of each other. A more 
compelling example: it is natural to think of a mathematical set as having its 
subsets as parts, as in (LEwis 1991), but pace (MADDY 1990) these things 
are not normally thought to be in space and time. 
Finally, against the proposal that the affirmation or denial of DAIJP be con- 
sidered an essential feature of the concept of parthood, consider the number 
of philosophers who must be unknowingly talking past each other when they 
argue over whether DAUP is true or false. van Inwagen considers serious 
arguments for DAUP in his paper (VAN INWAGEN 1981) from such luminar- 
ies as Roderick Chisholm and David Lewis. From all appearances there is 
serious metaphysical disagreement here. It should take a lot to persuade us 
that van Inwagen's views are in fact compatible with Lewis's. 
An incredulous stare? 
The final objection to entension may be that it is absurd, inconceivable, or 
impossible that something should extend without having parts. One answer 
to that is that it is conceivable because it is conceived, at least by me, and, 
indeed, by some other metaphysicians, of whom David Hume and Peter van 
Inwagen have already been mentioned. Additionally, according to van In- 
wagen (VAN INWAGEN 1990B, p. 98), Aristotle held that living organisms 
entend, and Weyl mentions the Mutakallimûn as believers, like Hume, in the 
"atomistic theory of space." (WEYL 1949, p. 43) 
That entension has its serious critics is also, paradoxically, a point in its 
favour. As Hume put it so well: 
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[C]an any thing be ímagin'd more absurd and contradictory than this 
reasoning? Whatever can be conceiv'd by a clear and distinct idea 
necessarily implies the possibility of existence; and he who pretends 
to prove the impossibility of Its existence by any argument deriv'd 
from the clear idea, in reality asserts, that we have no clear idea of 
it, because we have a clear idea. (HUME 1978, I.II.iv) 
The fact that there are so many substantive arguments against entension 
suggests that its detractors have a clear idea of what it is that they don't 
believe in, which tends to support the view that it is conceivable. 
In any case, if it were demonstrably true that entention is absurd, the Argu- 
ment from Analogy would be redundant. Given the Analogy Thesis, for any 
demonstration of the incoherence of entention, there should be an analogous 
demonstration of the incoherence of endurance, which could be used directly. 
5.2.3 The Problem of Change: Indexed properties 
The indexed property reply corresponds to Lowe's analysis 13, and to Lewis's 
"second solution" to the problem of temporary intrinsics. In reply to the 
semantic problem of change, the indexed property theorist says that `at t' 
modifies the predicate of those sentences it appears in. So, "the poker is hot 
at t1" and "the poker is cold at t2" contain references to the same object, 
but they do not ascribe the incompatible predicates "hot" and "cold" to 
it. Rather, they ascribe the compatible predicates "hot- at -t1" and "cold -at- 
t2" , respectively.The ontological correlates of these predicates, the property 
of being hot at t1 and the property of being cold at t2, are often called 
"temporally indexed properties ". 
In reply to the problem of temporary intrinsics, the indexed property theorist 
says that properties such as being hot or being bent are not had simpliciter 
by objects, but only in a temporally indexed version: being hot at t1 or being 
bent at t2. When we say that something has a changeable property such 
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as being hot, what we in fact assert is that it has the temporally indexed 
property of being hot at some time (usually hot at the present time). 
The classic defender of this is N.L. Wilson: 
It is so obvious, so necessary that if Philip is drunk, Philip is drunk 
at some time, that if Scott wrote Waverley, he wrote it during some 
period - it is so obvious and necessary, that in ordinary language 
we generally drop the at some time" and are left with the simple, 
the too simple, noun -copula- adjective form of sentence. (Perfidious 
ordinary language!) (WILSON 1955, p. 597) 
Wilson meant it to follow that the reference to a time modified the predicate 
it is "shifted across the copula... from subject to predicate" he says (twice). 
(WILSON 1955, pp. 592, 594 -595) 
What is not so clear is how we are supposed to read off the ontology be- 
hind the language from this. In 1955, Wilson seemed to hold that he was 
not disagreeing with perdurantists such as Quine as regards ontology. His 
complaint was rather that 
Ordinary language is a substance [ie. indexed predicate] language, 
and, whether we like it or not, we have not the slightest intention of 
abandoning this language type. (WILSON 1955, p. 592) 
By 1973, however, he was prepared to say that "ra] fact is constituted by an 
individual, a property, and a time, and it cannot have fewer components." 
(WILsoN 1974, p. 311). True to the Tractatus, however, whose doctrines he 
cites approvingly, Wilson is silent on the all- important question for ontologies 
of facts: what is the relation of the fact to its constituents? There may be 
a fact that Philip is drunk at 3 o'clock, but there cannot be a fact that 3 
o'clock is drunk at Philip. Why is this? The answer cannot be simply that 
times can't occupy the `individual place' in a fact, for there may be the fact 
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that 3 o'clock is past at 4 o'clock, or the relational fact that Philip anticipates 
4 o'clock at 3 o'clock. These are not identical, of course, to the fact that 4 
o'clock is past at 3 o'clock, or that Philip anticipates 3 o'clock at 4 o'clock. 
Wilson owes us an explanation of these phenomena, but he does not give 
one. This is not to say that his account is mistaken, though, rather that it is 
indeterminate between a range of different options that might be exposed to 
different problems. Since these are problems in. the ontology of facts, rather 
than of time, I will put them to one side here.' 
Something rather similar to, and better known than, Wilson's ontology of 
temporal facts has been proposed by D.H. Mellor. In 1981, Mellor held that, 
if a is a thing, it has no temporal parts to take over properties G 
and G*. They are properties of a itself, albeit at different times. 
They are in short relations a has to the times at which it has them. 
(MELLOR 1981, p. 111) 
Here a is a changing thing, like our poker; G and G* are the incompatible 
properties with respect to which it is changing: in our example, the properties 
of being hot and being cold respectively. The view, then, is that temperature 
is not in fact a monadic property at all, but a relation; as is every changeable 
property. 
It is important to realise that this view, that changeable properties are rela- 
tions, is not essential to the indexed property theory; nor is it clear that this 
really what Mellor wants to say (even though he does say it, for example in 
the quotation given above). A more plausible way of putting Mellor's 1981 
theory would be to say that changeable properties are relational. Mellor 
himself does not seem to distinguish this from the claim that the properties 
are relations, but they are importantly distinct. 
'See (ARMSTRONG 1997, pp. 119 
-123) for one view, a standard one, on the rela- 
tionship between facts and particulars. My (PARSONS 1999) defends a rather different, 
non -standard one - also taken up by ( LEWIS 2001). 
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What may be neutrally said on the behalf of both theories is that when a 
poker is hot at a time, there is some relation, G, holding between the poker 
and the time. In addition, the analysis of sentences like "the poker is hot at 
t1" is an indexed predicate analysis, so that "hot at t1" is a semantic atom, 
expressing the relational property of hearing C to t1. This doesn't commit 
us to the claim that C is hotness, the property of being hot simpliciter. 
Plausibly, G is a relation we don't yet have a name for, though we can make 
one up - "hot at" perhaps. 
This should silence Lewis's objection that we know, don't we, that temper- 
ature (or shape, or whatever property is being used as the example) is a 
property, not a relation. (LEWIS 1986, . p. 204) (MERRICKS 1994, p. 168) 
This surely right: if anything is hot, it's pokers, not ordered pairs of pokers 
and times! But Mellor doesn't need to say that any property we now have 
a name for is the relation G. As for hotness simpliciter, recall what Wilson 
found "so obvious and necessary ", that this is the property of being hot at 
some time -a relational property, but not a relation! 
There's an instructive parallel to Mellor's 1981 proposal in the discovery 
that weight is a relational property. Suppose I have a poker that weighs 
30 Newtons here on Earth, but weighs 5 Newtons on the moon. How is it 
possible for one thing to have two different weights? The answer is simple: 
there's a relation H that holds between things and planets on the surface of 
which the weight is being measured. The poker bears H to Earth, but doesn't 
bear H to the moon. To say that the poker weighs 30 Newtons on Earth is 
to say that the poker has the property H -on- earth, which is compatible with 
not having the property H -on- the -moon. 
It would be a bad objection to this to say that surely we know that weight 
is a property not a relation. We do know that, but the relation II is not the 
poker's weight - it is the relation "weighs 30 Newtons on the surface of ". 
The poker's weight, we know, is a relational property; but not a relation. 
5.2 Replies 109 
5.2.4 Intrinsic Indexed Properties 
There is a problem remaining for the indexed properties approach. In the 
previous section I considered the objection that it makes properties that 
ought to be monadic into relations; and the objection that it makes properties 
that ought to be non -relational into relational ones. Neither of these were 
found to be sound. 
However, in the light of what I said about the relational ; non -relational 
distinction in section 2.1.6, we also need to ask whether the indexed proper- 
ties solution might not make properties that ought to be intrinsic relational 
properties into extrinsic relational properties. 
The perdurantist can agree with the indexed property theorist to a certain 
extent. Yes, there are such properties as being hot at t1; yes, these are 
relational (in whatever sense properties may be said to be relational!) - 
but not all of them are extrinsic. Supposing that being hot is intrinsic, then 
having a hot part at t, is intrinsic too, and this property, the perdurantist 
thinks, is none other than being hot at ti. 
You might think that not even having a hot part at ti can be intrinsic, as it 
makes essential reference to a moment of space -time. Having the property of 
having a hot part at 11 entails being located at ti. But being located at tt is 
extrinsic. Hence, any property the having of which entails that I am located 
at t1, cannot be intrinsic. 
The answer to this is that we should understand "t1 ", as it appears in the 
names of the temporally indexed properties, as a reference to a moment of 
time relative to the temporal position of the object that has the property. 
So we should understand the property of being hot at ti as, for example, the 
property of being an x such that x is hot for the first second of x's life. The 
temporally indexed properties should be understood in a way that makes it 
possible for objects located at two different times to share such a property. 
If two pokers, created at different times, were to have the same history of 
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cooling down, and being destroyed, they would share all their temporally 
indexed heat properties. 
This shows that the perdurantist can give an account of the indexed proper- 
ties that accepts that some of them are intrinsic. Can an endurantist do as 
well? It seems to me that they can, if they adopt the strategy I recommend- 
ed in (PARSONS 2000), of identifying indexed properties with disjunctive 
distributional properties. 
Dsitributional Properties 
The surface of a chessboard has a certain colour distribution. The property 
of having that colour distribution is a distributional property.5 Or, take 
a poker that is hot at one end, and cold at the other. It has a certain 
heat distribution, and has the distributional property of having that heat 
distribution. Imagine such a poker, call it a, and another poker, b, which 
has a different heat distribution, being uniformly hot, for example. Call 
the heat distribution of a, the property A, and that of b, B. Note that 
these distributional properties are fully determinate: having any one of them 
entails that you do not have any other of the same determinable (in this 
case the determinable property of having some heat distribution). So, for 
example, that a has A entails that a does not have B. 
A and B are both intrinsic properties. Though my description of A involved 
talking about `ends' of the poker, it's clear that having A involves nothing 
outside the poker that has the property. Any duplicates of a would have to 
also have A, or they would not be duplicates. Now notice that we can define 
now up the property of being hot at one end. It is simply having A or B 
or any other of the fully determinate heat distribution properties that, as it 
were, put heat at one end of the object. And this property is intrinsic as well. 
You can't get an extrinsic property by conjoining or disjoining two intrinsic 
ones. 
5T introduced the concept of a distributional property in (PARSONS 2000, p. 410) 
(reproduced as appendix C). See also appendix F 
5.2 Replies 111 
A distributional property, then, is a perfectly intelligible kind of property, 
which everyone ought to believe in to the extent that they believe in any kind 
of intrinsic property. Disjunctions of them are equally intelligible, and ought 
to be believed in to the extent that one believes in any disjunctive property. 
The disjunctive distributional properties I have just described are spatially 
indexed properties. For temporally indexed properties, apply this procedure 
in the temporal case. Imagine now two pokers, one of which begins its life 
hot, and cools down over time, the other of which remains hot for its entire 
existence. CaII them c and d respectively. Both c and d, we will suppose, 
begin to exist at t1, and are destroyed at t2. If we accept that persisting 
objects are multiply located, then we will think of c and d as four -dimensional 
objects, extended over time. Just like a and b, c and d have different heat 
distributions. c is hot at one end, its earlier end, and cold at the other; d, 
on the other hand, uniformly hot. Just as before, let us give names to their 
heat distribution properties: c's can be C, and d's D. 
Now we can define up the property of being hot at t1 as the disjunctive 
property of having either C or D, or any of those other heat distribution 
properties that, as it were, place heat at the tl end of their instance. Just 
as in the spatial case, this property is perfectly intrinsic and non -relational. 
Nor, I think, need it commit us to there being any proper parts of an object 
which has such a property. 
To generalise: wherever we have a temporally indexed property of being ¢ 
at t, we have a number of corresponding permanent distributional proper- 
ties: the al distributions. being 0 at t is a disjunction of some of those il 
distributions, namely, the ones that are compatible with being q at t. 
The Problem of Difference 
The same mechanism can be used to solve the problem of difference referred 
to in section 3.5.4. In that section I said that it is possible that things 
as seemingly different as a strawberry and a potato might turn out to be 
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numerically identical; indeed, it might be that the world is superfically just 
as it actually is, but there he only one thing, the Absolute. 
The problem of difference is the problem that the Absolute would appear to 
be intrinsically qualitatively different from itself. A potato and a strawberry 
are intrinsically different strawberries being sweet while potatoes are not.s 
If the Absolute is identical to both, then it seems we can derive a contra- 
diction from the hypothesis of Absolute monism, contrary to what I claimed 
earlier. 
Strictly speaking, however, what we should say of the Absolute is that it has 
a certain sweetness distribution. It is sweet over here, not sweet over there, 
where being sweet at p for some position p is understood as a disjunctive 
sweetness distribution. 
5.2.5 The Problem of Change: Adverbialism 
Adverbialism is best presented as a reply to the semantic problem of change. 
It corresponds to Lowe's analysis 14, in which the "at t" phrase is supposed 
to modify the copula. As Lowe puts it, the 
ascription of a shape to a is temporally qualified, i.e., the property - 
exemplification relation between a and a shape is relativised to a 
time... [the indexed copula solution] retains a and F as subject and 
predicate respectively and takes at t' at its face value as having 
adverbial (or predicate modifier) status. (LOWE 1988, p. 73) 
This idea has also been taken up by Sally Haslanger: 
The intuitive idea behind the so- called 'adverbial' option is that ob- 
jects have properties at times, and that time should modify this 
6I am assuming a primary property theory of sweetness here. 
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'having' rather than the subject or the property. Lewis interprets 
this in terms of a commitment to a three -place instantiation relation 
which takes objects, properties and times as arguments. 
(HASLANGER 1989, p. 120) 
There seems to be a lot of confusion in these proposals. Remember that we 
are supposed to be dealing with a semantic problem here as Lowe would 
surely agree, once we start speaking of three -place (or any place) instantiation 
relations, we are into deep metaphysics. What is left of adverbialism, once 
we shear it of metaphysical suggestions about the ways in which objects 
instantiate properties? Only one thing: Lowe's comment that the "at t" 
phrase of "a is F at t" is has "adverbial (or predicate modifier) status." 
This is not sufficient to distinguish adverbialism from the temporally indexed 
property solution discussed in section 5.2.3. Normally, adverbs modify the 
semantic value of the predicate of sentences they appear in, which is just 
what "at t" does according to the indexed predicate theory. Lowe wants to 
deny that "at t" works this way: according to him, the trouble with the 
indexed property solution is that it is "revisionary about predicates" (LowE 
1988, p. 73), a problem the adverbial solution is supposed to lack. 
How to understand adverbialism 
For this reason, we must take the label "adverbial" with a grain of salt, as 
Haslanger's scare quotes suggest. I cannot really extract from Lowe's text 
what the distinctive answer to the semantic problem offered by the indexed 
copula solution is supposed to be. I can see two further possibilities for what 
Lowe might have had in mind, though, beyond the adverbial one, for a total 
of three ways of understanding the indexed copula solution: 
I "at t" is an adverbial modifier. As already noted, this collapses in- 
to the indexed property solution. However, it could be accompanied 
by a distinctive metaphysical story involving relativised instantiation 
relations. I believe that this is the only plausible reading. 
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2 "at t" modifies the copula "is". This is suggested by the way in which 
Lowe presents the taxonomy of solutions, attaching "at -t" with a hy- 
phen to different words in the sentence -schema "a is F ". The trouble 
here is that the copula has no semantic value to modify - it's entire- 
ly an artifact of English grammar! Though other natural languages 
have the copula, its only function is to convert an adjectival phrase 
like "hot ", "drunk at ti ", "weighing 50 Newtons on the moon" into the 
corresponding verb phrases "is hot ", "is drunk at t1" etc. It's quite 
possible for artificial languages such as standard quantificational logic 
to have no copula at all. Even natural languages can get along without 
it: "Philip drinks at t1" is a perfectly respectable instance of the type 
of sentence we are trying to analyse here, and it has no copula. 
3 "at t" modifies the semantic value of the whole sentence without mod- 
ifying the semantic value of its parts. It is, in other words, a sentential 
operator. Since it is obviously not truth functional, it must be inten- 
sional, like a modal or belief operator. "The poker is hot at t" is thus to 
be likened to such usages as "Holmes lived at 21B Baker St. according 
to the Sherlock Holmes stories" or "Shipley won the 1999 election in 
the possible world w ". This is a familiar account of the function of "at 
t" (it's the account endorsed by presentists) - but it is one that Lowe 
explicitly leaves out of his taxonomy.? 
So I find nothing but confusion in the idea that adverbialism represents a 
distinctive answer to Lowe's "semantic problem ": the problem of semantical- 
ly analysing "a is F at t". Most plausibly, I think, the `adverbial' proposal 
should he seen as a variant of the indexed property proposal, with an ad- 
ditional suggestion as to the underlying metaphysics. That suggestion is: 
avoid the charge that temperature, drunkenness, shape etc. are relations by 
'Lowe says of his three solutions: "These do not correspond exactly to Lewis's original 
three candidate solutions: the first and third correspond to his first and third, but the 
second corresponds to a solution mentioned in Lewis's first footnote." (LowE 1988, p. 
73) Lewis's "second solution ", which Lowe has left out, is the one now under consideration. 
(LEWIS 1986, p. 204) 
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relativising not temperature, drunkenness, shape, etc. (as Mellor did) but 
the instantiation relation holding between these properties and the objects 
that have them. 
I think I have already undercut the motivation for the adverbial solution 
by arguing that, in any case, the indexed property solution need not entail 
that temperature, drunkenness, etc. are relations. This aside, though, the 
adverbial solution has its own problems. 
We need not worry too hard about the hotly debated point (LEwis 1988, 
fn. 1) (HASLANGER 1989, pp. 120 -122) of whether the `adverbial' solution 
entails that there is a three -place instantiation relation. You might think 
of the "at t" as supplying a time to fill the third place of an instantiation 
relation. Or you might think that there are two -place instantiation relations 
corresponding to each time, and that "at t" disambiguates between them. In 
the latter case, it's easy enough to define up a three -place relation between 
an object, a property, and a time, which holds iff the two -place instantia- 
tion relation associated with that time holds between that object and that 
property. 
Objections to adverbialism 
Here's what I understand the `adverbial' solution to be saying: we analyse 
"the poker is hot at ti" into the subject "the poker ", and the predicate "is 
hot at t1 ". The predicate expresses the relational property of bearing the 
instantiation relation tily to hotness. Hotness is a monadic property, not 
a relation. "bearing the instantiation relation tily" is to be understood in 
either of the two ways described above. 
My objection in either case will be the sanie: just as requiring a copula to link 
subject and predicate was bad grammar, requiring an instantiation relation 
to link objects and properties is bad metaphysics. "The danger ", Haslanger 
rightly says, "of a three -place instantiation relation is that it invites us to 
treat objects as related to their properties as individuals are related to other 
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individuals; this would be undesirable." (HASLANGER 1989, p. 122) I might 
add that the undesirability is identical if a two -place, or any instantiation 
relation is admitted. 
The trouble is that the instantiation relation itself is a property, and if objects 
must be related to their properties by instantiation, then a second instance 
of the instantiation relation is needed to relate the original object and prop- 
erty to instantiation; and a third to relate those three items to instantiation 
again, and so on ad infinitum. If any explanatory work was done by bring- 
ing instantiation into the picture, it cannot be completed. This is a version 
of F.H. Bradley's celebrated regress of relations. (BRADLEY 1897, p. 18) 
(ARMSTRONG 1978A, p. 106). 
The force of Bradley's argument is that predication cannot be analysed in 
terms of instantiation. ( LEwIS 1983B, pp. 21 -23) Any such analysis will 
still contain predication - of an instantiation relation. It's just such an 
analysis that the adverbialist is attempting: they want to analyse "a is F at 
t" in terms of "a bears the instantiation relation at t to F- ness ". But this is 
just plain circular, for "a bears the instantiation relation at t to F- ness" is 
just another predication. 
5.3 Arguments 
The positive arguments for endurantism are mostly reactive - they argile 
against perdurantism by claiming that perduring objects cannot change (sec- 
tion 5.3.1); or that, if it is possible to defuse the positive arguments for 
perdurantism, endurantism appears to be a reasonable generalisation of per- 
durantism (section 5.3.2). 
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5.3.1 The Essential Temporality of Change 
According to D.H. Mellor, first, there is an important distinction between 
change and mere difference; second, this distinction is underwritten by an 
important metaphysical difference between persistence and extension; and 
third, this difference is that changeable things must persist by enduring. 
Mellor's stalking horse is the theory according to which things change if and 
only if they are non- uniform over time; the view that, as D.C. Williams says, 
"the `change' of a leaf's color from day to day is of the same denomination 
as its `change' from inch to inch of its surface ". (WILLIAMS 1966, p. 306) 
On Williams's view, ordinary language makes a metaphysically gratuitous 
distinction between the temporal and spatial cases of non - uniformity, calling 
the former "change ", and the Iatter not. In fact, it does not even do this 
consistently - it is natural to say "the river changes colour as it reaches the 
sea ". I will call this the doctrine of Change as Non -uniformity. 
Richard Taylor has also urged this same idea: 
[T]ime has always been thought of as an essential ingredient to mo- 
tion and change... This way of looking at things is no more than a 
reflection of certain predjudices, however. 
[S]omething, such as a wire might be blue at one end and red at 
another, and perhaps various other colors between these two places. 
This would accordingly be an example of spatial change. This sense 
of "change' is not, moreover, strange or unusual. It would make 
sense, for instance, to say of a wire, which was found to be red in 
one town and blue in another, that somewhere... between those two 
places it changes color. (TAYLOR 1992, p. 73 -74) 
Mellor believes that this way of thinking papers over an important meta- 
physical distinction. He gives the example of 
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Jim and his grandson Jake, who is conceived after Jim dies and has 
a different blood group. Because Jim and Jake are different people, 
this difference between them is not a change.... For it is not a change 
in Jim or Jake, neither of whom ever changes his blood group; nor 
is it a change in their family, which, as a whole has no one blood 
group. So, since it is certainly not a change in anything else, it is 
not a change at all. (MELLOR 1998, p. 89 -90) 
Mellor goes on to argue that, for the same reasons, differences between the 
parts of an extended object cannot constitute a change: 
Take the poker that is hot at one end, and cold at the other. This is 
not a change in either end, since in neither end is there any difference: 
one end is all hot, and the other is all cold. Nor is it a change in 
the poker, which as a whole is neither hot nor cold; and nothing can 
change it from being hot to cold if it is neither. And if this difference 
is not a change in the poker or either of its ends, it is not a change in 
anything else, so it is not a change at all. (MELLOR 1998, p. 90) 
The crucial point about the poker case is not simply that we would not say 
that the poker changed. According to Change as Non -uniformity, the poker 
only changes if it is non -uniform over time, and the case just hasn't said 
anything about that yet. What's crucial is the parallel with Jake and Jim. 
We are supposed to think that change in blood group has not occured in the 
Jake and Jim case for the same reasons that change in temperature has not 
occured in the poker case. 
We are supposed to think that in the Jim and Jake case, there is an out: the 
difference in blood group could constitute a change, if Jim and Jake were 
the same person. The way that a person persists makes it the case that a 
difference between the temporal extremities of the person counts as a change. 
However, the way that a family persists (by having a person here, a person 
there) is too like the way an object extends over space (by having a part 
here, a part there) for such difference to count as change. 
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Therefore, contra Williams and Taylor, persistence is unlike extension, in 
that there are two possibilities for the way things can persist: the way that 
a person persists, which allows the possibility of change, and the way that 
a family persists, which does not allow this. Only the latter is analogous to 
spatial extension. 
I think that there are two things wrong with this argument. First, as I argue 
in section 5.2.2, things can (and do) sometimes extend through space (i.e. 
by entending) in the way that Mellor thinks persons persist through time 
(i.e. by enduring): by being wholly located at each of several temporal or 
spatial places. If I am right, then there are two possibilities for the way an 
object extends through space, analogous to the two possibilities for the way 
an object persists through time Mellor cannot appeal to an metaphysically 
important disanalogy between space and time on this point. 
Second, it is not clear to me that the two cases Mellor mentions parallel each 
other in the way that he needs. That is, the reason that we say there is no 
change in the Jim and Jake case is not the same as the reason we say there 
is no change in the poker case. 
The plausibility of the Jake and Jim case hangs on the fact that Mellor throws 
in the option of believing that the family might change in virtue of having 
distinct members who have different blood groups, and then tells us that a 
family cannot change its blood group because it does not have a blood group 
to change. 
In fact this depends on what we think the ontological status of families is. 
There is a temptation to think that families are a kind of abstract object Iike 
sets, which don't have blood groups, because they don't have blood. But that 
cannot be what Mellor wants us to think, because it breaks down the analogy 
between this case, and the case of the poker. The family is supposed to be 
changeless because it is related to Jake and Jim in the same way that the 
poker is to its ends. That is, the family must be regarded as a mereological 
fusion of its members, rather than some abstract thing. 
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With this out of the way, it is hard to see why we should not think of 
the family -fusion as changing its blood group. It certainly has blood, and 
may, thereby, have a blood group. It probably has more than one; but why 
should this interfere with its blood group changing? According to Mellor, 
it is at least a necessary condition of something's changing that it have two 
incompatible properties at two different times (MELLOR 1998, p. 89) - so 
anything that changes its blood group must, on Mellor's own account, have 
at least two blood groups. 
The "family_ as a whole has no one blood group." -- non sequitur! Mellor 
positively requires that an object have more than one blood group, if it is to 
change as regards its blood group. Indeed this seems to be what he has in 
mind when arguing that the poker does not change from being hot to being 
cold, because it is neither hot nor cold. 
So, insofar as the Jim and Jake case is convincingly a case in which no 
change is described, it is not analogous to the poker case. And insofar as 
it is analogous, there is no pressure to deny that the family as a whole has 
changed. 
5.3.2 Generalisation 
Endurantism, as I understand it, is a weaker doctrine than perdurantism. 
The endurantist and the perdurantist agree that persisting objects are lo- 
cated at multiple times. At this point, the endurantist says no more, while 
the perdurantist goes on to say that persisting things have distinct temporal 
parts at each time at which they are located. 
Understood this way, endurantism does not need to deny that things may 
persist by perduring. Rather, it holds that perdurance, if it ever oceured, 
would be sufficient, but not necessary, for persistence. Individual enduran- 
tists also hold that there are apriori reasons for thinking that nothing, or no 
changing thing, could perdure, as discussed in. sections 5.2.1 and 5.3.1, but 
it is not necessary to accept this to be an endurantist. 
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Perdurantism is on a par with the position I have have called strong en- 
durantism, the view that endurance, and endurance only, is necessary for 
persistence. The onus is on the holders of these positions to take us beyond 
the assumption that both positions share, that persisting things are located 
at multiple times, to the stronger views, either that persisting things are par- 
tially (never wholly!) located at multiple times, or wholly (never partially!) 
located at multiple times. 
Thus, if the arguments for pedurantism (or for strong endurantism) are un- 
convincing, we should believe endurantism. 
5.4 Problems 
I discuss one outstanding problem for endurantism, to do with temporary 
parts (section 5.4.1). This problem is connected with the issues to do with 
material constitution and mereological extensionality that were briefly dis- 
cussed in section 3.3.1. 
5.4.1 Dion /Theon cases 
The problem of change, at least in the version presented by Lewis, concerns 
objects having temporary properties. A variant on this idea uses temporary 
parts. For example, in a puzzle from the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus, an 
unfortunate man called Dion has his foot annihilated, at some time t1. Dion 
survives this accident. Now, speaking in the atemporal language of classical 
mereology, what do we say about the relationship between the Dion and his 
foot is it a part of him or not? (BURKE 1994) 
There are only two ways to answer this puzzle within the confines of classical 
mereology. We might interpret classical mereology so that its formulae are 
implicitly present- tensed. This is a possibility that I will take up later, in 
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section 6.3.2. In that case, the answer is that whether the foot is part of 
Dion depends on whether the foot exists at the time of utterance. 
The alternative requires that there he temporal parts: Dion has a temporal 
part prior to t, which the foot is eternally part of; and he has a distinct 
temporal part after t, which the foot is eternally not part of. Dion has both 
temporal parts eternally as well. Now, in fact, this is not just a gratuitous 
introduction of temporal parts. It is in fact required of anyone who accepts 
that the theorems of classical mereology are eternal truths. 
To see why this is, suppose that Dion has the minimal number of proper 
parts required to satisfy the hypothesis: a foot (Foot) and a body minus 
that foot (Dion - Foot), or to give it a proper name, Theon. Suppose that 
both Theon and Foot endure throughout their lives. 
Roth Theon and Foot are respectable spatial parts. Foot, however, is also 
a temporal part. Recall our definition of temporal part from section 4.1: a 
temporal part of an object is either the object itself, or a part that is located 
at some but not all of the times at which the object is located. And indeed 
this is true of Foot (see figure 5.3). 
The temporal part of Dion prior to ti is simply Dion. The temporal part 
of Dion after ti is Theon. Dion has Foot as a part, Theon does not. All 
this follows just from the description of the hypothesis, provided we think of 
the objects in question as multiply located, and the part -whole relation as 
holding eternally. Whatever reasons we have for thinking that Dion survives 
his accident are reasons for thinking that Dion has perdured, not endured, 
through a change of parts. 
Nor will the distributional properties approach answer this argument. To 
replace the part -whole relation with a "parts distribution" would be to revise 
classical mereology; even if the idea of a "parts distribution" were intelligible, 
which I am not sure that it is. 
Note that this argument does not refute endurantism or establish perdu - 
rantism; it shows instead that the position I described earlier as strong en- 
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Figure 5.3: Dion and Theon 
durantism is false. If things can survive the removal of a part, then some 
things perdure; however, it need not be the case that everything that persists 
perdures. 
5.5 Variants 
I discuss just one variant on endurantism: the claims that some objects 
endure while others perdure (section 5.5.1). It seems to me that this gives 
an appropriate answer to the problem of Dion and Theon. 
5.5.1 Mixed Theories 
A mixed theory of persistence is one according to which some things per- 
sist by perduring, and others persist by enduring. By my definition, this 
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is a type of endurantism, and it is commonly enough held by self- ascribing 
endurantists. There are three main motivations for such a view: 
O The continuant / occurent distinction. 
Some endurantists, such as Mellor, believe that there is an important 
distinction between those persisting entities that can change (like ma- 
terial objects) and those that cannot (like processes or events). This 
distinction is often identified with the distinction between those objects 
that endure, and those that perdure. It is thought by these enduran- 
tists that endurance, while not a necessary condition of persistence, is a 
necessary condition of change, and that there is an important category 
of persisting objects for which this condition is not met. 
I have already discussed this view in section 5.3.1, so I won't repeat 
myself here. 
O An answer to the problem of change. 
It might be thought that the problem of change does not refute en- 
durantism, if there are objects that are not undergoing intrinsic change 
at every moment at which they exist. Perhaps objects endure up until 
the point at which they change, perdure over that moment, and then 
start enduring again. 
This view could seem undermotivated - but in fact, I think, it could 
be motivated by a desire for parsimony with respect to temporal parts. 
We should only believe in as many temporal parts as we need to. So, 
if f did not have an answer to the problem of intrinsic change already, 
I would be attracted to this option. 
® An answer to the Dion / Theon problem. 
It seems to me that a mixed theory of persistence is the right conclusion 
to the argument presented in section 5.4.1. Objects that otherwise 
endure can change their parts; when they do so, they automatically 
perdure. This does not seem to me to he any kind of concession to 
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perdurantism, either: in the remainder of this section I will explain 
why. 
An object x undergoes a Cambridge change at t iff before t it was true to 
say that "x is 0", and after t it was true to say that "x is not 0". Because 
we place no constraints on 0, here, every object undergoes a Cambridge 
change at every moment at which anything changes. Suppose 0 expresses the 
property being such that there are precisely 100 sandcastles on the English 
coast. At the moment, t, that such a sandcastle falls, the Great Pyramid 
undergoes a Cambridge change because before t it is true, and after t false, 
to say "The Great Pyramid is p ". 
It seems odd to say that the Great Pyramid changes because of the fall of a 
sandcastle. This goes to show that we need to distinguish intrinsic change 
from mere Cambridge change. The property of being such that there are 
precisely 100 sandcastles on the English coast is not a respect in which the 
Great Pyramid can change intrinsically. Among Cambridge changes, some 
are intrinsic, and some are not they are mere - Cambridge changes. 
Similarly, I think, we need to distinguish among the intrinsic changes between 
those that involve the creation or destruction of an object, and those that 
do not. The former kind are substantial changes, the latter mere - intrinsic 
changes. The type of change that Dion undergoes when his foot is annihilated 
is the paradigm of a substantial change; whereas the types of changes that 
are used as examples of the problem of change - cooling down, bending, 
becoming drunk - seem importantly not to involve creation or destruction. 
To believe otherwise is to subscribe to a kind of essentialism about intrinsic 
properties - to believe that intrinsic change is not possible without destruc- 
tion or creation a type of essentialism that I complained about in another 
context in (PARSONS 1999) (see appendix A). It seems to me that this essen- 
tialism is quite gratuitous, and so we should respect the distinction between 
substantial and mere -intrinsic change. 
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If this distinction is well founded then: first, we have another objection to 
perdurantism (which I regard as the decisive one) - namely that it conflates 
the distinction by assimilating intrinsic change to substantial change. And 
second, it would seem reasonable to treat the way in which objects persist 
through substantial change differently to the way we treat the way in which 
objects persist through mere -intrinsic change. This is what I propose to 
do: objects perdure through substantial change, and endure through mere - 
intrinsic change (as well as through mere -Cambridge change, or periods of 
no change at all). 
Chapter 6 
Presentism 
6.1 The Theory 
Presentism is a popular turn in philosophy of time which holds that many 
problems about time are solved by recognising that everything there is is 
present; nothing is past or future. It follows that no object is located at 
any time other than the present - there are no such times for objects to 
be located at. Every object, according to the presentist, is located at one 
and only one time: the present. Presentists must, therefore, reject what 
perdurantists and endurantists agreed on, that being located at multiple 
times is a necessary condition for persisting. 
Presentism is not a simple doctrine about persistence, but a comprehensive 
philosophical theory of time. The two key planks of this theory are what I 
will call "tensism" and 'anti-realism (about the past and future) ". 
6.1.1 Tensism 
Tensism is the doctrine that tense is imanalysable (with analysis construed 
fairly broadly). 
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Tensed sentences are not logically equivalent to any tenseless sentence, ac- 
cording to tensism. Nor are sentences asserting that a tensed sentence is true 
equivalent to any tenseless sentence. This second clause is needed because 
presentists wish to reject analyses of this form: 
Given some tensed sentence, say 31, 
31 There were dinosaurs. 
we analyse it by giving its truth conditions in a sentence such as 32 
32 31 is true iff there are dinosaurs at a time earlier than the tokening of 
31 
Presentists reject these analyses because they wish to hold that there were 
dinosaurs without being ontologically committed to dinosaurs (which, if they 
exist, are past). But if 32 is true, then to accept 31 is to accept the right 
hand side of 32, that there are dinosaurs at some time. So presentists reject 
analysis 32, and all analyses like it - they affirm tensism. 
Strong Tensism 
In the discussion above I made free use of a distinction between tensed and 
tenseless sentences. Even the non -presentist accepts that there is a perfectly 
good sense in which there are no dinosaurs: the last one died about 64 million 
years ago. This is the present tense use of "there are no dinosaurs ". But, 
for the non -presentist, there is another, important sense in which "there are 
no dinosaurs" is false, for there are past dinosaurs, and a past dinosaur is a 
kind of dinosaur. The former sense is where "are" is a verb in the present 
tense; the latter sense is where "are" is a ` tenseless' verb. 
English fails to distinguish between the two, but it is perfectly possible to in- 
troduce a distinction of this kind for philosophical purposes. One convention 
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for making this distinction explicit in English is to render tenseless verbs in 
italics (SMART 1963, p. 133) another, in parentheses (SMITH 1993, p. 7); I 
will adopt the convention of appending " -now" to present tense verbs where 
they are not to be understood tenselessly. So, the non -presentist claims that 
there are dinosaurs, but not that there are -now dinosaurs. 
To put this another way, if we are to distinguish between tenseless sentences 
and their present tense analogues, we need a distinction between gram- 
matical tense and logical tense. The belief in tenseless sentences is not 
grammatically revisionary. Grammatically speaking, the sentence "there are 
dinosaurs" is in the present tense. How it should be understood for the 
purposes of philosophical semantics is another matter. 
This distinction, between tensed and tenseless senses of the grammatical 
present tense, excites opposition from many presentists. Presentists often 
underwrite their tensism but saying that tensed language cannot be analysed 
in terms of tenseless language because there is not any tenseless language in 
terms of which to do the analysis. This claim is stronger than tensism; I 
will call it strong tensism (and when I need to draw the contrast between 
strong tensism and the view described in the previous section, I'll call the 
latter weak tensism). 
Though tensism is a semantic doctrine, it has important methodological 
consequences. It follows from weak tensism that philosophical semantics 
of tensed language must be done, if at all, in tensed language. And it follows 
from strong tensism, that all philosophy, including especially metaphysics 
must be clone in tensed language. 
6.1.2 Anti -realism 
Anti- realism about the past and future (or anti -realism, as I will henceforth 
call it for brevity) is the doctrine that we should not be ontologically commit- 
ted to anything past or future; or, more naturally, that there is not anything 
which is past or future. 
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The former, more clumsy formulation of this doctrine is needed because of the 
danger of presentists and non -presentists speaking past each other owing to 
confusions about tense. The question of ontology is often put thus: "What 
is there ?" following Quine (1953). This question is normally taken to be 
a tenseless one. But if strong tenselessism is on the table, this cannot be 
assumed. 
What should we take the question of ontology to be, by the lights of strong 
tensists? There are two possibilities, neither of which is satisfactory - both 
lead to presentists talking past their opponents. 
First, it might be "What is there now ?" - an explicitly present tense 
question. In that case, the ontological part of presentism is a trivial truth 
recognised by realists about the past and future. Of course there are only 
present things right now! But, as Mellor says, "authors who think that only 
what is present... exists are not peddling mere tautologies." (MELLOR 1998, 
p. 20) 
Second, it might be "What is, was, or will be there "? - a disjunction of 
three tensed questions. This formulation has the opposite problem, because, 
of course, now the presentist won't answer this question any differently to 
a realist about the past and future. Presentists admit that there were di- 
nosaurs, and there will be, perhaps, nasally -installed computers; but these 
would be past and future things respectively, and cannot he things that a 
presentist believes that there are for the purposes of ontology. 
A presentist can avoid this problem by rejecting strong tensism, continuing 
to hold weak tensism, and accepting that the question of ontology is a tense - 
less one. Then anti -realism becomes the doctrine that there is tenselessly 
nothing past or future. This is a very good reason for rejecting strong ten - 
sism. It is very clear that realists and anti -realists about the past and future 
disagree over something. However, there are no tensed sentences that the 
one holds that the other doesn't. It follows that whatever sentence(s) they 
are disagreeing over must he tenseless. 
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Though it seems to nie that strong tensism is indefensible for the reasons 
given above, I don't wish to assume that point for the purposes of my other 
arguments here. To accomodate strong tensists, we can say that anti -realism 
is the doctrine that we ought not to be ontologically committed to past and 
future things, where the reasons why not are spelled out in some way that 
avoids the problems described above. 
6.1.3 The presentist theory of persistence 
It might seem that, given that presentists deny that there is anything past 
or future, they would simply deny that, strictly speaking, things persist. 
The presentist account of persistence is sometimes described in these terms, 
as in Lewis's "second solution" to the problem of temporary intrinsics (see 
section 4.2.2): " This is a solution that rejects endurance; because it rejects 
persistence altogether..." (LEWIS 1986, p. 204) 
Lewis's comment is taken from a context in which "persistence" requires 
location at multiple times, however. The presentist theory of persistence 
is most naturally taken to be a theory on which multiple location is not a 
necessary condition of being a persisting object. If we grant presentists the 
resources required to make presentism a coherent position, presentists have 
a very obvious and natural sounding theory of persistence available to them. 
According to the presentist theory of persistence, an object persists iff it 
either did exist. or will exist. 
In effect, a persisting object on the presentist theory is one that exists at 
two times; both a past or future one, and the present one (since everything 
is at the present time, according to anti- realism about the past and future). 
Of course, a presentist will refuse this gloss, quantifying as it does over past 
and future times. 
It is an important point, I think, that what I have described here as the 
"presentist theory of persistence" is not entailed by presentism, construed 
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as the conjunction of anti- realism and tensism. For the moment I will not 
attempt to establish this - in section 6.5, however, I describe two variants on 
presentism, one of which combines a form of anti -realism about the past and 
future with an endurantist theory of persistence (section 6.5.1), and the other 
of which combines a realist ontology with a presentist theory of persistence 
(section 6.5.2). If these two theories are coherent, then presentism proper 
must he orthogonal to the presentist theory of persistence. 
6.2 Replies 
6.2.1 The Analogy with Space 
Presentists standardly reject any analogy between time and space. the ar- 
guments they use are similar to those considered earlier (see section 5.2.1). 
Instead they claim that time should be understood on the model of modality. 
I will discuss analogies between time and modality in sections 6.3.1- 6.3.3. 
There is, however, a problem about how to make presentism compatible with 
relativistic physics. Given the relativity of simultaneity, it is not possible to 
pick out one set of events as the present independently of a choice of reference 
frame. But which frame shall we choose? (PUTNAM 1967) 
There are two basic lines of reply to this problem. The first is to advance 
presentism as a piece of conceptual analysis of ordinary language - the folk 
theory of time - without intending to affirm or deny that theory. The claim 
then is not that the past and future do not exist, but that we speak as though 
they don't. 
Alternatively, a presentist might choose the bold course of denying that cur- 
rent relativistic physics is correct. This could be done either as a part of a 
denial of scientific realism, or as part of a programme of naturalised meta- 
physics. To he slightly less bold, the presentist could claim only the relativis- 
tic physics is incomplete (which seems plausible) and that completed physics 
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will give us a reason to prefer one reference frame, rehabilitating absolute 
simultaneity. 
6.2.2 The Problem of Change 
Presentists also have an easy answer to the problem of change. Since objects 
do not have any properties other than those they have at the present moment, 
the arguments connected with the problem of change can get no grip. 
The presentist replies to the semantic problem of change by endorsing analy- 
sis 15 (see page 74), and to the problem of temporary intrinsics by endorsing 
Lewis's "second solution" : "the only intrinsic properties of a thing are those 
it has at the present moment. Other times are like false stories; they are ab- 
stract representations, composed out of the materials of the present, which 
represent or misrepresent the way things are" (LEWIS 1986, p. 203 -204) 
Lewis complains that this solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics 
involves the denial that things persist at all. As I understand presentism, 
however, it is not denying that things persist, but offering an analysis of 
persistence - that things persist iff they did, or will exist. Lewis's definition 
of persistence, which is intended to be neutral, in fact begs the question in 
favour of endurantism and perdurantism and against the presentist theory of 
persistence, as I mentioned above (section 6.1.3). 
6.3 Arguments 
The main argument for presentism that is independent of its treatment of 
puzzles concerning persistence consists of a series of analogies that presentists 
draw between time and modality (section 6.3.1), and between aspects of the 
language of time, and modal language (sections 6.3.2- 6.3.3). 
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6.3.1 Metaphysical Analogies with Modality 
The presentist's attitude to past and future times is very like the actual - 
ist's attitude to possible worlds. Actualists wish to continue using modal 
language, such as "It is possible that dinosaurs are warm -blooded" without 
being ontologically committed to possible warm -blooded dinosaurs. Pre - 
sentists wish to continue using tensed language, such as "It was the case 
that dinosaurs were warm -blooded" without being ontologically committed 
to past warm -blooded dinosaurs. 
Actualism is a difficult doctrine to hold onto, given the types of semantical 
theory that are available for modal language. A standard strategy for actual - 
ists is to reconstrue seeming quantification over some merely possible objects 
- normally possible worlds, or possible situations - as quantification over 
objects that are clearly actual, but abstract. This strategy is called modal 
ersatzism, and the actual objects that play the role of possible worlds or sit- 
uations are called ersatz possible worlds, ersatz possible situations. (LEWIS 
1986) 
A clear example of this is Peter Forrest's account of possible worlds as world 
properties. (FoRREST 1986) Think about the property of being just the 
way the world actually is. Now if this property is perfectly ontologically 
respectable, then there seems no reason not to think that similar world prop- 
erties that the world does not actually instantiate should also be ontologically 
respectable. In particular, there is no reason to hold that a property is itself 
not actual merely because it has no actual instance. 
So, according to one version of modal ersatzism, merely possible worlds can 
be identified with these uninstantiated world properties. A world at which 
there are purple people- eating monsters is really the property of being a world 
containing at which there are purple people- eating monsters. If there were 
such a world, it would be a possible object, and actualism would be false. 
But that is no reason to be opposed to the property of being such a world. 
An analogous move is possible with regard to times. Consider the property 
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of being just the way the present time actually is. If this property is ontolog- 
ically respectable, then very similar time properties that happen not to be 
instantiated by the present time are ontologically respectable. These prop- 
erties are ways that the present time might have been. Among them, some 
are ways the present time was, and other are ways it will be. The former are 
ersatz past tines, the latter ersatz future times. (BIGELOw 1996) 
There is an important distinction which comes along with modal ersatzism 
that I should mention here. This is the distinction between the actual world, 
and actualised worlds. In the world -property ersatzism that I described, 
among the ersatz worlds is the property of being just the way the world 
actually is. This is the actualised world, or the actual ersatz world: the 
one among the ersatz worlds that is an actually instantiated property. It 
is merely one among many ersatz worlds. The actual world, on the other 
hand is the object that instantiates this property, and is the one and only 
non -ersatz world. (LEwis 1986, pp. 137 -138) 
A similar distinction is needed for temporal ersatzism. We need to distinguish 
the present time from the property of being just the way that time actually is. 
The former is (according to presentism) the one and only time - the present 
time; the latter is the one ersatz time among many that is instantiated - 
the present ersatz time. 
6.3.2 Syntactical Analogies with Modality 
Presentists usually think that the appropriate model for tense is modal logic. 
Tenses should be construed as sentential operators, like the modal operators 
box ( - often interpreted as "it is necessarily the case that ") and diamond 
(Q often interpreted as "it is possibly the case that "). 
The corresponding tense operators I will write as F ( "it will be the case 
that "), P ( "it was the case that "), G ( "it will always be the case that "), 
and H ( "it was always the case that"). F and P correspond to modal logic's 
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0, asserting, as it were, that there is some future or past time at which 
the embedded sentence is true. G and H correspond to modal logic's , 
asserting, as it were, that the embedded sentence is true at all future and 
past times. 
(I say "as it were" in the above paragraph hecause of course any presentist 
is going to jibe at the quantification over past and future times involved 
in these explications. The English - language interpretations in parentheses, 
however, are presentistically respectable -- or at least, they are according to 
presentists.) 
Sentential operators are pieces of logical vocabulary that can modify both 
open and closed sentences - by contrast with predicate modifiers (which 
modify only open sentences) and statement operators (which modify only 
closed ones).1 So the mark of a feature of natural language that is best 
translated into logic as a sentential operator is that it is subject to scope 
ambiguities when used with quantifiers. 
For example, consider the future tense English sentence 
33 All human beings will have computers installed in their noses. 
Using "Px" for "x is a human being" and "Qx" for "x has a computer 
installed in his or her nose ", which of 34 and 35 should be the translation of 
33 into logic? 
34 F(Vx)(Px D Qx) 
35 (dx)(F(Px 7 Qx)) 
I blur the distinctions between predicates and open sentences, and between statements 
and closed sentences here only to secure terminological standardness. I don't think these 
distinctions matter to the point I am making here 
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34 and 35 have different truth conditions. 35 is only true if all present human 
beings survive until the invention and wide use of nasal computers. 34 on 
the other hand only requires that it will be the case that all humans being 
then in existence will have nasal computers installed. 
The ambiguity between these two readings seems to exist in the English 
language sentence that they are intended to translate. This suggests that the 
way in which the tense of 33 interacts with the rest of the sentence is best 
understood on the model of a sentential operator (like the modal operators). 
By analogy, therefore, presentists think we should treat the tense operators 
very much in the way that we treat modal, and other intensional operators: 
If I allege or believe that someone has stolen my pencil, there may be 
no specific individual with respect to whom I allege or believe that 
he stole my pencil. There is alleged or believed to be an individual 
who stole it, but there is no individual who is alleged or believed to 
have stolen it... 
[W]hat I am suggesting is that the sort of thing that we unques- 
tionably do have with "It is said that" and "It is thought that ", we 
also have with "lt will be the case that" and "lt was the case that ". 
(PRioR 1968, p. 12 -13) 
I will call this doctrine, that tenses should be understood as nnanalysable 
sentential operators, operator tensism. 
6.3.3 Semantical Analogies with Modality 
According to many presentists, times play a similar semantic role to possible 
worlds. Times, like worlds, are the sort of thing at which sentences may be 
true or false. A sentence might be true at one time, and not another. For 
example, "there are dinosaurs" is be true at some past times, but false at 
the present one. 
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Temporally relativised truth can be used - and is used, in model theory of 
tense logic - to give a semantics for the tense operators: 
Fa iff there is a future time at which "a" is true. 
Pa iff there is a past time at which "a" is true. 
Ga iff "a" is true at every future time. 
Ha iff "a" is true at every past time. 
Here again we are slipping into quantifying over times, which might he 
thought to be dubious by presentist lights. However, the same dubious- 
ness hangs over the quantification over merely possible worlds that is used 
to give the analogous semantics for the modal operators. In the modal case, 
a standard move is to say that the possible worlds being quantified over are 
the ersatz worlds discussed earlier (section 6.3.1). Similarly, presentists will 
wish to say, the times that are being quantified over here are ersatz times. 
6.4 Problems 
There's a simple, table- thumping objection to presentism which is, I think, in 
a. certain sense the right objection. All subsequent objections to presentism 
can be presented as rejoinders to the presentist's response to this: 
The anti -realist about the past is in the same absurd position as 
someone who holds that God created the world ex nihilo in 4004 
BCE, complete with fossils to test the faithful. Worse, she holds 
that 1 did not even begin this sentence! The anti -realist about 
the future holds that I will not thump the table in the next 5 
seconds.... IThump!] I refute her thus! 
6.4 Problems 139 
This is, of course, an unfair characterisation of what even the most minimally 
sophisticated philosophical presentiste believe. An anti - realist about the past 
does not have to hold that there were no dinosaurs, or no last Thursday, or no 
beginning of this sentence. All presentiste that I know of want to reconstruct 
talk of the past in such a way that "There were dinosaurs 64 million years 
ago" comes out true, or at least assertable in a way that its negation is not, 
without there being any dinosaurs. 
That is, the anti -realist about the past need not hold that "There were 
dinosaurs 64 miIIion years ago" is false, but only that it carries no onto- 
logical commitment to past, mind -independent dinosaurs. A similar move 
will be made for future tense sentences. The anti -realist about the future 
need not deny "Australia will be a republic ", provided that she denies that 
this sentence carries ontological commitment to a future, mind- independent, 
Australian Republic. 
The presentist is writing a promissory note for a semantic theory that will 
deliver these implications about past and future tense sentences. Presumably 
that semantic theory will be given an analogous form to that of the possible - 
worlds semantics for modality, as discussed in section 6.3.3. 
So far as I know, there are three possible moves that a realist can make at this 
point. First, the realist might try to think up more true sentences that seem 
to be committed to past or future entities, but which cannot be treated in the 
way the presentist proposes to treat "there were dinosaurs" and "Australia 
will be a republic" (I discuss this option in sections 6.4.1- 6.4.3). Second, the 
realist might try to argue that the type of semantics the presentist proposes 
will not yield anti- realism about the past and future. I won't discuss this 
option directly, but it is implicit in my discussion of stage theory, which tries 
to take the presentist's treatment of tense and persistence, and combine it 
with a realist ontology of time (section 6.5.2). Third, the realist might try to 
argue that the proposed semantics of tense do not really answer the problem 
posed by the tablethumping objection given above (to be discussed in section 
6.4.4). 
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6.4.1 Present -tense truths about the past and future 
If the presentist can accept that past things did exist, and future things will 
exist, what exactly does she believe that's different from what the realist 
about past and future believes? For one thing, the presentist holds that 
though there were past things, and there will be future things, there aren't 
any of either. 
Most ordinary talk about the past or future is couched in the past tense or 
the future tense. Ordinary past tense sentences about the past such as 36, 
36 Some dinosaurs were herbivores. 
can he dealt with by the presentist's proposed semantics for the past tense. 
Suppose for the sake of argument, for the remainder of this section, that such 
a semantics exists, is plausible, and compatible with anti -realism about the 
past. No objection remains to the compatibility of presentism with 36. 
Truths involving "is past" and "is future" 
We do not always talk about the past and future in the past or future tense. 
Take for example, 
37 Some dinosaurs are past. 
38 Some nasal computers are future. 
37 is certainly true. There were some dinosaurs, even the presentist will ad- 
mit. But if there were some dinosaurs, and there are no longer, then those 
dinosaurs are past. The most natural reading of this proposition, even assum- 
ing operator tensism, is straightforward quantification over past dinosaurs, 
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outside of the scope of a tense operator. And on a standard, quantificational 
view of ontological commitment, that makes 37 committing to dinosaurs. 
Similar reasoning applies to 38. Supposing that there will sometime be 
nasally -installed computers, those computers are now future. 
One answer to this is that the "natural reading" treats "are past" as an 
ordinary predicate, expressing an ordinary property of pastness, which may 
be a mistake. That way lies McTaggart's paradox. (MCTAGGART 1927, ch. 
33) (See also appendix E on this point). 
How else could we understand sentences such as 37? One way is to appeal 
to the distinction between grammatical and logical tense discussed earlier. 
Normally the logical tense of a sentence that contains a copula, as 37 does is 
determined by the tense of the copula, which is the main verb of the sentence. 
But perhaps in some cases, the remainder of the predicate can also make a 
contribution. "Past" could work like that, adding a past -tense operator with 
wide scope, so that the correct logical structure of 37 is the same as that of 
39 There were some dinosaurs. 
which, Iike 36, can be dealt with by the mechanisms we have granted the 
presentist. 
Truths involving other predicates 
Presentists sometimes express this point discussed above by saying "pastness 
is not a property ". But it is not only the predicate "is past" that generates 
this problem. Take: 
40 Some dinosaurs are dead. 
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A similar argument to that given above applies. If there were some live 
dinosaurs, and they were destroyed, they are now dead. They are not any 
less dead because they don't now exist - destroying a live thing is a way of 
killing it. 
The trouble here is that there seem to be two ways of being dead. First, 
something can be dead by being a corpse - by being a body that is not 
alive. Second something can be dead simply by being past. The property of 
being a corpse is a perfectly ordinary qualitative property; so the existence 
of predicates like "is dead" that seem to be disjoin being a corpse and being 
past undermines the view that "pastness is not a property ". 
This is more of a challenge than an argument. My point is that the presen- 
tist's semantics are becoming more and more complicated - she owes us an 
account of the semantics of predicates seemingly unrelated to tense, such as 
"is dead". And this account must be more complicated than realists about 
the past need to give. 
6.4.2 Proper names of past things 
Another well- discussed problem for presentism involving present -tense truths 
about the past concerns proper names for past things. The classic example 
is: 
41 Queen Anne is dead. 
Of this Prior says: 
What we must be careful about here is simply getting our prefixes in 
the right order. Just as 
(1) I think that (for some specific X (X stole my pencil)) 
does not imply 
6.4 Problems 143 
(2) For some specific X (I think that (X stole my pencil)), 
so 
(3) ft was the case that (for some specific X (X is called `Anne', 
reigns over England, etc.)) 
does not imply 
(4) For some specific X (it was the case that (X is called 'Anne', 
reigns over England, etc.)). 
On this view, the fact that Queen Anne has been dead for some 
years is not, in the strict sense of `about', a fact about Queen Anne; 
it is not a fact about anyone or anything - It is a general fact. 
(PRIOR, 1968, p. 15) 
It is a bit unclear what Prior means by "general fact" here. In the case of 
my thinking that someone stole my pencil, is it the content of that thought, 
or the fact that I am thinking it, that is supposed to be the general fact? 
Prior must mean the latter - for it is only that way that the analogy with 
41 (i.e. his (3)) goes through. Prior wants to say that "Queen Anne is dead" 
is a general fact because its logical structure is analogous to that of (I) and 
not of (2). 
On the other hand, if we think pre -theoretically about the sense in which a 
general fact is involved in (1) and not in (2), it is only sensible to say that 
the content of the belief mentioned in (1) is general, while the content of 
the belief mentioned in (2) is not. There is no sense in which the fact that 
I believe that someone stole my pencil is a more general fact that the fact 
that there is someone of I believe that they stole my pencil. The difference 
between (1) and (2) is not to do with the type of fact they express, but to 
do with the content of the belief mentioned in each. 
My point here is just that Prior's use of the term "general fact" is misleading. 
There is a kind of generality associated with (1) and not with (2), and it is 
easy, when reading Prior's argument less than carefully, to think that Prior 
is suggesting an analogy between the generality of "for some specific X (X 
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stole my pencil)" and "(for some specific X (X is called `Anne', reigns over 
England, etc.) ". But that cannot be what he means. Prior is trying to show 
that it is (3) as a whole that is "general ", not that the part of it inside the 
scope of the tense operator is. 
Prior's Russellian solution 
With all the confusions about general facts out of the way, there is still a 
residual point to Prior's argument: it does not follow from the fact that the 
name "Queen Anne" is used meaningfully that Queen Anne exists. This is 
the familiar point about the existence of empty names. Everyone needs to 
believe in empty names: "Pegasus ", and so on. Prior's point is simply that 
the analysis classically used to avoid commitment to Pegasus and friends 
work equally for the names, like "Queen Anne" that presentists believe to be 
empty. 
That analysis is Russell's theories of definite descriptions and ordinary proper 
names. Prior's real solution to the puzzle of "Queen Anne is dead" is simply 
to treat "Queen Anne" as a Russellian ordinary proper name - equivalent 
to some description, which Prior has rendered as "called `Anne', reigns over 
England, etc." 
The view that the names of historical personalities such as Queen Anne 
are Russellian proper names, while unexceptionable in Prior's day, is now 
thoroughly controversial. Without wanting to get too deeply into the debate 
about description theories of names and of meaning, I'll mention briefly the 
problem I take to be particularly troublesome for Prior's approach. This is 
Kripke's problem of error. 
In Kripke's example, we imagine that we have figured out the description 
abbreviated by the name "Gödel ", and that it is "the man who discovered 
the incompleteness of arithmetic ". 
Suppose that Gödel was not in fact the author of this theorem. A 
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man named 'Schmidt', whose body was found in Vienna under mys- 
terious circumstances many years ago actually did the work in ques- 
tion. His friend Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and it 
was thereafter attributed to Gödel. On the view in question, then, 
when our ordinary man uses the name ' Gödel', he really means to re- 
fer to Schmidt, because Schmidt is the unique person satisfying the 
description, 'the man who discovered the incompleteness of arith- 
metic'... 
So, since the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic 
is in fact Schmidt, we, when we talk about 'Gödel', are in fact always 
referring to Schmidt. But it seems to me that we are not. 
(KRIPKE 1972, p. 83 -84) 
Kripke's point is that, even if we could find a description that uniquely applies 
to Gödel, the name is not vulnerable to error in the way that the description 
is. They cannot, therefore, be semantically equivalent. Prior's treatment of 
"Queen Anne" suffers from the same problem. If it turned out that Queen 
Anne did not satisfy the description Prior offers, and that someone else did 
satisfy it, then we would still refer to Queen Anne by the naine "Queen 
Anne" , and not that someone else. 
If Queen Anne did not rule over England, etc. but someone else did, it would 
be false to say "Queen Anne ruled over England ". It would still be true to 
say "The person who ruled over England, etc., ruled over England ", so the 
name and the description cannot be equivalent. 
This shows, I think, that Prior's treatment of names of past things as empty 
Russellian ordinary proper names is inadequate. But the Russellian treat- 
ment is not the only one available. It is much more plausible, on the assump- 
tion of presentism, to think of names like "Queen Anne" as empty logically 
proper names. 
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A free logical solution 
This requires that the normal inference rule of existential generalisation, 
Pa H Px)(Px) be invalid. For if a could be an empty name, we would not 
want to infer that anything has the predicates that may be truly applied to 
it. For example, if a means the same as "Pegasus" and P means "does not 
exist ", we would not wish to infer falsehood "Something does not exist" from 
the truth "Pegasus does not exist" 
Presentists would be best advised, I think, to take up a free logic. These are 
logics where the inference described above is blocked. Existential generalisa- 
tion is restricted, one way or another, to non -empty names. There may be 
both true and false subject -predicate propositions in such a logic. For exam- 
ple, if a means the same as "Pegasus ", and Q the same as "flies ", it might 
be true to say Qa and false to say E!a (where E! is the existence predicate). 
(LEBLANC AND HAILPERIN 1959; SCHOCK 1968) 
This means that it can be straightforwardly true that Queen Anne is past, 
or dead, or whatever, without it following that there are any past things. 
While these logics are syntactically very attractive, the difficulty with them 
lies in giving an adequate semantic account of them that does not, itself, 
quantify over things that are non -existent from the point of view of the 
object language. What is it about the empty name "Pegasus" that makes it 
the case that "Pegasus flies" is true, while "Pegasus does not fly" is false? To 
go hack to the case in point, what is it about the empty name "Queen Anne" 
that makes it the case that "Queen Anne is past" is true, while "Queen Anne 
is future" is false? 
It had better not be that there is something non -existent which is Queen Anne 
and is past; not just because this violates Quinean dogmas about existence, 
but because it also violates anti- realism about the past, which as I have 
construed it, is the doctrine that there is not anything past. 
Free logic comes at a price, but it is a price that the presentist must be 
prepared to pay - for the same problems afflict operator tensism. Just as 
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it is hard to have free logic without non -existent objects, it is hard to have 
tense logic without past and future objects. Even on Prior's proposal to treat 
empty names as descriptions, Russell- style, there is the same puzzle. What it 
is about the empty description "is called 'Anne', reigns over England, etc." 
that makes it the case that it was the case that something satisfied that 
description, but not that it will be the case that something satisfied that 
description? 
So, though free logic is certainly problematic, it is not more so than tense 
logic already is. Since, at this stage, I am granting that the presentist can 
supply a semantics for tense logic that is compatible with anti- realism, I 
should grant them a semantics for free logic as well. It may be thought that 
I am being more than generous in doing this; a point which I will discuss in 
section 6.4.4. 
6.4.3 Relational truths about past or future things 
Presentists have often worried about relational truths that ascribe a relation 
between non- contemporaries. For example: 
42 Colin Powell is not as good a strategist as Julius Caesar. 
Here again we have a present -tense sentence that seems to refer to a past 
object. 
Disturbingly (for the presentist) this present tense sentence seems as though 
it ought to be equivalent to a past tense sentence: 
43 Julius Caesar was a better strategist than Colin Powell. 
It is hard to see how either sentence can be true by presentist lights, ei- 
ther in our day or in Caesar's, because Caesar and Powell have never been 
contemporaries. 
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Pretence solutions 
As we found in the previous section, there is a sense in which everyone must 
deal with this problem. We often ascribe relations between existing things, 
and fictional objects or persons. There has been some lively discussion in the 
literature on truth in fiction on this topic. Mark Crimmins offers a standard 
analysis: 
I might say: 
(2) The degree of cleverness and the degree of modesty that actually 
are such that in the Sherlock Holmes stories there is portrayed there 
being a person named 'Holmes' with that degreee of cleverness and 
there being a person named 'Watson' with that degree of modesty, 
are such that Ann's degree of cleverness is comparable to the former, 
and her degree of modesty is greater than the latter. 
While perspicuous, that takes a long time to say, it is not easy to 
follow, and one needs considerable conceptual sophistication to for- 
mulate or understand it. What I actually say, of course, is: 
(3) Ann is as clever as Holmes and more modest than Watson. 
(CRIMMINS 1998, p. 3) 
The presentist could take a similar approach. Perhaps what we mean by 42 
is something like 42', and what we mean by 43 is something like 43': 
42' D, the degree of ability in military strategy that is such that Julius 
Caesar displayed D, is such that Colin Powell's degree of ability is less 
than D. 
43' E, the degree of ability in military strategy that is such that Colin Pow- 
ell displays D, is such that Julius Caesar's degree of ability is greater 
than E. 
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In these paraphrases, the name "Julius Caesar" is never used outside the 
scope of a past tense operator, and the name Colin PoweII is never used 
inside the scope of such an operator. There is a cost: we must accept degrees 
of military strategy into our ontology, and they must exist at every time (or 
in more presentist- friendly language, they must always have existed). 
Causation 
Some relational present -tense truths about the past and future cannot be 
given the analysis described above. This is especially the case where the 
relation concerned is an intrinsic relation, in the sense of section 2.1.9. 
Presentists who believe that causation is an intrinsic relation are sometimes 
forced to say that it holds only between contemporaries. John Bigelow, for 
example, claims that 
At any given time the causal relation holds between properties... each 
of which is present and is presently instantiated. These properties 
may include things like the property of being burdened with a certain 
sort of past, or (as Leibniz put it) pregnant with a certain sort of 
future. (BIGELow 1996, p. 47) 
The cause of, for example, a snatch's now having the property being alight 
might be regarded as the match's now having the property having been struck. 
This latter property has to be understood in a way that makes a match's 
having it compatible with the non- existence of the past. I am not sure that 
there is any such way; but supposing that there is, my point still stands. An 
anti- realist about the past may be able to give a causal explanation of the 
match's being alight, but cannot give the causal explanation we do give in 
our scientific and ordinary practice, in terms of a past striking of the match 
(or in terms of any past event). 
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It seems to me that Bigelow's proposal stretches the boundaries of what we 
mean by "causation" too much. However, this is to get into metaphysical 
problems for presentism, and for the moment I want to restrict myself to the 
merely logical problems. 
6.4.4 Truthmakers for Past /Future Tense Sentences 
In the foregoing sections 6.4.1- 6.4.3, I have been assuming that the pre - 
sentist's strategy of appealing to the semantics of tense to block the table 
thumping objection of section 6.4 is legitimate. However this is a point that 
is not usually granted by realists about the past and future. A more normal 
reply to the presentist is to insist that the point of the table -thumping ob- 
jection was not to ask for a semantic theory of the truth of past and future 
tense sentences, but rather a metaphysical theory - the realist wants to 
know what the truthmakers for truths about the past and future are. 
Though this objection to presentism has wide appeal to realists about the 
past and future, it can be hard to say exactly what it amounts to. In order 
to get a clearer idea of what the request for truthmakers means, I think it is 
best to put it in the context of a specific theory of truthmakers. 
According to the theory I introduced in section 2.1.3, a proposition p is made 
true by an object x iff x is intrinsically such that p is true. That is, it is 
impossible that p not be true, and x have just the intrinsic nature that it 
actually has. Let us call this strong intrinsic truthmaking. 
A weaker, but related conception the one defended in (PARSONS 1999) 
and (PARSONS 2001B) (reproduced as appendices A and B) puts it coun- 
terfactually; were p not true, x would have a different intrinsic nature from 
the one it actually has. In effect this replaces what is a strict implication 
in the stronger formulation with a would -counterfactual. Call this weak 
intrinsic truthmaking. 
The difference between strong and weak truthmaking reflects an issue about 
whether we should think of the connection between a proposition and the 
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kinds of thing that would make it true as necessary or contingent. In turn, 
this is connected with what propositions are. If propositions are imagined to 
have their truth conditions essentially (as is usually the case), then the strong 
conception of truthmaking will be appealing, because such a proposition, if 
true, could not fail to be made true by a duplicate of its truthmaker. 
On the other hand, if propositions have their truth conditions contingently, 
then the weak conception will appeal: a proposition could fail to be made 
true by a duplicate of its truthmaker, if that proposition had different truth 
conditions to those it actually does. In (PARSONS 1999) I identified the 
propositions with sentence tokens of ordinary language, which is why I pre- 
ferred the weak conception there. For the sake of simplicity, though, here 
I will use the strong conception. I don't think it will affect the argument 
against presentism. 
The argument 
Realists about the past and future have no problem coming up with truth - 
makers for propositions about the past and future. Past and future objects 
will do. Take the truth "there were dinosaurs ". The realist about the past 
can say that past dinosaur lineages are the truthmakers for this propositions. 
If there had not been dinosaurs, those lineages would have had to be different 
in some intrinsic respect - by being so much more like their non -dinosaur 
ancestors than they actually are, so that they would not count as a dinosaur 
lineage, perhaps - or by not existing at all. 
To put things more simply, the realist about the past can say what would 
be different about the world as a whole, had the proposition "there were 
dinosaurs" been false. The anti -realist about the past has a very hard time 
answering this question. 
I have no proof that it is impossible for a presentist to supply an answer to 
the question. But it is possible to taxonomise the available answers in a way 
that makes then all look unattractive. 
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The general no truthmakers answer: "Why do we need to believe in 
truthmakers for true propositions at all? Isn't it the case that even the hest 
truthmaker theorists have trouble coming up with enough truthmakers for 
every true proposition? We're no worse off than anyone else." 
There is a reason that truthmaker theorists try to come up with truthmakers 
for every true proposition: it seems to make sense to ask "What is it about 
the world that would be different, were the proposition p false ?" And it 
does seem natural to think that something is remiss with an alleged truth for 
which this question has no answer. Truthmaker theory hits the nail squarely 
on the head for theories that involve such truths: Rylean behaviourism about 
the mental; if- thenism about mathematical truth. 
Moreover, the admitted troubles in coming up with truthmakers for every 
true proposition all fall into one of two categories. First, propositions such 
as "All ravens are black ", where, were the negation of this proposition true, 
there would be no problem about its truthmaker. Problematic propositions of 
the first kind all have either truthmakers or falsemakers. Second, propositions 
such as "Either all ravens are black, or some cockatoo is purple ", which 
might have neither truthmakers nor falsemakers,2 but which are boolean 
combinations involving the propositions of the first kind (in this case, "All 
ravens are black "). 
By contrast, however, the problem for presentists involves a whole domain of 
discourse. "All dinosaurs were cold -blooded" "Some dinosaurs were warm - 
blooded", and "Either all dinosaurs were cold -blooded or some dinosaurs 
were herbivorous" are all in the same boat. Realists about the past may 
'Suppose all ravens are black, and no cockatoo is purple. Were the proposition in 
question false, it might be that nothing that actually exists would be any different from 
the way it actually is, because there could be an extra non -black raven which does not 
actually exist. So the proposition has no truthmaker. Now suppose there is a non -black 
raven, and, as before, no purple cockatoo, so that the proposition's negation is true. Were 
the negation false, it might be that nothing that actually exists would be any different 
from the way it actually is, because there could be an extra purple cockatoo which does 
not actually exist. So the original proposition has no falsemaker either. 
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have the standard trouble with the first and third of these, but a presentist 
has the same problem with all three. 
The specific no truthmakers answer: "It's appropriate to ask for truth - 
makers for the truths of some domains of discourse, and not for the truths of 
other domains It's precisely because presentists are anti -realists about the 
past that they don't need to believe in truthmakers about the past." 
This suggestion adds another plank to presentism, along with tensism and 
anti -realism about the past and future: anti -realism about truthmakers for 
propositions about the past and future. The former kind of anti -realism does 
not entail the latter, however (as we will see in the foIIowing two answers to 
the truthmaker question for presentists). So a presentist, where presentism 
is the doctrine described in section 6.1, is not forced to be an anti -realist 
about truthmakers for propositions about the past and future. 
The presentist, therefore, stands in need of a non- question -begging reason for 
giving this answer to the truthmaker question, rather than a general denial 
of truthmaker theory. That is, the presentist needs to explain why discourse 
about the past and future is deficient in this way, when discourse about the 
present is not. 
At the same time, however, the presentist needs to hang onto the idea that 
past and future tense talk is not in any sense second class discourse, or not 
really true because the presentist needs to answer the table- thumping 
objection of 6.4. 
The trace answer: "Propositions about the past and future have truth - 
makers; but the truthmakers are those one would associate with the proposi- 
tions about the present that epistemically verify the propositions about the 
past and future. The truthmakers for `there were dinosaurs' are dinosaur 
fossils." 
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This type of presentist is a Dummettian T -type anti -realist about the past 
and future (i.e. one who is a Dummettian anti -realist about the past and 
future, but a realist about the present). (DuMMETT 1978B, pp. 366 -367) 
There are two problems with this view: 
First, there is the same problem as with the specific no truthmakers answer: 
the presentist needs to hold that propositions about the past and future 
are not true only in a deficient or second -class sense. But how else can a 
distinction between domains of discourse of which verificationism is true, 
and domains of which it is not be justified? 
Second, the hypothesis of radical deception about the past or future (for 
example, if God created the earth in 4004 BCE complete with misleading 
evidence) does not seem incoherent. But it would have to be if we were 
verificationists about propositions concerning the past and future. Perhaps 
these hypotheses would seem incoherent to someone with more sympathies 
for verificationism than myself; but at least they should still seem no more 
incoherent than other types of radical deception hypothesis - brain -in -a -vat 
scenarios for example. 
The ersatzist answer: "Propositions about the past and future have 
truthmakers; but the truthmakers are those one would associate with propo- 
sitions about certain kinds of presently existing abstract objects, or arcane 
properties of presently existing concrete objects." 
For example, it might be thought that talk about past and future things 
is really talk about past and future ersatz times, in the sense discussed in 
section 6.3.1. Recall that there I considered the identification of past and 
and future times with uninstantiated time properties, ways the present time 
might have been. Of these, some will be such that, were they instantiated, 
there would be dinosaurs (call this class D). What makes it true that there 
were dinosaurs, it will be said, is that one of the members of D has the second 
order property of having been instantiated. 
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Abstract and arcane indeed! But, as I argued in section 6.3.1: nominalis- 
tic worries aside, there is nothing ontologically unrespectable about these 
properties. My objection is not to the properties but to the strange things 
that presentists have to believe about them. For here is where I think the 
truthmaker argument is at its strongest. 
Call the time property of being such that there are dinosaurs P, and the 
second order property having been instantiated P. What makes it true that 
P has the property P? Realists about the past will think that P is an extrin- 
sic property, because whether P has it depends on whether there are past 
dinosaurs; the dinosaurs themselves being wholly distinct from the property 
P. So the realists can say that the dinosaurs make this proposition true. 
But according to the presentist, there's nothing more to say than that P has 
P. Certainly, P's having 7 does not concern the intrinsic nature of anything 
apart from P and 0 themselves. If the proposition that P has the property 
P has a truthmaker at all, then, it must be P itself, and 11 must be intrinsic 
to P. But it seems bizarre to believe that this should be the case - that the 
intrinsic nature of a property should depend on whether it is instantiated. 
Past and future facts as dispositions 
A proposal which, I think, puts the best slant (from a presentist point of 
view) on the difficulties about truthmakers I have been discussing is that 
which assimilates propositions about the past and future to another type of 
proposition where it has seemed that truthmakers may be lacked: proposi- 
tions about dispositions. 
In (PARSONS 2001A), (reproduced as appendix E), I suggest that if the 
A- theory of time were true - that is, if pastness, presentness and futurity 
were intrinsic properties of times (called A- properties) then it would be 
natural to analyse the past and future tenses in terms of what would have 
been, were a time that is actually past or future present. For example, 
"Caesar was bald" is given the analysis "There is a past time t, such that if 
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t were present, Caesar would he bald." This analysis gets the right answer 
for iterated tenses: "Caesar was future" comes out as "There is a past time 
t, such that if t were present, Caesar would be future." 
We could think of these counterfactuals as expressing dispositions. Caesar 
is not in fact bald now. But he has the unactualised disposition to be bald, 
were only the right time present. 
It takes a little work to make this idea compatible with presentism. There 
is the problem that the analysis quantifies over past and future times; but 
perhaps these can be replaced with ersatz past and future times. And then 
there is the problem that the proposed analysis of "Caesar was bald" does 
not eliminate Caesar. To deal with this, we should analyse past and future 
tense sentences in two steps: first, replacing talk of past or future objects 
(such as Caesar) with world properties, then applying the counterfactual 
dispositional analysis recommended above. 
So 
44 Caesar was bald. 
becomes 
45 The world had the property of being such that Caesar is bald. 
which in turn becomes 
46 There is an ersatz time t, such that, were t present, the world would 
have the property being such that Caesar is bald. 
which is to say 
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47 There is an ersatz time t, such that the world has the a disposition to 
be such that Caesar is bald, which would be actualised were t present. 
There is a tradition of worries about whether propositions asserting that an 
object possesses an unactualised disposition can be really, non -deficiently, 
true. In Dummett's famous example: whether a person who dies without 
having been in danger can be truly said to be brave. (DUMMETT 1978A, p. 
148) The truthmaker problem for presentism could be seen as a variant of 
that problem, if the presentist is prepared to accept the dispositional analysis 
of the past and future tenses I described above. 
6.5 Variants 
I consider two variants on presentism. The first combines the presentist's 
doctrines about the unreality of the past and future with endurantism (sec- 
tion 6.5.1); the second combines the presentist theory of persistence with 
realism about the past and future, and a temporal parts ontology (section 
6.5.2). 
6.5.1 Presentism with Endurance 
Thus far I have been assuming that presentists are anti -realists about the 
past and future, in that they deny the existence of anything past or future. 
They might instead be anti -realists about the past and future in a weaker 
sense: they might deny the existence of anything that is not present. These 
two can come apart if any of the things that presently exist also exist at past 
or future times. Such things would have to endure; if they perdured they 
would have to have parts that were past or future without being present, and 
no presentist could believe in those. 
To put this another way, there is a distinction between presentists who hold 
that objects are are like three -dimensional time -slices of a perduring universe 
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(these presentists have more in common with perdurantists); and those who 
hold that objects are four -dimensional enduring things, but that only present 
enduring things exist. 
What is going on here? Recall the distinction made in section 6.1 between 
the three doctrines involved in presentism: tensism, anti -realism, and the 
presentist theory of persistence. It is possible to believe that there is only 
that which presently exists; and also think that to persist is to be multiply 
located in time that is, it's possible to combine a presentist ontology with 
an endurantist theory of persistence. This type of presentist will say that to 
persist is to be extended in time, just as the endurantist does (see section 
5.1), 
It might be objected that endurantism requires quantification over past and 
future times, which the presentist cannot countenance. This is a familiar 
problem, however, and can he solved by the usual mechanism of ersatz times 
(see section 6.3.1). 
Though I think it is an important point that a presentist has a choice of 
theories of persistence available to her, I do not think that this variant is 
particularly more defensible against the problems raised in section 6.4, so I 
will leave it here. 
6.5.2 Stage Theory 
In the previous section I described how presentism can be combined with 
a theory of persistence not normally associated with it the endurantist 
theory. In this section, I show that presentism and the presentist theory 
of persistence are completely orthogonal: it is possible to believe the latter 
while rejecting presentism. 
Such a position has been clearly defended in the literature by Ted Sider. 
He calls this view stage theory. Sider also claims that early perdurantists 
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such as J.J.0 Smart held stage theory (SIDER 1996A, p. 433n) (compare my 
comments in section 4.3.1).3 
According to stage theory, ordinary things are singly located at one dura- 
tionless time: the present. (SIDER 1996A, p. 433) These things however, 
persist, and do so in virtue of there being other, past and future, times, at 
which past and future things are located. It's the existence of a past thing, 
bearing a special relation the "I- relation" to a a present object that 
makes it the case that that object did exist. Such an object is the present 
thing's former stage. Similarly, it's in virtue of there being a future thing 
I- related to x a later stage that x will exist. (SIDER 1996A, p. 437) 
Finally, and most importantly, stage theory endorses the presentist theory 
of persistence: "the stage view does not rule out persistence through time, 
for... the stage view allows that I both exist now and previously existed in 
the past." (SIDER 1996A, p. 446) Sider's idea is clearly that something 
persists iff it either did exist or will exist (c.f. section 6.1.3). 
Like presentism, stage theory thinks of time and tense on the model of modal- 
ity and modal language, rather than on the model of space and spatial index - 
icals. However, the model is not the way most philosophers treat modality, 
but David Lewis's modal realism and counterpart theory. (LEWrs 1986) In 
Lewis's theory of modality, ordinary things are regarded as being world - 
bound individuals, and de re modal truths about some individual x are 
explained in terms of the simpliciter truths about a merely possible indi- 
vidual bearing a special relation - the counterpart relation - to x. The 
I- relation plays the same role in stage theory that the counterpart relation 
plays in counterpart theory. 
Stage theory thus has a lot going for it: 
3In the specific case of Smart, while he may have been a stage theorist in 1959, as Sider 
claims, he was clearly a perdurantist by 1963, when he wrote "It is perfectly possible to 
think of things and processes as four -dimensional space -time entities." (SMART 1963, p. 
133) Armstrong, however, seems to have blurred the two as late as 1980, as I noted earlier. 
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It can take over many of the arguments for presentism that work by 
arguing for an analogy between time and modality. 
It can use the well worked out formal structure of counterpart theory. 
It can answer problems about truthmakers by appealing to the exis- 
tence of past and future stages. 
But it has some problems: 
Two kinds of persistence? 
Sider notes that he believes that there are perduring objects - "worms ", as 
he calls them. (SIDER 1996A, p. 433) It's just that they are not the everyday 
objects of our experience. Nor is this belief on his part accidental - it is 
forced upon him on him by his acceptance of classical mereology. If I persist 
by the lights of stage theory, then there are past or future stages of me. The 
fusion of all those stages is a worm. In fact, it is what a perdurantist would 
claim to be the worm that is me. Classical mereology requires that there is 
such a fusion; and since I have argued for this feature of classical mereology 
on independent grounds (see section 3.3.2) I have an argument that every 
stage theorist should believe in worms. 
Now the problem: do worms persist? Either way the stage theorist answers 
this, there is trouble. 
Suppose the answer is no. This just seems bizarre. If there is anything that 
is multiply located in time (and appropriately causally unified) what could 
be lacking from it in virtue of which it does not persist? My doubts about 
perdurantism are doubts about the ontology of temporal parts (see sections 
5.2.1, 5.2.2, and 5.5.1). But the stage theorist accepts that ontology. 
Suppose the answer is yes. Then there are two ways to persist: by having 
an earlier or later stage, and by perduring. This also seems odd, because 
persistence doesn't seem to be an equivocal concept. 
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Notice that this problem does not arise for counterpart theory in modali- 
ty. The counterpart theorist, for the same reasons as the stage theorist, is 
committed to modal continuants - trans -world individuals that are the 
fusions of an object with all its counterparts. However, it costs the counter- 
part theorist nothing to accept that the modal continuants, and not ordinary 
world -bound objects, are the things that modally persist - because the coun- 
terpart theorist is not committed to the claim that ordinary objects modally 
persist. What the counterpart theorist is trying to capture is de re modality, 
not any modal analogue of persistence. 
The stage theorist, on the other hand, is trying to capture the common- 
sensical idea that ordinary objects persist. So it is problematic that the 
worms persist in a way that seems stríkíngly different to the way that ordinary 
objects are alleged to, according to stage theory. 
Tense logic and the Temporal Barcan formulae. 
Another problem for stage theory concerns the formal semantics of tense 
that stage theory might like to help itself to. I said above that stage theory, 
like presentism, trades on analogies between time and modality. This would 
suggest that a stage theorist could help herself to the machinery of tense 
logic worked out by presentists. However, this is by no means so simple as 
might appear. 
The problem concerns the status of the tense IogicaI analogues of the Barcan 
formula:4 
BFF F(3x)(Px) D (3x)(FPx) 
BFp PPx)(Px) D (3x)(PPx) 
'For a discussion of the formalities of the Barcan formula in quantified modal logics, 
see (HUGHES AND CRESSWELL 1968, pp. 143, 170, 173 -174) 
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For the sake of simplicity, I will discuss the future tense version of this for- 
mula, BFF. Reading it in ordinary language, "if it will be the case that there 
is an x such that x is P, then there is an x such that it will be the case that 
x is P." Tense logicians normally think that this formula is invalid. (PRIOR 
1957, p. 27 28) To see why, consider interpreting P as "is a president of 
Australia ": "if it will be the case that there is a president of Australia, then 
there is someone who will he the president of Australia." It does not seem 
that it should follow from the supposition that Australia will one day be a 
republic that its future president has already been born. 
The plausibility of the Barcan formula is connected with the interpretation of 
quantifiers. In modal logics that validate it, the validity of the Barcan formula 
suggests that the quantifiers contained in it are possibilist, ranging over all 
possible objects. Similarly, in tense logic, the rejection of the Barcan formula 
corresponds to the rejection of tenseless quantification that is widespread 
among tense logicians. 
It seems to me that the stage theorist should accept the temporal Barcan 
formulae as valid. If there will be a president of Australia, even if she is 
not born yet, then there is a future stage of the world that has a president 
of Australia as a part. So there is a person who will be the president of 
Australia. 
This shows that the tense logic that the stage theorist wants is not of the 
standard kind used by presentists. It is not too problematic to construct a 
tense logic that validates BFF and BFp but it is not clear that such a 
treatment would be preferable to the type of tenseless semantics for tense 
described in section 6.1.1. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
7.1 Review of the options 
What then, is persistence? To answer this question, let's begin by reviewing 
the available options. The most fundamental divide between the theories I 
have considered concerns whether persistence is anything at all like extension 
in space - are persisting objects located at multiple times (as opposed to 
only at one instant)? 
If the answer to this question is no, then we must prefer presentism. If yes, 
then we have a choice between perdurantism and endurantism. This choice 
concerns whether persisting objects have temporal parts (See figure 7.1). 
We have learned, however, that things are not so simple. The presentist 
theory of persistence, I argued in sections 6.1.3 and 6.5, does not entail 
the presentist ontology of anti -realism about the past and future. So there 
seem to be two further options if we answered "no" to the first question. 
Supposing that persistence is not a matter of multiple Iocation, it is still an 
open question whether objects persist in virtue of what is going on at other, 
past or future, times, or not. If we would prefer to think of persisting as a 
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Are persisting objects 
multiply located? 
Yes 
Do persisting objects have 
temporal parts? 
Yes No 
Perdurantism 
(chapter 4) 
Endurantism 
(chapter 5) 
Presentism 
(chapter 6) 
Figure 7.1: Simple decision tree for theories of persistence 
matter, not of being multiple located, but of having later or earlier stages, 
we can believe in persistence without being presentists - by being stage 
theorists (see section 6.5.2). So let's add the question "Do objects persist in 
virtue of there being other objects, located at past or future times ?" to the 
tree in place of "Presentism". 
Similar additions will have to be made under " Endurantism" and "Perduran- 
tism". Supposing all persisting objects have temporal parts, are there any 
further criteria that must be satisfied for an object to persist? Armstrong's 
two gods argument might suggest that the answer to this question is "yes" 
(see sections 4.2.3 and 4.4.1). If we are convinced, we should prefer a form of 
`strong perdurantism' to perdurantism proper. On the other hand, we might 
be convinced by Lewis's liumean argument that strong perdurantism buys 
us nothing. 
I discussed "strong endurantism" , or the view that everything that persists 
endures, only briefly, as it seems particularly problematic to me. Even those 
authors who seem closest to endorsing strong endurantism (such as Mellor 
- see section 5.3.1) often turn out to be endorsing it only for a restricted 
domain. In Mellor's case, this the domain of changeable things, such as per- 
sons, as against non - changeable processes or histories. Strong endurantism 
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also seems unable to cope with the possibility of objects changing their parts 
(see section 5.4.1). Nevertheless, it is worth adding it to the picture as weII. 
The complete tree of available theories of persistence is shown in figure 7.2 
on the following page. 
7.2 What is persistence? 
The theory of persistence I prefer is a form of mixed endurantism, of the 
kind discussed in section 5.5.1. I will now explain why this is. I will not be 
introducing any new arguments here, simply calling attention to those parts 
of earlier chapters that I regard as decisive. 
7.2.1 The rejection of presentism 
Presentism proper faces what I regard as insoluble problems. These are the 
argument for the analogy with space based on special relativity (sections 
4.2.1 and 6.2.1), and the problems in coming up with plausible truthmakers 
for any past or future tense sentences (section 6.4.4). Presentists are not very 
much motivated to deal with these problems, I think, because they think of 
presentism as being close to a truth of logic. That is, they tend to think of the 
driving idea of presentism as tensism, and the related tense- logical treatment 
of the language of time (section 6.1.1). They are apt to respond to puzzles of 
the kind that I think decisive by showing that the puzzles cannot be stated 
in tensed terms, and must therefore be pseudo -problems. Here they rely on 
strong tensism - the doctrine that the only intelligible language there is is 
tensed. But strong tensism is false as an empirical claim about language, 
because it entails that presentists and non -presentists are not disagreeing 
about anything, when it is obvious that they are (section 6.1.2). 
Stage theory can deal with all the problems described above. It is not com- 
mitted to an absolute present, so is not incompatible with special relativity; 
Are persisting objects 
multiply located? 
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Do all persisting objects 
have temporal parts? 
Yes No 
Are there any further Do some persisting objects 
conditions that must be have temporal parts? 
satisfied by a persisting 
Yes / \ No 
object? 
No 
Do objects persist in virtue 
of there being other 
objects, located at past or 
future _times? 
Yes / \ No 
Stage theory 
(section 6.5.2) 
Presentism 
(section 6.1.3) 
Yes o 
Mixed theory 
(section 5.5.1) 
Strong 
endurantism 
(section 5.1.1) Strong 
perdurantism 
(section 4.4.1) 
Perdurantism 
(section 4.1) 
Figure 7.2: Decision tree for theories of persistence 
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and it can advance past and future things as truthmakers for past and future 
tensed truths. Though a stage theorist should believe weak tensism, there is 
no reason for her to be committed to strong tensism. 
However, since the stage theorist should believe in perduring things, she faces 
a difficult task explaining why these are not the paradigm persisting objects. 
Stage theorists like to point out the analogies between their position and the 
well worked out theories of presentism on the one hand, and counterpart the- 
ory in modality on the other. But these analogies are overstated. The stage 
theorist will need a revisionary version of tense logic; and the analogy with 
counterpart theory breaks down because counterpart theorists are precisely 
those people who deny that ordinary objects modally `persist' across worlds 
(section 6.5.2). 
So presentism is in bad trouble, and stage theory is unattractive. We should 
think of persistence as involving objects being multiply located in time. 
7.2.2 The rejection of perdurantism 
Perdurantism is in much better shape than presentism. I doubt however that 
there are as many temporal parts as perdurantists believe in. In order for 
every persisting object to perdure, every persisting object would have to have 
infinitely many proper parts, and there is quite simply no reason to suppose 
that this is the case (sections 3.5.2, 5.2.2). 
Moreover, perdurantism denies the distinction between substantial and mere- 
ly intrinsic change (sections 5.2.1, 5.5.1), as if every intrinsic property were 
an essential property (see also appendix A). 
These problems are had enough, I think, that we should be worried about 
the validity of the problem of change, used as an argument for perdurantism. 
Perdurantists are right that perdurantism explains why intrinsic change is 
possible in the light of the problem of change; but because of the problems 
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described above, we should not regard perdurantism as clearly the best ex- 
planation. It seems to me that the best explanation should be given in terms 
of distributional properties (section 5.2.4), which is neutral with regard to 
perdurantism and endurantism. (See also appendices C and F). 
Perdurantism is on the right track, but too strong. We would do best to 
settle for a generalisation of perdurantism to a mixed theory which allows 
that things persist either by perduring or enduring (section 5.3.2). 
7.2.3 The rejection of strong endurantism 
Should we go further, and deny that anything perdures? No; Armstrong's 
two gods argument shows that, given classical mereology (section 3.1) and 
the reality of past and future times, perdurance is possible (section 4.2.3). 
Or should we deny then that perduring things persist? 1 think not; once we 
admit that there are perduring things, any residual resistance to the claim 
that they persist is likely to be the result of the assumption that all persisting 
fusions of person stages are persons, and mutatis mutandis for other sortals in 
the place of "person" (section 4.3.2). Once this assumption has been exposed, 
there is no barrier to claiming that the strangest scattered perduring objects 
persist. 
It might be thought that the form of endurantism I have reached in answer- 
ing "No" to both the questions above is wishy -washy or indistinguishable 
from perdurantism. On the contrary, my reasons for rejecting perdurantism 
require that perdurance take place only under very restricted circumstances: 
when an object undergoes a substantial change, in the sense described in 
section 5.5.1. And it is an important truth that objects endure though mere 
intrinsic changes (section 5.2.4). 
The resulting theory of persisting is, to the best of my knowledge, a novel one. 
But it should be appealing to people who are currently moderate endurantists 
and perdurantìsts. Both of these groups are motivated by the need to retain a 
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distinction between mere - Cambridge and not- mere - Cambridge change: both 
the problem of change, and the "essential temporality of change" argument 
are premised on this distinction. My novel move simply takes this one step 
further. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic change is only part 
of the story about real change; the remainder is the distinction between 
substantial and mere -intrinsic change, and in order to maintain it we need 
both perduring and enduring entities. 
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Appendix A 
Trut hmakers 
Published as "There is no .Truthmaker' Argument against 
Nominalism" in Australiasia-n, Journal of Philosophy, 77:3 (PARSONS 
1999) 
Recause the notes to this appendix are quite lengthy, I have gathered 
them at the end of the appendix, rather than placing them at the 
foot of the page they belong to. 
A.1 The Truthmaker Argument 
In his two recent books on ontology, Universals: an Opinionated Introduction, 
and A World of States of Affairs, David Armstrong gives a new argument 
against nominalism. That argument seems, on the face of it, to be similar to 
another argument that he used much earlier against Rylean behaviourism: 
the Truthmaker Argument, stemming from a certain plausible premise, the 
Truthmaker Principle. Other authors have traced the history of the truth - 
maker principle, its appearance in the work of Aristotle (Fox 1987), Bradley 
(OLSON 1987), and even Husserl (MULLIGAN, SIMONS, AND SMITH 1984). 
But that is not my task - in this paper I argue that Armstrong's new argu- 
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ment is not logically analogous to the old, and, in particular, that it is quite 
possible to be a thoroughgoing nominalist, and hold a truthmaker principle.' 
For the purposes of this paper, by nominalism I shall mean a position rather 
stronger than what is usually meant by that word. T shall mean the belief 
that the world is composed entirely of things, of spatio -temporally located, 
concrete, causally efficacious particulars. No universals, numbers, classes, 
tropes, or abstracta are to be found in this ontology. When I wish to distin- 
guish this nominalism from weaker ones - that allow, for example, tropes, 
or extensional classes - I shall call my version `thoroughgoing nominalis- 
m'. This position may not be a happy one for independent reasons. Indeed, 
Armstrong's earlier argument against nominalism, the `One over Many' ar- 
gument (ARMSTRONG 1978A; ARMSTRONG 1980A) claims to be just such 
a reason. My aim here is not to defend thoroughgoing nominalism against all 
such objections but merely to show that it is compatible with a truthmaker 
principle. And if even thoroughgoing nominalism is not touched by a truth- 
maker argument, then weaker versions, that claim less, will not be touched 
either. 
As part of showing this, I distinguish the truthmaker principle from an ad- 
ditional thesis, `truthmaker essentialism'. Though this additional thesis is 
usually held with the truthmaker principle, it is not required in what I 
take to be the canonical use of the truthmaker argument the argument 
against Rylean behaviourism. It's a distinctive feature of my truthmaker 
theory that I hold that this essentialist thesis is false; however, I will not he 
arguing for that here. All I will need is that it is distinct from the truthmaker 
principle proper. 
A.1.1 Truthmakers Against Behaviourism 
To turn now to the truthmaker argument, we must run the clock back to 
1968, when Armstrong first published his Materialist Theory of the Mind. 
Therein we encounter Gilbert Ryle's view that `To possess a dispositional 
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property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change; 
it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state or to undergo a particular 
change, when a particular condition is realised' (ARMSTRONG 1968, p. 85) 
(The italics are Armstrong's, not Ryle's). Armstrong compares this view to 
his own that `to speak of an object's having a dispositional property entails 
that it is in some non -dispositional state or that it has some property ... 
which is responsible for the object manifesting certain behaviour [i.e. the 
disposition]'. 
Under the influence of C.B. Martin, Armstrong had come to believe that the 
trouble with Ryle's dispositions was that they required that there be truths 
without truthmakers. It may be true that someone has a belief which is never 
manifested in their behavioural dispositions: the belief that worms are not 
typically bearded, for example. Armstrong agreed with RyIe's dispositional 
view about belief, though; it's just that he insisted that there must be some 
difference in the world, some difference that the disposition makes, which 
makes it true that, at times when the disposition is not being manifested, it 
would be manifested, were we to ask, say, `Do worms have beards ?' 
In today's language, we might state this as that dispositional properties su- 
pervene on purely qualitative ones.2 This suggests an account of truthmaking 
in general: to say that a certain class of sentences (in our case, sentences as- 
serting dispositions) are made true is to say that those sentences supervene 
for their truth on the qualitative properties of something in the world. 'Qual- 
itative' is here used by contrast with `dispositional', but it is equally intended 
to cover something of what is meant by `intrinsic'. There is of course, much 
debate to be had over the exact meaning of all these terms, but that is not 
my project here. Suffice it to say that I shall use `intrinsic' and `qualitative' 
specifically to exclude barely dispositional and relational properties, as well 
as all such gerrymandered `impure' properties as `being such that Socrates 
was wise' (at least where that property is not had by Socrates himself). 
Since nominalism is in the background here, it would be better to prefer a 
more neutral formulation for our principle: let us say that, for every true sen- 
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tence, there is something on whose nature that sentence's truth supervenes, 
and that thing is the sentence's truthmaker. One might gloss a thing's na- 
ture as a grand conjunctive property, conjoining all of the thing's intrinsic 
properties.4 To say the least, this gloss is not obviously compatible with 
nominalism, but it gives you the idea. I must emphasise, though, that it is 
no part of the conception of a nature that a thing couldn't have failed to 
have the nature it actually does. This assertion, that every true sentence's 
truth supervenes on the nature of some thing, is what I will mean by the 
`truthmaker principle'.' 
To put this another way, for every true sentence, there is some thing such 
that the sentence cannot become false without a qualitative change, a non - 
Cambridge change, in that thing. That thing, whatever it is, is the sentence's 
truthmaker. Or, the truthmaker for a sentence is that thing that is intrin- 
sically such that the sentence is true. I am such that Socrates was wise, let 
us say. But, I am that way extrinsically. A duplicate of me could exist in a 
world where Socrates was foolish. If this wasn't so, and I (or my duplicates) 
somehow excluded Socrates from being foolish, I could count as a truthmaker 
for `Socrates was wise'. 
The Rylean theory of dispositions is in conflict with this principle, because, 
on the Rylean view, a true sentence expressing a disposition entails nothing 
about the intrinsic nature of the world. If my beliefs were Rylean dispositions, 
I could cease believing something without any real change taking place in me 
or indeed anywhere in the world. All that is required is that I cease to be 
`liable to be in a particular state ... when a particular condition is realised'. 
Tf that condition was not realised when I ceased believing, no change need 
occur at all. But yet, at some point it would cease to be true that I believed. 
This is precisely the sort of thing that the truthmaker principle denies. There 
is thus a truthmaker argument against Ryle, having the truthmaker principle 
as its premise. 
For the purposes of this paper, I will grant that Armstrong's truthmaker 
argument against Ryle (as I have here interpreted it) is sound. However, as I 
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will argue, it is not logically analogous to his argument against nominalism, 
so there is no reason for admirers of the former to believe the latter. 
A.1.2 Truthmakers Against Nominalism 
And so we come to Armstrong's new argument: 
Accepting the truthmaker principle will lead one to reject Quine's 
view that predicates do not have to be taken seriously in considering 
the ontological implications of the statements one takes to be true. 
Consider the difference between asserting that a certain surface is 
red and asserting that it is green. An upholder of the truthmaker 
principle will think that there has to be an ontological ground, a 
difference in the world, to account for the difference between the 
predicate "red" applying to the surface and the predicate "green" so 
applying. (ARMSTRONG 1989, p. 89) 
The point of invokving Quine here is that, according to Quine's criterion 
of ontological commitment (QuINE 1953), to say `There is a red surface' 
commits us to no more things than `There is a surface' commits us to. To 
be is to be the value of a bound variable in first order logic, and variables 
ranging over red surfaces range over no more (indeed, less) than those that 
range over all surfaces do. 
If Quine's criterion is right, nominalism is fairly easy. All a theory has to do 
to be nominalistically respectable is to refrain from quantifying over any of 
the disreputable kinds of entity that I enumerated in section I. By contrast, 
if Armstrong is right that predicates are ontologically committing, in a way 
incompatible with Quine's principle, it seems difficult for a nominalist to 
say what they are committing us to. The truthmaker principle asserts that 
true sentences have truthmakers. So, Armstrong wishes to add to Quine's 
criterion, that besides being committed to the domain of quantification of 
our assertions, we are committed to their truthmakers. 
178 Truthmakers 
But is the truthmaker principle really incompatible with Quine's criterion? 
Quine is not saying, nor need a nominalist be saying, that `there are red 
roses' is not ontologically committing at all. Nor, that the truth of this 
sentence makes no difference to the world. What is there, then, to stop us 
identifying an item in the domain of quantification of a sentence, which we 
are already committed to by Quine's principle, and calling it the truthmaker 
of that sentence? 
It is of the nature of a red rose that it is red, let us suppose. And suppose 
that I have a red rose. If I say `This rose is red', for that sentence to become 
false, there must be a change in the rose. And that would be no mere 
Cambridge change, not the sort of `change' that the Great Pyramid undergoes 
at the moment a sandcastle falls on the English coast. It sounds as if the 
relationship between sentence and rose is of the right sort, by the letter of our 
definition of truthmaking, for the rose to count as a truthmaker for `This rose 
is red.' So it would seem that one can be both a Quinean about ontological 
committment, and endorse the truthmaker principle. 
A.2 Truthmaker Essentialism 
I think that Armstrong would be prepared to grant all that I have said 
so far. He seems to be considering something like this proposal when he 
writes: `Quineans, although they maintain the ontological insignificance of 
the predicate, do have a truthmaker for truths that ascribe properties to a 
particular. The truthmaker is the particular itself' (ARMSTRONG 1997, p. 
125). So what has happenned to the argument against Quine, and, indirectly, 
against nominalism? 
Armstrong admits that his argument is not apodeictic: `There is no high 
road from the principle to universals' (ARMSTRONG 1989, p. 89). Rather, 
the principle makes nominalism, on balance, rather less plausible than it 
would otherwise be. He believes that `the truthmaking relation is an internal 
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one ... [where} an internal relation is one where the existence of the terms 
entails the existence of the relation ... in every world in which the terms 
exist, the relation holds between them' (ARMSTRONG 1997, p. 115). The 
internal relations, on this account, are de re necessary, and analogous to 
essential properties. I call the doctrine that truthmaking is internal in this 
sense `truthmaker essentialism'. 
I am taking truthmaker essentialism to be saying something additional to the 
truthmaker principle. According to the truthmaker principle, every truth has 
a truthmaker, in virtue of which that truth is true. According to truthmaker 
essentialism, every truth has a truthmaker, which is essentially that truth's 
truthmaker. This doctrine is quite maintstream in the truthmaker literature; 
so much so that those authors who hold it quite often incorporate it into 
their characterisations of the truthmaker principle itself.6 Armstrong does 
not he has a seperate argument to show that truthmaker essentialism 
is true (which we shall be meeting in the next section). Furthermore, as I 
have shown earlier, it is possible to run an Armstrong -Martin style argument 
against behaviourism without bringing in the essentiality of truthmaking. 
This seems to justify distinguishing the two notions. 
But notice that truthmaker essentialism will cause trouble to a nominalist 
who goes the way I suggested in the previous section. For, not only are roses 
red, but they appear to be contingently red. If a red rose were to make true 
`This rose is red', by truthmaker essentialism, that very rose could not fail 
to make the sentence true. That is, it could not fail to be red. Of course, if 
the rose could be somehow distinguished from what makes it true that it is 
red, this would not follow, but that road is not open to the nominalist.? 
Now, before I go on to reflect on this new turn that the argument has taken, 
let us note that it no Ionger looks so analogous to the case against Ryle. To 
argue against Ryle, no mention of essential properties or `internal' relations 
was necessary. Whereas, in the case of nominalism, the thesis of truthmaker 
essentialism emerges as a crucial premise. You might think that this thesis 
is true, and indeed that the argument is sound, and still agree with me that 
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it does not count as a truthmaker argument, because it does not have quite 
the same form as the classic argument against behaviourism.$ 
What's one extra premise, though? In the remainder of this paper I argue 
that not only is the truthmaker principle insufficient by itself to prove Arm- 
strong's case, but, given what appear to he his reasons for holding truthmaker 
essentialism, it is unnecessary. 
A.2.1 Truthmakers Without Essentialism 
Let's the nominalistic picture clear: a red rose, let us say, makes true the 
sentence `This rose is red', But that sentence is only a contingent truth 
(let us grant). In another possible world, that very rose (or its counterpart) 
exists, and is yellow. In that world, the rose does not make true `This rose 
is red', and instead makes true `This rose is yellow'. 
To drop the metaphor of possible worlds, let us consider a case where contin- 
gency is replaced with change: a certain beacon takes the form of a light that 
alternates between glowing red and glowing green. When it is red, it makes 
true the sentence `The beacon is red', but when it becomes green, it stops 
making this sentence true, and starts making `The beacon is green' true. 
Both of these cases are incompatible with truthmaker essentialism. Accord- 
ing to truthmaker essentialism, making true is not the sort of thing you can 
stop or start doing, either over time or between possible worlds. Is there a 
case for truthmaker essentialism strong enough to convince us of the falsity 
of nominalism? 
Armstrong gives a very brief argument: truthmaker essentialism 
seems evident enough if we consider for a moment the idea that 
the [truthmaker] relation should be external, contingent. If it is 
said that the truthmaker for a truth could have failed to make the 
truth true, then we will surely think that the alleged truthmaker was 
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insufficient in itself, and requires to be supplemented in some way. A 
contingently sufficient truthmaker will be true only in circumstances 
that obtain in this world. But then these circumstances, whatever 
they are must be added to give the full truthmaker 
(ARMSTRONG 1997, p. 116) 
What should we say about cases where a proposed truthmaker is seen to be 
insufficient? Suppose I claimed that only the rose's smallest petal, not the 
whole rose, makes it true that `This rose is red'. This we can all agree to be 
an insufficient truthmaker. We do not need to advert to essentialism to refute 
this proposal, we merely need to apply the supervenience characterisation of 
truthmakíng that I suggested in section II. One way that `This rose is red' 
could become false, or fail to be true, would be if the rose were a rose of 
mixed colours, with some petals red and others yellow. So, this sentence 
could become false even though the rose's smallest petal remained red; even 
if there were no real change in the smallest petal at all. There would be 
a change in the truth of the sentence without a change in the proposed 
truthmaker. This shows that, back in the actual world, where the whole rose 
is red, just the petal can't be the truthmaker. 
Regardless of essentialism, it just isn't the case that the smallest petal makes 
true `The rose is red'. There is a way to mark the difference between proposed 
truthmakers that are insufficient, and the real truthmaker of a sentence, 
other than the distinction between essential and contingent truthmaking. 
Insufficient `truthmakers' are simply not truthmakers at all, they are proper 
parts of truthmakers.' 
But the case put forward by the nominalist is quite different. On the nomi- 
nalist view, the whole red rose is not insufficient. Sure, it is only a truthmaker 
in virtue of actually being red, but to a nominalist, the request that we `add 
this circumstance' to the truthmaker makes no sense. We have already added 
it, in whatever meaningful sense it can be added, by adding the rose. And if 
Armstrong means to say, `there must be some further thing, besides the rose, 
that we need to add', he begs the question. Nor is our nominalist simply 
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playing a linguistic trick, and calling an insufficient truthmaker a sufficien- 
t one. Nominalists and realists can agree on what a paradigm insufficient 
truthmaker would be (the smallest petal case), and on why it is insufficient. 
A.2.2 `Intrinsic' and `Essential' 
Another way of reading Armstrong's argument for truthmaker essentialism 
is to concentrate on the word `external' and ignore the word `contingent'. 
Perhaps his criticism is really directed towards the view that `x makes true 
y' is more like `x is one meter away from y' than like `x is one meter taller 
than y'. In the taller than case, once you know the heights of x and y, 
you know who is taller. But there's nothing you could know just about the 
intrinsic nature of r. or the intrinsic nature of y that will tell you how far 
apart they are. That depends on something beyond just x and y themselves. 
Here we have a distinction between external and internal relations in a sense 
different to the one that Armstrong is officially using. 
This new sense of internal vs external relations emphasises intrinsicality 
rather than essentiality. Where, for Armstrong, if the relata of an inter- 
nal relation exist, then the relation holds between them (like an essential 
property), for this new conception of internal relation, duplicates of the rela- 
ta would do just as well (like an intrinsic property). This new sense is not in 
any way idiosyncratic. It is the sense in which such a careful metaphysician 
as David Lewis uses the terms (LFWTs 1986, p. 62).10 It is the sense in 
which Bertrand Russell used the terms in his classic attack on the British 
idealists' axiom of internal relations (RUSSELL 1910, pp.160 161).11 
Now it would he very peculiar indeed if the truthmakìng relation turned out 
to be external in this sense. if a duplicate of the red rose could fail to make 
true `This rose is red', then we would indeed be tempted to say that the red 
rose was insufficient as it stood, no true truthmaker. But this does not, on 
the face of it, make any essentialist point. It says nothing more than what 
the truthmaker principle does. According to the truthmaker principle, as 
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I've stated it, the truth of a sentence supervenes on the qualitative nature 
of its truthmaker. That nature is precisely what duplicates duplicate, so a 
duplicate of a truthmaker will do as well for truthmaking purposes as the 
original. 
Armstrong seems to take this as unquestionable evidence that the relation 
must be internal in his sense too. In fact he quite generally seems to hold 
that all intrinsic properties of a thing are essential to their instances: `[I]f 
a particular is taken along with all its non- relational properties, then it will 
have all these properties "in every possible world". So, in a sense, it has every 
such property necessarily' (ARMSTRONG 1997, p. 125). The alternative to 
taking a particular 'along with' its properties is taking it to be propertyless: 
`!I]n one sense a particular is propertyless. That is the thin particular. In 
another sense it enfolds properties within itself. In the latter case it is the 
thick particular' (ARMSTRONG 1989, p. 95). For Armstrong, there seems to 
be no middle road between taking a particular to have a property essentially, 
and taking it to have that property, at best, by proxy, by being related to 
the thick particular that has the property essentially. 
If this `Leibnizian essentialism' were right, then the `intrinsicalist' account of 
internal relations would indeed collapse into the `essentialist' account in the 
way that Armstrong expects. This is, for example, how he is able to treat 
resemblance as an internal relation in his sense: `[T]o fall under our definition 
of internal relations, the particulars involved must be taken as having their 
non -relational properties' (ARMSTRONG 1997, p. 88). Of course, they must 
be taken not only as having those properties, but as having them essentially: 
recall, an internal relation for Armstrong is one that is entailed by the mere 
existence of its relata. To Armstrong, though, this is all one: there is not 
distinction to be made between having a property and having it essentially, 
nor between essential and accidental properties (ARMSTRONG 1997, p. 124). 
Armstrong can consistently take the same view about the truthmaker rela- 
tions as he does about resemblance: it is internal in the Lewis /Russell sense, 
and therefore in his own sense, as the distinction between the two rests on a 
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(by his lights) mistaken distinction between accidental and essential proper- 
ties. This would justify his use of truthmaker essentialism. But only on the 
Leibnizian assumption that to have a property is to have it essentially.12 
A.2.3 Essentialism Without Truthmakers 
Leibnizian essentialism is not an entirely unpopular doctrine. It has an im- 
portant argument in its favour - the argument from the indescernability 
of identicals. Surely, in some sense, I cannot fail to be the same height as 
myself. According to the argument, it follows from this that I could not have 
been any taller or shorter while retaining my identity. And so on for any 
real, qualitative change. 
Someone who holds, as Armstrong does, that there are sui generis truth - 
makers, states of affairs, can sweeten this bitter pill a little. Look, he can 
say, you could be taller alright, but only because we are treating you as a 
thin particular. That thing continues to exist, and it is a thing which could 
be taller, in that it is a constituent of a state of affairs of its being a certain 
height at one world, and constituent of another state of affairs of its being 
another height at a different world. 
For my present purposes, it does not matter whether Leibnizian essentialism 
is true or false - for it appears to be an issue wholly independent of the 
truthmaker principle. If the argument against nominalism depends on truth - 
maker essentialism, which in turn depends on Leibnizian essentialism, it is 
sounding less and less like the paradigm truthmaker argument against Ryle, 
and more and more like some new argument, which, if sound, is not a truth - 
maker argument. In fact, now that we have arrived as the Leibnizian roots 
of the argument against nominalism, we can drop the truthmaker principle 
as a premise. 
Consider the following triad of propositions: 
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1. There is contingency in the world: a certain rose might not have been 
red, but yellow, I might have been taller than I am, and so on. 
2. Leibnizian essentialism: all intrinsic properties are essential ones. 
3. Thoroughgoing nominalism: there are only concrete things. 
Armstrong can resolve the seeming antinomy between 1 and 2. The strategy 
would be to explain away de re contingency - contingency in the nature of 
things, `in the properties that things have' - in terms of internal relations 
to contingently existing states of affairs. The rose (qua thin particular) is 
not contingently red (it's not really red at all), but it is contingent that there 
is a state of affairs of its being red. This state of affairs might have failed to 
exist (but could not fail to be red). We must not let the contingent truth of 
`The rose is red', based on the contingent existence of its truthmaker, lead us 
to hold that there is anything which is, de re, contingently red. There is not 
really any de re contingency here, though we can explain away the illusion 
of it. 
But this is at the cost of proposition 3. It requires that besides all the 
things, all the roses, people, and so on, there be thin particulars: propertyless 
abstracta which the thoroughgoing nominalist cannot countenance. 1 and 2 
may thus be taken together as an argument against 3. This argument would 
appear to be valid; if Leibnizian essentialism, and the (Moorean ?) fact of 
contingency are true, it is sound. But not a whiff of truthmaking has entered. 
This, I contend, is the real argument suggested by the principle of truthmaker 
essentialism, and it is completely independent of the truthmaker principle. 
A.3 Conclusion 
So, contrary to popular belief, David Armstrong has given no valid truth - 
maker argument against nominalism. He may have given a valid argument of 
some kind, but, if he has, it has the truthmaker principle among its premises 
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only on an honorary basis. Not only is the truthmaker principle insufficient 
to refute nominalism, but, placed in a strong enough context to form a valid 
argument against nominalism, it is unnecessary. 
As a subsidiary point, a fairly radical brand of nominalist can hold a truth - 
maker principle. This sort of nominalist will of course hold that all truth- 
makers are ordinary concrete things like chairs and tables, what I call the 
`facts in a world of things' view.13 She will inherit the old problems of neg- 
ative and general facts,14 that face all truthmaker theorists. She will also 
have to deal with some of the problems that face less radical nominalists, 
for example, the account to be given of relational facts, which troubles some 
trope theorists.15 Additionally, any nominalist needs to give an answer to 
the many other arguments against nominalism ably surveyed by Armstrong 
(ARMSTRONG 1978A). 
Here I will make no comment on the practicality of surmounting these ob- 
stacles. But at least I hope I have shown there to be one fewer of them than 
there might be.16 
Notes 
11t may be that Armstrong does not himself think that the two arguments (the one 
against Ryle and the one against nominalism) are two arguments of the same form. He 
does not dispel the illusion, though, writing of `the truthmaker argument ... as a certain 
style of argument'. (ARMSTRONG 1997, p. 115) 
ZOne might add to the supervenience basis, in the case of dispositions, the relevant 
laws of nature. However, it is presumably the qualitative nature of the laws in turn that 
is required - the law of gravity would not underwrite the disposition of dropped objects 
to fall at about 10 m /s, were the gravitational constant to have a different value - and 
so my original formulation stands. 
3For a discussion of impure properties and their relationship to intrinsic ones, see 
(HIMsNRSTONE 1996), esp. section 2, pp. 209 -227 
4As in Armstrong: (ARMSTRONG 1997, p. 125). 
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'An account of truthmaking in terms of supervenience is hardly novel. Armstrong 
emphasises the connection between the two: (ARMSTRONG 1997, pp. 11 -14), and in 
connection with dispositions (ARMSTRONG 1997, p. 82). In their recent philosophy of 
mind text, David Braddon- Mitchell and Frank Jackson treat truthmaker issues of the 
kind raised against Ryle as expressions of supervenience theses (BRADDON -MITCHELL 
AND JACKSON 1996, pp. 15 -17). 
soften this is done by a locution such as Bigelow's `Whenever something is true, there 
must be something whose existence entails that it is true' (BIGELOW 1995, p. 125). What 
makes this essentialist is that it is the mere existence of what is actually the truthmaker 
that is said to be sufficient for the sentence's being true. 
'Interestingly, Armstrong comes close to falling into the same trap, holding as he does 
that thick particulars (among them all the roses) are the states of affairs of that particular 
having whatever nature it has (ARMSTRONG 1997, p. 125). For more on this, see below, 
sections VI and VII. 
'The prevalence of truthmaker essentialism might lead some people to say that the 
truthmaker principle is what I'm calling the principle, plus truthmaker essentialism. This 
is not an objection to what I'm saying here. The argument against Ryle needs only the 
principle minus truthmaker essentialism. Regardless of which principle really deserves the 
name ` truthmaker principle', this is still a point of disanalogy between the two arguments. 
'Some truthmakers for a sentence p might have proper parts that are also truthmakers 
for p. In this case, the insufficient 'truthmakers' for p are all the parts of the minimal 
truthmaker for p; the truthmaker that has no proper parts as truthmakers. (For more on 
minimal truthmakers, see (MULLIGAN, SIMONS, AND SMITH 1984, p. 297 -298). Though 
Mulligan, Simons and Smith are often cited as the origin of the notion of `minimal truth - 
maker', it was probably first used by Bruce Langtry (LANGTRY 1975, p. 9)). 
"See also his discussion of similarity as the paradigm internal relation (LEWIS 1986, 
pp. 176 -179); and, on the relationship between intrinsic properties and internal relations, 
(LANGTON AND LEWIS 1998, Section VIII) 
'Note particularly Russell's characterisation of external relations: `[T(here are such 
facts as that one object has a certain relation to another, and such facts cannot in general 
be reduced to, or inferred from, a fact about the one object only together with a fact 
about the other object only: they do not imply that the two objects have ... any intrinsic 
property distinguishing them from two objects which do not have the relation in question'. 
'Armstrong has suggested to me (in conversation) that I am taking insufficient notice of 
the fact that he espouses a counterpart theory, so that for him, what it would be for (e.g.) 
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a rose to be essentially red, would be for there to he nothing in another possible world 
that was both red and shared a certain kind of constituent (a thin particular) with the 
rose. But what then does he mean by `the truthmaking relation is internal'? If he means 
the strong claim that no counterpart of a truthmaker for p could ever fail to make p true, 
then he is still committed to Leibnizian essentialism, for among those truthmakers are the 
thick particulars. If he means the weak claim that no truthmaker for p could ever fail to 
make p true (but its counterparts might) then the doctrine he holds is not truthmaker 
essentialism, but something quite compatible with thoroughgoing nominalism. 
13It's an interesting question whether what I have said here on behalf of nominalism 
could he said, on behalf of realism, as a defence against John Fox's truthmaker argument 
against realism ( (Fox 1987), see also (BIGELow 1995, pp. 135 -138)). Fox argues that, 
a believer only in universals and substances (and not in, say, states of affairs, or tropes) 
cannot construct truthmakers for sentences asserting that a particular has a property 
accidentally. Fox's argument shows at least, that for a nominalist contemplating truth - 
maker essentialism, merely adding universals to her ontology will not help. If, contra Fox, 
truthmaker essentialism is to be denied, a believer in just universals and particulars could 
believe in the nominalistic view I have advertised; but that leaves a question mark over 
what reason such a person has for believing in universals, if particulars are enough to 
account for all their truthmakers. For this reason I think Fox's argument meets its mark 
regardless of the status of truthmaker essentialism. (Fox's argument doesn't claim to be 
analogous to the Armstrong- Martin argument against Ryle). 
14For a broadly nominalist attempt to deal with these, see (SiMONs 1992). 
t5See, for example, (CAMPBELL 1990, Chapter 5). 
16Thanks to David Armstrong, Helen Beebee, Richard Holton, Rae Langton, Cathy 
Legg, Daniel Nolan, and Daniel Stoljar for comments and discussion on this paper. 
Appendix B 
Truthmakers continued 
Unpublished paper entitled "What is the problem of Truthmakers ?" 
(PARSONS 2001B) 
B.1 Introduction 
Truthmaker Theory has two parts. As Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, and 
Barry Smith put it in their classic paper "Truth- Makers ": 
The neutral term "truth- maker" enables us to seperate the gener- 
al question of the need for truth -makers from the more particular 
question as to what sort - or sorts - of entities truth -makers are. 
(MULLIGAN, SrMONS, AND SMITH 1984, p. 280) 
Questions of the first kind make up the formal theory of truthmakers, con- 
cerning why we should believe in truthmakers; what it is to make a sentence 
true; what the relationship between the truthmaker of a conjunctive (or dis- 
junctive) sentence and the truthmakers of its conjuncts (or disjuncts) might 
be - things that can be characterised solely in terms of truthmaking. The 
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formal theory of truthmakers usually asserts the Truthmaker Principle, that 
all truths require truthmakers (with, perhaps some exceptions according to 
taste for general or negative truths). 
The second, material theory of truthmakers, concerns what kinds of things 
realise the truthmaker role. While truthmaker theorists, insofar as they are 
talking about a common subject matter, tend to converge on the formal the- 
ory, there are (nearly) as many material theories of truthmaking as there are 
truthmaker theorists. Truthmakers could be identified with tropes (MULLI- 
GAN, SIMONS, AND SMITH 1984), or with `states of affairs' (ARMSTRONG 
1997), or with concrete particulars (PARSONS 1999). 
My concern in this paper is with attempts to argue from the formal part 
of truthmaker theory to the material part. That is, to establish a certain 
ontological view - the falsity of nominalism on the basis of the formal 
theory of truthmaking alone. 
I think that that kind of project is a mistake. The force of a Truthmaker 
Principle should be to prevent metaphysicians from shirking their ontological 
responsibilities. A plausible sounding theory can require a very implausible 
ontology. Perhaps this can be best shown with a quick example: Rylean 
behaviorism. 
The Rylean holds that mental states are "bare dispositions" - they don't 
have any consequences for the actual qualitative nature of the world. A world 
in which I believe that worms have no beards could be qualitatively just like 
a world in which I don't believe that worms have no beards (provided in 
each world, the disposition corresponding to each belief is not manifested). 
It follows that the Rylean has no distinctive ontological commitments - she 
is committed neither to dualism or materialism. 
But this will not do: the Rylean lacks truthmakers for belief statements 
- there is no "difference in the world" corresponding to differences in be- 
lief (according to Ryle). Truths require truthmakers, says the Truthmaker 
Principle, and there's no way to provide truthmakers for belief statements, 
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without providing an ontology of the mental. There's nothing to stop Ryle, 
of course, accepting the Truthmaker Principle, and believing in a kind of 
Platonic realm of dispositional truthmakers which are neither physical nor of 
the sort of stuff that dualists believe in - and so remaining neutral between 
physicalism and dualism in the way that behaviourism was supposed to. If 
he did that, however, the Truthmaker Principle would have done its work: a 
Platonic behaviourist is not shirking any ontological commitments (though 
that view may have other problems). It's a mistake to try to go after a Pla- 
tonic behaviourist with arguments from the formal theory of truthmaking. 
Similarly for any kind of nominalism, or anti -nominalism for that matter. 
These are already explicitly ontological doctrines, and there should be no 
objection to them on the basis of merely the formal theory of truthmakers. 
Nevertheless, it has been claimed at various times by David Armstrong 
(ARMSTRONG 1989; ARMSTRONG 1997), and more recently by Gonzalo 
Rodriguez -Pereyra (RODRIGUEZ- PEREYRA 2000), that a certain kind of 
nominalism, which I will call "thoroughgoing nominalism ", can be refuted 
by appeal to the Truthmaker Principle. Rodriguez - Pereyra presents the rele- 
vant arguments particularly clearly and explicitly, so it is he who will be my 
principal stalking- horse. 
B.2 Background 
Thoroughgoing nominalism is the doctrine that there are only concrete par- 
ticulars. There are no universals, tropes, or classes, only things: such familiar 
objects as chairs, tables, human bodies, and electrons. Roughly, a thing is 
something that one can, in principle, kick. I can certainly kick a chair; if I 
were small enough, I could kick an electron; if I were big enough, and robust 
enough, I could kick a star - but I don't have any conception of what it 
would be to kick triangularity, or the empty set. 
There are many ways to challenge thoroughgoing nominalism. One is to 
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appeal to the role of mathematics in our best science. Another is to point 
to the difficulty of analysing away `abstract reference', as occurs in sentences 
like "The colour blue is more similar to green than to red ". 
In this paper, I won't be interested in these questions, because I'm not in- 
terested here in the truth or falsity of thoroughgoing nominalism, but rather 
of what I will call "Truthmaker Nominalism" - the doctrine that the things 
exhaust all the truthmakers. It might be that to fully accomodate science or 
semantics, we may need abstracta. Truthmaker Nominalism is the relatively 
restrained view which, accepting this possibility, holds that abstracta are not 
needed merely for an account of truthmakers. Rather, the truthmakers are 
all to be identified with concrete particulars. Truthmaker Nominalism is thus 
a material theory of truthmakers. Truthmaker Nominalism does not entail 
thoroughgoing nominalism, but it does entail that thoroughgoing nominalism 
cannot be refuted by appeal to Truthmaker Theory. 
Suppose I have a red rose, called, for convenient reference, "Rosie". The 
Truthmaker Nominalist holds that "Rosie is red" is made true by Rosie. Why 
Rosie, and not anything else? Because, were this sentence false, it is Rosie 
that would be different, and not anything else.1 Rosie is, as Armstrong would 
put it (ARMSTRONG 1989, p. 89) the "difference in the world" between our 
world, were "Rosie is red" is true, and other worlds, where "Rosie is red" is 
false. 
Rodriguez- Pereyra doesn't believe, however, that this sort of account can 
work even going so far as to identify this problem with the traditional 
"problem of universals" which was supposed to confront nominalism. In the 
remainder of this paper, I consider his arguments. 
lI assume a naïve theory of colour here - readers unhappy with this are welcome to 
substitute some predicate of fundamental physical science if they wish. 
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B.3 The Argument from Contingency 
Rodriguez - Pereyra offers two arguments against Truthmaker Nominalism. 
The first concerns the contingency of the connection between truths and 
truthmakers according to the Nominalist approach: 
One might think that the truthmaker version of ostrich nominalism 
fails simply because a sentence like "a is F" may be contingently 
true. If so, then a does not suffice to make it true that it is F, 
since "a exists" does not entail "a is F ", for the former may be true 
and the latter false. Therefore a is not the truthmaker of "a is F ". 
(RODRIGUEZ- PEREYRA 2000, p. 268) 
Many truthmaker theorists connect truthmaking with entailment. Some 
loosely say that a truthmaker for a given sentence entails that that sentence 
is true. But this is a confusing usage. Only truthbearers (be they sentences, 
or whatever) can entail each other; and many truthmakers, on anyone's ac- 
count, are not truthbearers. What truthmaker theorists really mean when 
they say this sort of thing is that a sentence asserting that a truthmaker for 
p exists entails p. Thus, Rodriguez -Pereyra endorses a principle he calls T *: 
(RODRIGUEZ- PEREYRA 2000, p. 262) 
T* If E is a truthmaker of S then "E exists" entails S. 
The force of T* is that a truthmaker's truthmaking activities are essential to 
it. Reading "entails" in the familiar possible worlds way, if E is a truthmaker 
of S then E doesn't just make S true around here it makes S true in every 
possible world at which it exists - which is to say that E essentially makes 
S true. 
Given that Rosie, presumably, exists at lots of worlds where Rosie is not red, 
Rosie doesn't look like a plausible candidate for something that essentially 
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makes "Rosie is red" true. This is, I think, a good and difficult problem for 
thoroughgoing nominalism. But it is not any problem specifically to do with 
truthmakers it is a problem to to with essential properties. 
Compare the relationship between me and my body. My body, many people 
would like to think, is the sort of thing that could not fail to be a human 
being it is essentially a human being. I, on the other hand, could perhaps 
have been a disembodied spirit; or have had a robot body; or a Martian 
body. This makes it hard to believe that I am identical to my body. 
Another example: suppose I make a statue of Rosie out of plastic. The 
particular lump of plastic I used, we would perhaps like to think, could not 
have been some material other than plastic, could not have been partially 
clay, for example. It is essentially wholly plastic. However, I could have 
made that very statue out of clay, or out of a mixture of clay and plastic. 
The statue does not appear to essentially wholly plastic. This makes it hard 
to believe that the statue is identical to the material that it is composed of. 
Each of these examples is a prima facie argument against thoroughgoing 
nominalism. If we want to hang onto our judgements about the essential 
properties, we'll need to give up thoroughgoing nominalism. Conversely, if 
we want to hang onto thoroughgoing nominalism, we'll need to be more 
careful in trusting our intuitions about essential properties than we might 
be. We may need to give up on the idea that my body is essentially a human 
body, or that lumps of plastic essentially contain no clay, or, that whatever 
makes it true that "Rosie is red" does so essentially. 
This is not to say that a thoroughgoing nominalist rejects any connection 
between truthmaking and entailment. T* can be purged of its essentialism, 
to produce a principle like this: 
T * * "F, is a truthmaker of S" entails S. 
T ** represents a weaker connection between entailment and truthmaking 
than T *. In particular, T ** cannot play the role played by T* in the argu- 
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ment from contingency, because it does follow from "Rosie is a truthmaker 
of ` Rosie is red "' that "Rosie is red". 
B.4 The Argument from Multiplicity 
Rodriguez - Pereyra does not take the argument from contingency to be con- 
clusive. He follows it up with another argument that he does take to be 
conclusive, though: 
[Clan "Socrates is human" and "Socrates is moral ", predicating such 
different characteristics of Socrates, both have the same truthmaker? 
Can those two sentences be true in virtue of the same thing when 
"is human" and "is moral" are not even coextensive predicates? 
(RODRIGUEZ- PEREYRA 2000, p. 268) 
The principle implicit in this paragraph, that sentences having just the same 
truthmakers should have just the same truth conditions, is plausible. Let us 
call it the relevance principle -a sentence's truthmaker must be relevant to 
that sentence. ft is not trivial to formulate it accurately. 
We might be tempted to say that, if two sentences have the same truthmaker, 
then they have the same truth conditions - they are logically equivalent. 
Talk of "the same truthmaker ", however, glosses over the fact that sentences 
may have many truthmakers. In addition, disjunctive sentences may share 
truthmakers with their disjuncts: 
Disjunctions show that the truthmaking relation is not one -one, but 
many -many. On the one hand, some truthmakers make true more 
than one sentence: the fact that Socrates is white makes true both 
"Socrates is white or Socrates is round" and "Socrates is white or 
Plato is white ". On the other hand, some sentences, like "Socrates 
is white or Plato is white ", have more than one truthmaker: the 
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fact that Socrates is white and also the fact that Plato is white, 
the existence of either of which entails the truth of the sentence. 
(RODRIGUEZ -PEREYRA 2000, pp. 262 -263) 
To accomodate these points, we could make the relevance principle say that 
if two true sentences have all and only the same truthmakers, then they are 
logically equivalent. That is, 
R (p A q A (Vx) (x makes true p w x makes true q)) D (p w q) 
R does rule out Truthmaker Nominalism in the way that Rodriguez -Pereyra 
suggests. If Truthmaker Nominalism is true, that Rosie would be the only 
truthmaker for both 1 and 2, below: 
1 "Rosie is red." 
2 "Rosie is rose -shaped." 
These two sentences are far from being logically equivalent - so R clearly 
furnishes a valid argument against Nominalism. 
Forunately for Truthmaker Nominalists, however, R is false on independent 
grounds. The counter- example is a pair of sentences which Rodriguez -Pereyra 
himself uses as an example in a different context. (RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA 
2000, p. 262) Consider 3 and 4: 
3 "Socrates is white." 
4 "Socrates is white or Socrates is round." 
Suppose that 3 has just one truthmaker (Socrates' whiteness trope, perhaps) 
and that Socrates is not, in fact, round. In that case, 3 and 4 will have all and 
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only the same truthmakers, while not, of course, being logically equivalent. 
This is a counterexample to R as it stands. 
A distinctive point about this class of counterexample is the contingency of 
the coincidence between the truthmakers of 3 and 4. It might have been 
the case, perhaps, that Socrates was round. In that case, 4 would have 
had an additional truthmaker, namely, whatever it is would have made true 
"Socrates is round ", and it would be no counterexample to R. This suggests 
a weakening of R to avoid the counterexample: what the relevance principle 
should say is that if two sentences have, necessarily, all and only the same 
truthmakers (if, that is, they coincide in their truthmakers, in each possible 
world, not just in the actual one), then they are logically equivalent. Thus: 
R* (bx)(x makes true p - x makes true q) D (p - q) 
R* is not refuted by the example of 3 and 4, because there's a world at which 
Socrates is white and round, and in that world, 4 does not have all and only 
the same truthmakers as 3. 
Fortunately again for Truthmaker Nominalists, R* does not rule out Truth - 
maker Nominalism in the way that R does. I and 2 have the same truthmaker 
in the actual world, but not in any world in which Rosie is not red. In those 
worlds, 1 is false and has no truthmakers, while 2 is true and has Rosie as a 
truthmaker. 
Notice that this is dependent on the Truthmaker Nominalist's rejection of 
Truthmaker Essentialism. It's because Rosie might not have made true those 
sentences she actually does that it is possible for worlds to vary in regard to 
whether 1 is made true, independently of whether 2 is made true, in spite of 
the fact that, wherever both are made true together, it is by the same thing, 
Rosie. If, as Truthmaker Essentialism would have it, Rosie could not exist 
without making true all those sentences she actually makes true, then Rosie 
could not exist without making 1 true. A fortiori, she could not make 2 true 
without making 1 true, and vice versa. 
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So, R* does offer some argument against Truthma.ker Nominalism, by draw- 
ing attention again to the fact that a Truthmaker Nominalist should reject 
Truthmaker Essentialism. This argument, however, is dependent on the same 
premise, Truthmaker Essentialism, as the much more straightforward argu- 
ment considered in the previous section, the argument from contingency. 
Thus R* even makes sense of Rodriguez -Pereyra's argument, as a covert ap- 
peal to Truthmaker Essentialism (which, after all, he assumes a Truthmaker 
Nominalist will accept). But perhaps there is a stronger relevance principle 
that might rule out Truthmaker Nominalism while avoiding the counterex- 
ample to R? 
What anti -nominalists perhaps find objectionable about 1 and 2 on the 
Truthmaker Nominalist view, is not that they're actually made true by just 
the same things, but that, wherever they're both true, they're always made 
true by the same things. This is not the case for 3 and 4. This suggests yet 
a third version of the relevance principle: 
R * * (dx) ((p A q) D (x makes true p = x makes true q)) D (p w q) 
In spite of its initial appeal, R ** is in exactly the same position as R. It 
licenses an argument against Truthmaker Nominalism in the same way that 
R does, but, like R, it has an independent counterexample, this time not one 
considered by Rodriguez -Pereyra: 
5 "Rosie is red or Rosie is yellow." 
6 "Rosie is red or Rosie is purple." 
On anyone's account, not just the Truthmaker Nominalist's, 5 and 6 will 
come out to be made true just by whatever it is that makes true "Rosie is 
red" (perhaps Rosie's redness trope) in every world in which 5 and 6 are both 
true. This is incompatible with R * *. 
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Finally, perhaps a desperate anti - nominalist might offer as a relevance prin- 
ciple R or R ** restricted to non -disjunctive sentences. 
While there is an obvious sense in which 4 -6 are disjunctive (they contain the 
English word "or "), this is not required for them to act as counterexamples 
to R and R * *. The disjunctive examples I have used can made into subject - 
predicate sentences by defining up `disjunctive' predicates like, for example, 
"whound ", applying to all the white things, and, in addition, all the round 
things. We can write 4 as: 
4' "Socrates is whound." 
For familiar reasons,2 it is much, much, harder to say what makes a pred- 
icate like "whound" disjunctive (if, indeed there is any sense in which it is 
disjunctive) than it is to say what makes a sentence disjunctive. 
The only plausible reading of the argument from multiplicity that I can find 
makes its premises R *, Truthmaker Essentialism, and, of course, the Truth - 
maker Principle. From these it follows that thoroughgoing nominalism is 
false; but the same follows from Truthmaker Essentialism and the Truthmak- 
er Principle, without R* - as is shown by the argument from contingency, 
The argument from multiplicity, is, therefore, no advance on the argument 
from contingency as an attempt to refute thoroughgoing nominalism. 
B.5 Conclusion 
None of what 1 have said should be very surprising if we keep in mind the 
comments with which I began. The formal theory of truthmaking is a broad 
2I refer, of course, to the literature (STALKER 1994) surrounding Goodman's "new 
riddle of induction ", and the predicate "grue ". "Grue" is `disjunctive' in the same sense 
that "whound" is - notoriously, it is very difficult to lay down an exact specification of 
what that sense is. 
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church; it describes just what we mean by talk of truthmakers without pre- 
judging the underlying metaphysics. It should be surprising if such a theory 
were to rule out thoroughgoing nominalism. 
The division of Truthmaker Theory into two distinct parts is part of its 
attraction. There is little consensus on what the question is, to which general 
ontological theories like realism, thoroughgoing nominalism, or trope theory 
are the answers. Such a question should not presuppose any of the global 
ontological theories themselves. 
Truthmaker Theory seems to offer such a question: what are the truthmak- 
ers? For it to be an advance in understanding general ontological theories, 
this question should be able to be made sense of in any such theory. 
Appendix C 
Four - dimensionalism and 
Temporal Parts 
Published as "Must a Four -dimensionalist believe in Temporal 
Parts ?" in the Monist, 83:3 (PARSONS 2000) 
Because the notes to this appendix are quite lengthy, I have gathered 
them at the end of the appendix, rather than placing them at the 
foot of the page they belong to. 
C.1 Introduction 
The following quotation, from Frank Jackson, is the beginning of a typical ex- 
position of the debate between those metaphysicians who believe in temporal 
parts, and those who do not: 
The dispute between three -dimensionalism and four -dimensionalism, 
or more precisely, that part of the dispute we will be concerned with, 
concerns what persistence, and correllatively, what change, comes 
to. Three -dimensionalism holds that an object exists at a time by 
being wholly present at that time, and, accordingly, that it persists 
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if it is wholly present at more than one time. For short, it persists 
by enduring. Four-dimensionalism holds that an object exists at a 
time by having a temporal part at that time, and it persists if it has 
distinct temporal parts at more than one time. For short, it persists 
by perduring (JACKSON 1998, p. 138) 
In the light of these comments, some readers will perhaps find the question 
that forms the title of this paper a little puzzling. They may have learned to 
use the terms `four -dimensionalism' `perdurantism' and `belief in temporal 
parts' interchangeably; or perhaps even to define one in terms of the other. 
Such a usage, however, is inapposite. We might imagine a Flatland -like world 
of two spatial dimensions and one temporal, whose philosophers are divided 
between a theory of persistence on which they persist by having temporal 
parts, and a theory on which they persist by being wholly located in each 
of several times. This is just the same issue we face, but at least the label 
`four- dimensionalism' seems inapposite: the four -dimensionalist Flatlanders 
believe in only three dimensions!' 
In any case, this is not the usage intended by Jackson. Temporal parts are a 
`part of the dispute' between four- and three -dimensionalists, not the whole 
of that dispute. For Jackson, four -dimensìonalism is a broader programme 
that (allegedly) entails a certain specific theory of persistence, namely per - 
durantism. That is the usage of 'four-dimensionalism' that I have in mind, 
and my question is whether the alleged entailment actually holds. 
First, I'll set up definitions of `four -dimensionalism' and `endura.ntism' that 
are as strong as possible without actually making them analytically incom- 
patible. Second, I consider an argument for temporal parts which falls rather 
naturally out of the definition of `four -dimensionalism', and reject it as un- 
convincing. Third, I consider the argument that is most usually given against 
endurantism, and for temporal parts, the Problem of Change. I offer a new 
endurantist solution to this problem. With neither argument seeming to of- 
fer an apriori connection between four -dimensionalism and temporal parts, I 
conclude that there is no such connection. 
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C.1.1 Endurantism 
Things are often located at more than one time. Take me, for example: I'm 
somewhere at this very minute (call that t1). And I was somewhere five 
minutes ago (to). I might have moved in the intervening time, but you'll 
find me at both times: both now and five minutes ago. Following the now 
standard terminology, (JoHNSTOa 1987) I'll use the word `persistence' to 
cover multiple location in time in this neutral sense. 
But people often want to give theories of persistence: and the theories they 
give fall into two groups: those that believe in persistence with temporal 
parts, or perdurance, on the one hand, and those that believe in persistence 
without temporal parts, or endurance, on the other. According to the tem- 
poral parts view, the thing that persists through time (me, say) is the sum 
or composite of the several distinct things each of which occupy just a single 
one of the times I am Iocated at. These things, my temporal parts, or time - 
slices. are located at just one of the times at which I'm located (while I am 
located at many). So, on this view, while I'm multiply located at tl and to, 
that's so in virtue of there being some other things, singly located at each of 
t1 and to, which are my parts. 
On the endurantist view, however, this is not the case. According to enduran- 
tism, I'm wholly located at both t1 and to, without having a part located at 
t1 and not to, or a part located at to and not t1. It's important not to confuse 
`wholly located' (which is the opposite of `partially located') with `singly lo- 
cated' (which is the opposite of `multiply located'). Everyone can agree that 
some things are multiply located in time, that some things persist, in other 
words. Everyone can agree, too,that some things (be they persisting things, 
or only the temporal parts of persisting things) are wholly located at certain 
times. The difference between endurantism and perdurantism is on the issue 
of whether some things are both wholly and multiply located at those times 
at which they exist. An endurantist says yes, there are, a perdurantist says 
no. 
Sometimes endurantists claim that it's just a big mistake to even speak of 
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temporal parts that perdurance is not only a false metaphysical view, but 
an incoherent one. According to P. T. Geach, for example, while speaking of 
temporal parts is `very natural', it `involves an erroneous analysis of proposi- 
tions into subject and predicate' (GEACH 1968, p. 182). For the purposes of 
this paper, I'm just going to set aside this line of thought. The reason is that, 
if correct, it calls four -dimensionalism into question along with perdurantism 
this kind of endurantist thinks of time as different from space in such a 
profound way that they cannot be a four -dimensionalist (and the kind of en- 
durantism I want to defend is a kind compatible with four -dimensionalism). 
C.1.2 Four - dimensionalism 
The core of four -dimensionalism as I understand it, is the Dimensionality 
Thesis: that the universe is a four -dimensional manifold of which one of 
the dimensions is time. This doctrine on its own, however, is insufficiently 
strong to be of much help to us. It's certainly much weaker than what most 
writers mean by the term `four -dimensionalism'. So far as I am aware, the 
closest anyone has come to defending the Dimensionality Thesis on its own, 
is D. C. Williams on `the theory of the manifold': 
The theory of the manifold leaves abundant room for the sensitive 
observer to record any describable difference he may find, in intrinsic 
quality, relational texture, or absolute direction, between the tempo- 
ral dimension and the spatial ones (WILLIAMS 1966, p. 301) 
Even Williams, though, goes on the argue that it is unnecessary to add any of 
the further `differences' between space and time that he describes here. This 
is typical - besides affirming the Dimensionality Thesis, four -dimensionalists 
also claim that time is like space in various different ways. 
This second part of four -dimensionalism is responsible for much of its philo - 
sophical appeal, as it enables us to solve puzzles and construct arguments 
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about time by appealing to the analogous spatial cases.' I will subsume the 
varying different ways in which four -dimensionalists allege time to be like s- 
pace under a single vague doctrine, the Analogy Thesis that time is somehow, 
strongly or weakly, analogous to space. 
Four -dimensionalism, then, on my account, is the conjunction of the Di- 
mensionality Thesis with the Analogy Thesis. We must bear in mind, how- 
ever, that the Analogy Thesis is vague, and can be held in stronger and 
weaker forms. Accordingly, there will be stronger and weaker versions of 
four -dimensionalism. I'm going to argue that even the stronger versions of 
four -dimensionalism are stiII compatible with endurantism. 
C.2 The Argument from Analogy 
A version of the Analogy Thesis, in the shape of an analogy between extension 
in space and persistence through time, is often used to introduce the concept 
of a temporal part. Here is one example from a recent defence of perdurance 
by Theodore Sider: 
Persistence through time is much like extension through space. A 
road has spatial parts in the subregions of the region of space it 
occupies; likewise, an object that exists in time has temporal parts 
in the various subregions of the total region it occupies 
(SIDER 1997, p. 197) 
And another from Richard Taylor's classic collection of analogies between 
space and time: 
[T]he concept of length or extension has a place in both [spatial 
and temporal] contexts, though this Is easily overlooked. Things 
can be spatially long or short, but so too they can have a long or 
brief duration, i. e., be temporally long or short.... The notion 
of length in turn leads to that of parts, both spatial and temporal 
(TAYLOR 1964, p. 382) 
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Though these passages may not have been intended as arguments by their 
authors, they certainly suggest an argument from the Analogy Thesis to the 
view that things persist by perduring, by having temporal parts. This is the 
Argument from Analogy: 
Al Time is analogous to space; in particular, persistence is analogous to 
extension. 
A2 All things extend by having different parts at different places. 
A3 All things persist through time by having different parts at different 
times. 
Premise Al here is just a version of the Analogy Thesis. Premise A2 is the 
observation that macroscopic objects typically do have spatial parts: I fill 
this bit of space to my left by having my left arm there, and this distinct 
bit of space, to my right, by having a distinct part, my right arm, there. 
Each arm extends through its region of space by having many distinct cells 
as parts, each filling a distinct, smaller region of space, and so on down to 
the subatomic level. 
One thing you might do with this argument, if you wanted to deny the con- 
clusion, is to take it as a modus tollens against premise Al. If you thought 
that endurantism was more obviously true than the Analogy Thesis, you 
might reject or weaken the Analogy Thesis. Such a view might even remain 
recognisably four -dimensionalist. After all, the Analogy Thesis only asserts 
some, stronger or weaker, analogy between time and space. A weaker form of 
the Analogy Thesis could assert that time is just like space, except that ob- 
jects fill time by enduring, while they fill space by having spatial parts. This 
would still be strong enough to do some work, still allowing arguments from 
the Analogy Thesis against the passage of time, for example. D. H. Mellor 
accepts just such a weak version of four -dimensionalism, and argues that it 
is compatible with special relativity (indeed more compatible than a version 
including a stronger Analogy Thesis) (MELLOR 1998, pp. 53 -56). 
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This line of argument is unsatisfying for our purposes, as it tends to trivialise 
our question. Make four -dimensionalism weak enough, and of course it can 
be compatible with anything you like. So I would like a defence to the 
Argument from Analogy that allows the Analogy Thesis, and thence four - 
dimensionalism, to be held in as strong a form as possible. 
Suppose that the Analogy Thesis is to be affirmed in a strong enough form to 
make an analogy between spatial extension and temporal persistence. Now 
the argument can be treated as a modus tollens against premise A2. Just 
as there is a debate to be had between endurantists and perdurantists about 
how things persist through time, there should be an analogous debate to 
be had about how things extend through space. Analogous to perdurance, 
we have pertension, filling space by having distinct parts in distinct places; 
analogous to endurance, we have entension, filling space by being wholly 
located in each of several places. The defence against the argument from 
analogy is that just as things might endure through time, they might (and 
perhaps do) entend through space.3 
In fact there may be good reasons for thinking that some (if not all) things do 
entend, especially those things that have no parts - that are `mereologically 
simple':' the Argument from Avogadro: 
V1 All mereological simples are extensionless. 
V2 There are only finitely many simples. 
V3 All objects are mereological sums of simples. 
V4 All objects are sums of finitely many extensionless things. (from V1,V2, 
and V3) 
V5 All sums of only finitely many extensionless things are extensionless. 
V6 All objects are extensionless. (from V4 and V5) 
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V6 is absurd -- if it was true, we wouldn't have a problem about whether 
things entend or pertend! I take this argument as a reductio against Vl. It 
only remains to draw the contradiction explicitly: 
V7 But of course some objects are extended! 
V8 Some simples have extension; they entend. (reductio against VI) 
The most important premise in this argument is V2. I take it that V2 is 
a discovery of physical science - the discovery of Avogadro's number, the 
number of hydrogen atoms in a gram of hydrogen. Armed with Avogadro's 
number, and a theory of the subatomic constitution of matter, we can arrive 
at a finite total number of the simple objects that make up any ordinary 
finitely massive material object, like a chair or a table, (or the universe, for 
that matter). 
Substantivalists might object to V2 on the grounds that it counts only the 
material objects, and not the continuum many point -instants of space -time. 
For the purposes of this paper, I wish to be neutral on the issue of snbstan- 
tivalism: I am only interested in the manner in which material objects like 
chairs and tables extend (or persist) and not in the manner in which regions 
of space -time do so. Plausibly, space -time, if it exists, extends by pertending, 
and persists by perduring - but that's not the issue here. The argument 
from Avogadro is intended to be restricted to material objects and material 
simples, and substantivalist objectors are welcome to substitute throughout 
`material simple' for `simple' and `material object' for `object' throughout. 
So what are these entending simples? I think that it is most likely that they 
are the most fundamental objects of physics, leptons and quarks. Current 
physics regards these objects as mereologically simple (unlike nucleons, such 
as protons, which are made of quarks), and is silent on whether they are 
extended - they are, at largest, too small to be practically measurable.'s 
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An important thing to note about my argument that quarks and leptons 
entend is that it has many empirical premises. V2 is an empirical premise; so 
is the rnereological simplicity of quarks and leptons (it may yet be discovered 
that they have smaller parts in turn); so too are those things that are known 
about the extension, if any, of these objects. It follows that whether that some 
things entend (as I have argued), or whether, on the contrary, everything 
pertends (in which case V2 will turn out to be false) is an empirical matter. 
And, if we accept the Analogy Thesis in its strongest form, we should think 
that the issue of whether anything endures is likewise an empirical matter. 
It may be objected here that science is not in the business of discovering which 
things are mereologically simple. Instead, science discovers which things 
are, in practice, indivisible. In moving from the in- practice indivisibility of 
fundamental objects to the view that they are mereologically simple, we cross 
the boundary from science to metaphysics. 
There is a logical gap, to be sure, between on the one hand, the data that we 
have empirically available to us, about which things are divisible into their 
proper parts in a laboratory, and on the other, the theories we concoct about 
which things have proper parts to be divided. But that is no big news: the 
underdetermination of theory by evidence is ubiquitous in science. If that 
alone means that science can say nothing about whether an object has parts, 
then science can say very little. 
Moreover, the idea that the nature and number of parts an object has is 
an empirical matter is quite in line with orthodox mereology. It's a striking 
feature of classical mereology that it leaves open all questions of whether 
there are simples, and if so, the nature and number of those simples. Those 
are questions that involve `a geometric or at least a topological component, 
which introduces considerations essentially external to mereology' (StaloNs 
1987, p. 43). It's not to difficult to imagine that such considerations might 
be, finally, empirical in nature. 
The final objection to entension may be that it is absurd, inconceivable, or 
impossible that something should extend without having parts. One answer 
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to that is that it is conceivable because it is conceived, at least by me, and, 
indeed, by some other metaphysicians. According to Peter van Inwagen 
(VAN INWAGEN 1990B, p. 98), Aristotle held that living organisms entend. 
Hermann Weyl took seriously enough the proposal that some regions of space 
entend to construct an argument against it: the Tile Argument (SALMON 
1975, pp. 65 -66), which shows that the Pythagorean Theorem doesn't hold 
in such spaces. This of course does not affect my proposal, which is that 
some material objects, not regions of space, entend. In any case, if it were 
demonstrably true that entension is absurd, the Argument from Analogy 
would be redundant. Given the Analogy Thesis, for any demonstration of 
the incoherence of entension, there should be an analogous demonstration of 
the incoherence of endurance, which could be used directly. 
C.3 The Problem of Change 
Many perdurantists take themselves to have such an argument. This is the 
Problem of Change.6 It is simple to state. Suppose that a certain thing, a 
poker, say, is hot at one time, t1, and later, at t2, cold. And suppose that 
we have one standard of heat and coldness in mind here, so that it would be 
contradictory to say of one thing that it is both hot and cold. 
The problem is that it's supposed to be the very same poker at t1 and at t2. 
No -one has come along and switched pokers on us. But yet this one object is 
supposed to he both hot and cold. If I told you that I had a poker that was 
both hot and cold, I would be contradicting myself. We know that there are 
no such pokers, nor could there he. But if we believe that things can change, 
then we must believe that one thing can be both hot (at one time) and cold 
(at another), and we can say so without fear of contradiction. 
This intuitive way of stating the argument has some disadvantages. The 
emphasis on the self -contradictoriness of `This poker is both hot and cold' 
suggests that the problem is a semantic one: `the problem of specifying the 
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logical form of sentences ascribing temporary intrinsic properties to persist- 
ing objects, in such a way that we do not run into contradiction' (LowE 
1988, p. 73). On the contrary, the Problem of Change is supposed to be a 
serious metaphysical antinomy, which is only to be resolved by adopting a 
substantive metaphysical doctrine, perdurantism. 
To put the problem into sharper focus, let us begin by saying that two things 
are duplicates if and only if they are intrinsically7 just alike. Two identical 
twins are near duplicates, but not quite. Probably the only uncontested 
instance of genuine duplication that we will ever find is of one thing with 
itself. For everything is just like itself, nothing can ever be unlike itself. 
But it is precisely that one uncontested and uncontestable case that creates 
problems for us in the case of change. It seems to be essential to intrinsic 
change, change in temperature for example (or shape, or mass), that the 
poker of t2 not be a duplicate of the poker of ti. If the poker of t2 was a 
duplicate of the poker of t1, then one way in which it must duplicate it is 
the way of temperature. But, by hypothesis, that is not the case. Hence the 
poker of ti is not a duplicate of the poker of t2. Hence, since everything must 
be a duplicate of itself, the poker of ti is not the same poker as that of t2. 
To summarise: 
Cl The poker of ti (P- of -ti) is hot and the poker of t2 (P-of-ti) is cold. 
C2 hence, P -of -t1 is not a duplicate of P -of -t2 
C3 hence, P -of -t1 is not identical to P -of -t2 
C4 hence, The poker has not endured from ti to t2 
C5 hence, The poker has perdured8 from ti to t2 
For four -dimensionalists, an important solution to the Problem of Change is 
not available: the adoption of presentism. Presentists believe that `[o]ther 
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times are like false stories', or like ersatz possible worlds (LEWIS 1986, p. 
204). According to them, there is only one real time, the present, and the 
only things are those things that occupy that time. Supposing that it is now 
t2, and the poker is cold, the presentist will deny that there must be a hot 
poker to account for the fact that the poker was hot at ti. All that's required 
is that there be a a false story, or a merely possible world, according to which 
t, is the present, and the poker is hot. The presentist will thus deny C1.9 
Setting aside the presentist solution, endurantist solutions to the problem 
of change have a certain general form. Typically, they offer an analysis of 
premise Cl that is supposed to show how C2 doesn't follow from Cl. It's 
even possible to understand the perdurantist approach to the problem in this 
way, that is, as offering an analysis of premise Cl: 
Clp The temporal part at ti of P is hot and the temporal part at t2 of P is 
cold. 
An endurantist does not have to reject this analysis just because it speaks 
of temporal parts. Provided that the notion of temporal part is a coherent 
one, it's trivial that everything has at least one temporal part: itself. But 
the Problem of Change shows that this endurantist reading of C1p is not 
tenable: since the temporal parts at ti and t2 are not duplicates, they must 
be distinct. Hence, the poker must have more than one temporal part, and 
the endurantist cannot accept that. 
So it seems that we must search for another analysis. One analysis that 
endurantists offer, and the one I'll offer, is this one:m 
Cie P has the property of being hot -at -t1 and the property of being cold - 
at -t2. 
In this analysis, we've introduced these properties of being hot or cold at 
such and such a time, which are called temporally indexed properties. There 
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is no impossibility involved in one thing's having both the property of being 
hot -at -t1 and the property of being cold -at -t2 (whereas there would be in one 
thing's having both the property of being hot -at -t1 and the property of being 
cold- at -ti). If we can understand premise Cl in the way suggested by Cle, 
the problem of change is no problem. Merely pointing out that this analysis 
is available, however, is not enough to solve the problem, for two reasons. 
First, the analysis of Cl in terms of Cle is compatible with perdurantism. 
The believer in temporal parts need not deny the reality of temporally in- 
dexed properties: they can be identified with the property of having such - 
and -such a part. The property of being hot- at -t1, for example, would be the 
property of having a hot part located at t1. 
Second, supposing we rule out the perdurantist reading of Cle, we are stil- 
1 left with a mystery. We've said what the temporally indexed properties 
aren't - what are they, then? In order to have a genuine rival accoun- 
t to perdurantism, we need to say more about these properties than that 
they are not the perdurantist's properties of having such - and -such a part. 
For perdurantists will presumably believe that there are no other plausible 
candidates. 
It is often assumed that the temporally indexed properties must be relational 
properties: the property, for example, of bearing the external relation `hot at' 
to t1. But if that's right, then a lot of our commonsense judgements about 
the intrinsicality of heat, charge, mass, and the like will come out to be 
wrong. And some of those commonsense judgements may be so entrenched 
that, were we convinced they were false, we would no longer say that there 
was such a property, as Lewis suggests is the case with shape: `if we know 
what shape is, we know that it is a property, not a relation' (LEWIS 1986, 
p. 204). 
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C.3.1 Temporally Indexed Properties 
If we are to resist the Problem of Change by means of temporally indexed 
properties, we had better have an account of those properties to act as a gen- 
uine rival to perdurantism. And it had better he possible for those properties 
to he intrinsic. Before I state my account, I will first deal with a problem 
for any account of temporally indexed properties that takes those properties 
to be intrinsic (even the perdurantist interpretation of those properties de- 
scribed above). You might think that an indexed property cannot possibly 
be intrinsic as it makes essential reference to a moment of space -time. Having 
the property of being hot -at -ti entails being located at ti. But being located 
at ti is extrinsic. Hence, any property the having of which entails that I am 
located at ti, cannot be intrinsic. 
The answer to this is that we should understand `ti', as it appears in the 
names of the temporally indexed properties, as a reference to a moment of 
time relative to the temporal position of the object that has the property. So 
we should understand the property of being hot -at -ti as, for example, `the 
property of being an x such that x is hot for the first second of x's life'. The 
temporally indexed properties should be understood in a way that makes it 
possible for objects located at two different times to share such a property. 
If two pokers, created at different times, were to have the same history of 
cooling down, and being destroyed, they would share all their temporally 
indexed heat properties. 
This is just a point about how to understand what is required of a temporally 
indexed property, for it to he worthy of that name, and capable of solving 
the problem of change. It remains to be shown that there are any such 
properties (in whatever sense there are properties), and that they are not 
either the property of having a hot part at ti, or the extrinsic property of 
being related in a hot way to ti. On my account, the temporally indexed 
properties are perfectly intrinsic and perfectly non -relational. ft's just that 
they are disjunctive. 
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To explain how this is the case, we need to introduce the notion of a distribu- 
tional property. The surface of a chessboard has a certain colour distribution. 
The property of having that colour distribution is a distributional property. 
Or, take a poker that is hot at one end, and cold at the other. It has a 
certain heat distribution, and has the distributional property of having that 
heat distribution. Imagine such a poker, call it a, and another poker, b, which 
has a different heat distribution, being uniformly hot, for example. CaII the 
heat distribution of a, the property A, and that of b, B. Note that these dis- 
tributional properties are fully determinate: having any one of them entails 
that you do not have any other of the same determinable (in this case the 
determinable property of having some heat distribution). So, for example, 
that a has A entails that a does not have B. 
.A and B are both intrinsic properties. Though my description of A involved 
talking about `ends' of the poker, it's clear that having A involves nothing 
outside the poker that has the property. Any duplicates of a would have to 
also have A, or they would not be duplicates. 
Now notice that we can define now up the property of being hot at one 
end. It is simply having A or B or any other of the fully determinate heat 
distribution properties that, as it were, put heat at one end of the object. 
And this property is intrinsic as well. You can't get an extrinsic property by 
conjoining or disjoining two intrinsic ones. 
A distributional property, then, is a perfectly intelligible kind of property, 
which everyone ought to believe in to the extent that they believe in any kind 
of intrinsic, property. Disjunctions of them are equally intelligible, and ought 
to be believed in to the extent that one believes in any disjunctive property. 
The disjunctive distributional properties I have just described are spatially 
indexed properties. For temporally indexed properties, apply this procedure 
in the temporal case. Imagine now two pokers, one of which begins its life 
hot, and cools down over time, the other of which remains hot for its entire 
existence. Call them c and d respectively. Both c and d, we will suppose, 
begin to exist at t2, and are destroyed at t2. 
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If we are to be four -dimensionalists, in the sense of the Dimensionality Thesis, 
we will think of e and cl as four -dimensional objects, extended over time. Just 
like a and b, c and d have different heat distributions. c is hot at one end, its 
earlier end, and cold at the other; d, on the other hand, uniformly hot. ,lust 
as before, let us give names to their heat distribution properties: c's can be 
C, and d's D. 
Now we can define lip the property of being hot at ti as the disjunctive 
property of having either C or D, or any of those other heat distribution 
properties that, as it were, place heat at the ti end of their instance. Just 
as in the spatial case, this property is perfectly intrinsic and non -relational. 
Nor, I think, need it commit us to there being any proper parts of an object 
which has such a property. 
To generalise: wherever we have a temporally indexed property of being X- 
at-t, we have a number of corresponding permanent distributional properties: 
the X -ness distributions. X -at -t is a disjunction of some of those X -ness 
distributions, the ones that are compatible with being X- at -t." 
C.3.2 Can simple objects have distributional 
properties? 
It might be objected that to have a distributional property, an object must be 
extended, and nothing can be extended without having proper parts. That 
just takes us back to the argument from analogy, though. I've already argued 
that we ought to accept the possibility of extension without parts. 
But perhaps a weaker objection can be mounted. It might be thought that 
objects without proper parts can have distributional properties, but only 
uniform ones. If that is right, then enduring objects cannot change, as to 
change (in regard of temperature, for example), on my account, is to have a 
(in our example, temperature) distribution that is non -uniform over time. 
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This proposal is not plausible, however, once the possibility of extended 
simple objects has been accepted. If an object has extension, then it must 
be capable of having a shape; and since it would be arbitrary to insist that a 
simple object must have any particular shape, it must be capable of having 
any of the shapes that a similar complex object might have. Thus, it must be 
possible for it to have a non - uniform cross -section over time. For example, an 
conical object, with the axis of the cone oriented along the time dimension 
could be small in the spatial dimensions at one time, then larger at a later 
time. It would be growing, in other words it would have a non -uniform 
spatial size distribution, and that is a counterexample to the proposal under 
consideration. 
C.3.3 What unifies the distributional properties? 
One might still be a little suspicious about the theory just advanced. One 
common suspicion runs like this: What is it that unifies the disjuncts of an 
indexed property? The only way I've been able to tell you what the disjuncts 
of, for example, being hot at t1, are, is by using phrases like `those heat 
distributions which place heat, as it were, at the t1 end of their instances'. 
But this seems a little circular. Which exactly are those heat distributions? 
And is there a way of answering this question without speaking of `ends', 
which in this context must surely be parts? 
I don't see any reason to suppose so. But that shouldn't be a problem. Or 
if it is, it's only a problem in explaining the theory, rather than a problem 
in the theory itself. There are certainly those distributional properties, in 
whatever sense there are properties at all; and there are certainly all sorts 
of arbitrary classes of those properties, in whatever sense there are classes. 
Among those classes is the one I'm calling `the class of all those distributional 
properties that place heat as it were at the t1 end of their instances', and no 
point about the language I'm using to describe the class can show that if any 
object has one of the members of that class, then it must have some proper 
part. 
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By way of analogy, imagine the class of heights that have been the exact 
height of Socrates at midnight on some night. There is probably no other 
way of describing that class except in the way I just did, but it would be 
a mistake to think that those heights could only be had by anything that 
shared a universe with Socrates, or that Socrates must exist in order for that 
class to exist. There is even the disjunctive property of having one of those 
heights, (in whatever sense there are disjunctive properties), and again, it 
is a property that could be had without there being Socrates. The problem 
here is just that finite creatures such as ourselves don't have the language to 
name and list all the disjuncts. 
Nobody would make this mistake about the class of midnight heights of 
Socrates - why then does it seem tempting in the case of indexed properties? 
Perhaps what is really at the back of the mind of someone who objects that 
they cannot see what unifies the classes of distributional properties is a deeper 
metaphysical objection about resemblance: Let us return to my example of 
the two pokers, c, which is hot at t1, and cold at t2, and d, which is uniformly 
hot. These pokers are alike in a restricted way, namely in that they are both 
hot at t1. On my account, the pokers share an indexed property. 
These indexed properties are supposed to be disjunctive. But there is an 
influential tradition (ARMSTRONG 1978B; LEWIS 1983B) claiming that two 
objects can only resemble each other in virtue of their both possessing some 
non -disjunctive property. This might seem plausible: a raven and a writing - 
desk do not resemble each other merely in virtue of their sharing in the 
property of being either a. raven or a. writing -desk. There may be some cases 
where two objects seem to resemble each other in this way. For example, 
two birds might resemble each other in virtue of being either a raven or a 
crow. But in every such case, so runs the standard story, we will find that the 
resemblance is subserved by some resemblance in a non -disjunctive respect, 
in this case, in both birds being corvids, corvidity being a non -disjunctive 
property. 
Of course, this will not be the case for c and d, if c and d have no parts. c and 
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d have entirely distinct distributional properties, C and D, recall. And they 
need have nothing else in common, save for the disjunctive distributional 
property of having either C or D. But that's precisely what the traditional 
account of resemblance rules out. We cannot believe that c and d resemble 
each other in virtue of being hot at one end, if we think that an indexed 
property is simply a disjunctive distributional property, not subserved by 
any non -disjunctive property of parts of the objects in question. 
This is a way of making precise the worry about what unifies the disjunc- 
tive properties. If you believe the key premise, that resemblance is to be 
explained by shared non -disjunctive properties, you will be worried by the 
possibility that things might resemble each other by sharing a temporally in- 
dexed property, and that, in that case, temporally indexed properties cannot 
be analysed disjunctively, as I have done. 
One answer to this objection is just to deny the premise, the traditional 
theory of resemblance. We could replace it, for example, with a natural class 
theory, according to which things resemble each other in virtue of being in 
a natural class together. Since classes are extensional, there's no distinction 
between a disjunctive and and non -disjunctive class. If indexed properties 
are natural classes, that will explain the resemblance. 
We don't need to do this, though. The problem I face here is one that will 
recur for someone who holds the traditional theory anyway. It is the problem 
of fundamental determinates. I'm going to use an example from subatomic 
physics, because that's where we'll find uncontroversial examples of funda- 
mental properties and objects. There are seven charges that a fundamental 
particle can have: 1, 2/3, 1/3, 0, -1/3, -2/3, and -1.12. Take an electron 
(with charge -1) and a down -quark (with charge -1/3). Electrons resemble 
down -quarks in charge (both their charges are negative) - but not in virtue 
of having a charge in common - the fundamental charges of -1 and -1/3 
are quite as distinct as the fundamental charges of -1 and 1. Rather, they 
resemble in virtue of having similar charges. 
This case is quite analogous to the case of the two pokers. c and d resemble 
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not in virtue of having a temporally indexed property in common, but in 
virtue of having similar distributional properties. D is more like C than 
like, say, the property of being uniformly cold. Hence d will resemble (as 
regards temperature) c more than it resembles any poker that remains cold 
throughout its life. Just as any given electron will resemble (as regards 
charge) any given down -quark more than it resembles (as regards charge) 
any given positron. 
This is an independent problem that also stands in need of a solution_ What- 
ever that solution is, it can be applied to temporally indexed properties as 
well. 
C.4 Conclusion 
A four -dimensionalist can accept the account of endurance described above. 
This fact will be of interest to three groups of people. First, there are 
the endurantists who may wish to take up four -dimensionalism, the four - 
dimensionalists who may wish to take up endurantism, and uncommitted 
folk who may wish to take up both. I heartily recommend the doctrines I 
have described to such people. They will, however, to judge by the current 
literature, be in the minority. 
Second, there are the perdiirantìsts who, hitherto, have been in the uncom- 
fortable position of having to defend their view as not only true, but a truism. 
Lewis, for example, says: 
I too would welcome a fourth solution, but for quite a different rea- 
son. If [perdurantism] alone is tenable, then our commensense belief 
in persisting things commits us implicitly to perdurance - and this 
despite the fact that some of us firmly reject the notion of temporal 
parts... and many more have never heard of it! 
(Lawrs 1988, p. 76) 
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Such perdurantists will he only too happy to have a rival account of persis- 
tence made available; though they may have to find new and more substantive 
arguments to show that it is false without showing that it is incoherent. 
Third, there are those endurantists who argue against four dimensionalism by 
arguing against perdurantism. Judith Jarvis Thomson, for example, argues 
against the Analogy Thesis, on the grounds that it entails perdurantism, 
which she dismisses as a `crazy metaphysic' (THOMSON 1983, p. 213). This 
line of argument clearly cannot work if the entailment is false, as I have 
shown. 
A consistent four -dimensionalist should, inspired by the Analogy Thesis, take 
the same attitude to temporal parts as to spatial parts. Since, as I have 
argued, it is an empirical matter whether any given object has spatial parts, 
we should likewise think it an empirical matter whether any given object has 
temporal parts. It is a difficult question how we might find out which things 
perdure and which endure; but that is a different issue from whether either 
is possible.I3 
Notes 
'This point is not unknown to those writers who use the terms in this way. Theodore 
Sider, for example, after announcing that he will use `four- dimensionalism' and 'three- 
dimensionalism' to mean the same as `the theory that things perdure' and `the doctrine 
that things endure' respectively, says `We need to look carefully into just what three- and 
four -dimensionalism amount to. These names for the doctrines... are poor guides' (SIDER 
1997, pp. 197 -198). Peter van Inwagen, who uses a Flatland scenario much like the one 
I describe, uses scare quotes around `three- dimensionalism' and `four -dimensionalism' to 
highlight their strangeness in that context (VAN INWAGEN 1990A). Trenton Merricks says 
that he uses the terms 'four -dimensionalism' and `perdurantism' interchangeably while 
noting that he does not take them to mean the same, for similar reasons (MERRICKS 
1995, p. 525n). 
2J.J.C. Smart is one of the great masters of this technique: [I]f time flows, how fast does 
it flow? Does it flow at one second per second? ... Does my ruler advance at one centimeter 
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per centimeter ?' (SMART 1989, p. 34) And on temporal parts: [ Endurantists] may object 
that according to perdurantism] we would never see (say) a tomato, because the tomato, as 
four- dimensional entity would extend into past and future.... in consistency, [endurantists] 
should say that you never see tomatoes but only their facing surfaces' (SMART 1989, 
p. 19 
-20). Richard Taylor lists a number of analogies between spare and time in his 
(1964), among them an analogy between extension in space and persistence through time. 
This analogy is clearly important for our purposes. It is made the sole content of four - 
dimensionalism by Mark Heller, whose `minimal four -dimensionalism' is the thesis `that 
persisting objects extend over time in the same way they extend over space' (HELLER 
1993, p. 49). It is hard to know what this would mean outside of the context of the 
Dimensionality Thesis. If time were not a dimension, it is hard to see how objects could 
`extend' over it in the same way they extend through the spatial dimensions - so T take it 
that Heller implicitly endorses the Dimensionality Thesis too. 
31 have earlier cited Peter van Inwagen as someone who uses `four -dimensionalism' 
to mean perdurantism. Interestingly, however, if the distinction between entension and 
pertension is allowed, his definition of 'four -dimensionalism' becomes equivocal. According 
to him, four -dimensionalism is the view that 'persisting objects are extended not only in 
the three spatial dimensions, but also in a fourth, temporal dimension, and persist simply 
by being temporally extended' (VAN INWACEN 1990A, p. 245). If his `extended' is taken 
to mean my 'pertended', then his `four -dimensionalism' is the Dimensionality Thesis plus 
perdurantism, which makes it a trivial truth in his usage that a four -dimensionalist must 
be a perdurantist. On the other hand, if his 'extended' is taken to mean my 'extended', 
his 'four -dimensionalism' is the Dimensionality Thesis, plus a certain restricted analogy 
between time and space, specifically between persistence and extension. On this latter 
reading it is no trivial matter that a four -dimensionalist must believe in temporal parts. 
4T make some minor use of mereological concepts such as summation in the remainder of 
this section. The concepts I have in mind are those of the 'classical' mereology, also known 
as the 'Calculus of Individuals' (GOODMAN 1951, pp. 42 -51). This is also the mereology 
standardly used by perdurantists such as Lewis (1986, p. 69n). For a comprehensive 
survey of mereology, including non -classical theories, see Simons (1987). 
'For a readable introduction to the physics of quarks and leptons, see Fritzsch (1984). 
On the radius of electrons, and the practical difficulties of measuring it, see Ridley (1995, 
pp. 133 -138). 
6For an influential statement of the problem, see Lewis (1986, pp. 202 --205) and re- 
sponses to it, some of which can be found in Lowe (1988, 1987b); Lewis (1988); Mellor 
(1998); Haslanger (1989). 
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7I won't attempt to exactly explicate the idea of intrinsicality here. For an attempt at 
definition in modal terms, though, see Langton and Lewis (1998). 
'The move from C4 to C5 deserves more attention than I can give it here. I assume 
that endurantism and perdurantism are the only available accounts of persistence. There 
are other possibilities, among them the simple denial that anything persists. 
'Carter and Hestevold (1997) offer an interesting variant: they claim to deduce per - 
durantism from `Static Time', the view that `objects and events undergo no temporal 
becoming', They argue that Static Time entails a thesis they call `Temporal Parity', 
which functions to rule out presentist solutions in the same way that four- dimensionalism 
does. 
I °The major competing analysis indexes not properties, but the instantiation relation 
that holds between the properties and their instances. (As in Lowe's `solution (ii)' (LowE 
1988)). I fear that allowing an instantiation relation to do real explanatory work courts 
Bradley's famous regress of relations (BRADLEY 1897, pp. 17 -18), as is suggested by 
Armstrong's arguments against `relational realism' (ARMSTRONG 1978A, p. 106), those 
forms of realism that have this feature. This worry aside, the motivation for instantiation 
indexing is that it avoids any pressure to think of indexed properties as relational or 
extrinsic - but I will argue that there need be no such pressure in any case. 
11'What of being hot simplícíter?' it may be asked. I have nothing very interesting to 
say about `hot simpliciter' - it's not clear to me that it means something unambiguous. 
If it means hot in the way that a three -dimensional temporal part of a poker would be 
hot, then enduring things don't have such properties; but neither do perduring things. If 
it means hot, as it were, at some time, then it is just a very disjunctive heat distributional 
property. If it means hot, as it were, at every time, then it is a less disjunctive one (even 
the property of being permanently hot must be disjunctive, as there are many different 
temperature distributions that are non -uniform in different ways across space, even if they 
are uniform along the time axis). 
'The unit here is e, the charge on an electron - or on a positron, strictly speaking, as 
an electron is usually said to have charge -1 
13Thanks for comments on and discussion of this paper go to David Armstrong, Helen 
Beebee, John Bigelow, Vera Koffman, David Lewis, Neil McKinnon, Daniel Nolan, Barbara 
Nunn, Ted Sider, Jack Smart, Kim Sterelny, Daniel Stoljar, and two anonymous referees 
for the Monist. 
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Appendix D 
Intrinsic 
Co- authored with Dan Marshall, and published as "Langton and 
Lewis on `Intrinsic ' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
(forthcoming issue) (MARSHALL AND PARSONS 2001) 
In their paper "Defining 'Intrinsic ' Rae Langton and David Lewis propose 
a definition of intrinsicality in terms of modality and naturalness. Their 
key idea, drawing on earlier work by Jaegwon Kim, was that an intrinsic 
property is one that is independent of accompaniment, which is to say that 
P is intrinsic iff the following four conditions are all met: 
1 It is possible for a lonely object to have P. 
2 It is possible for an accompanied object to have P. 
3 It is possible for a lonely object to Iack P. 
4 It is possible for an accompanied object to lack P. 
Langton and Lewis say that an object is "accompanied" iff it coexists "with 
some contingent object wholly distinct from itself." (LANGTON AND LEWIS 
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1998, p. 333) A "lonely" or "unaccompanied" object is one that is not 
accompanied. We will also speak of an object being "accompanied by an F" 
iff it coexists with some F wholly distinct from itself. 
This works very nicely for the obvious examples. It works for being cubical, 
being 50 km from a capital city, and being lonely (intrinsic, extrinsic, extrin- 
sic, respectively). But it doesn't work for every property. Langton and Lewis 
note that disjunctive properties cause trouble: they give the example of being 
cubical and lonely, or else non -cubical and accompanied. This property is in- 
dependent of accompaniment, but intuitively is extrinsic. Other disjunctive 
properties are intuitively intrinsic (the property of being cubical or spherical, 
for example), so a new test must be prescribed for them. 
And that is, indeed, what Langton and Lewis do: they call the non -disjunctive 
intrinsic properties "basic intrinsic ", and apply the independent of accompa- 
niment test to them. So, a property is basic intrinsic iff it is: 
1 not a disjunctive property, and, 
2 not the negation of a disjunctive property, and, 
3 independent of accompaniment. 
They then define the relation of intrinsic duplication as the relation that holds 
between two objects iff they share all their basic intrinsic properties, and an 
intrinsic property as one that can never differ between intrinsic duplicates 
(actual or possible). Equivalently, one could say that an intrinsic property is 
one that supervenes on the basic intrinsic properties of its object. Intrinsic 
in this sense is applicable to even disjunctive properties. 
Unfortunately there is a problem that the Langton -Lewis analysis cannot 
deal with. It has to do with the way that Langton and Lewis use the notion 
of a disjunctive property. As they themselves point out, it is no trivial matter 
to define what it is for a property to be disjunctive. They offer the following 
analysis: 
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Given some or other notion of natural properties, let us define the 
disjunctive properties as those properties that can be expressed by a 
disjunction of (conjunctions of) natural properties; but that are not 
themselves natural properties. (Or if naturalness admits of degrees, 
they are much less natural than the disjuncts in terms of which they 
can be expressed). (LANGTON AND LEWIS 1998, p. 336) 
Two presuppositions of this definition are worth mentioning here. First, it 
is presupposed that there is some distinction between natural and unnatu- 
ral properties to be made. Lewis and Langton are explicit about this, and 
invite the reader to substitute in her favourite account of this distinction. 
They offer some examples of the sorts of accounts that they have in mind, 
including ontologies of sparse universals or tropes; accounts that posit an un- 
defined naturalness of certain classes; and accounts that define naturalness of 
properties in terms of the importance of the role those properties play in our 
thinking. This will be important later, as we will argue that Langton and 
Lewis may be leaning too hard on this distinction; that not every account of 
it can do the work they need. 
Second, it is presupposed that the individuation conditions for properties are 
coarser than the individuation conditions of predicates. There would be no 
point in speaking of "those properties that can be expressed" by disjunctive 
predicates unless it were possible that a property have multiple expressions, 
some disjunctive and some not. We take it that the intended individuation 
conditions of properties are along the extensional lines Lewis has endorsed 
elsewhere. (LEwIs 1986, p. 50) Properties are construed as sets of possible 
individuals: same set of individuals, same property. 
Now at last we are in a position to state the problem. We think that Langton 
and Lewis were mistaken to identify the properties that cause problems - 
that is, the properties that are capable of being extrinsic even though they are 
independent of accompaniment - with the disjunctive properties. We have a 
counterexample: a property that is extrinsic, independent of accompaniment, 
and not, we think, disjunctive in Langton and Lewis's sense. (Nor is it the 
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negation of an Langton and Lewis disjunctive property). It is the property 
of being such that there is a cube.' 
This is, to he sure, a silly property that only a metaphysician would ever 
think of. But the same is true of the example that motivates Langton and 
Lewis to deal specially with disjunctive properties. If the aim of the game 
was to deal only with non -silly properties, the independent of accompaniment 
test would suffice. Moreover, it would become crucial to have an account of 
which properties are silly, and our point could easily be restated as the point 
that not all of the silly properties are disjunctive. And finally, as an ad 
hominem point, notice that there is such a property according to the second 
presupposition of the Langton /Lewis analysis. It is the set of all the members 
of all the possible worlds that contain a cube. 
We think that it is as obvious as anything in this area could be that our 
property is extrinsic.2 Nevertheless it is independent of accompaniment. All 
the required possibilities are there, realised by the following possible worlds: 
1 A world containing nothing but two cubes. 
2 A world containing nothing but one cube. 
3 A world containing nothing but two non -cubes. 
4 A world containing nothing but one non -cube. 
'As with many counterexamples, once you -see how to do it, they're easy to make up. 
Other examples include: being such there is an electron; being holy, where to be holy is to 
he such that God exists (Rudolf Otto may have had such a view of the holy - thanks to 
Winifred Lamb for this point). There are also relational variants: touching a head; being 
within 5m of a philosopher. One important feature of these is that, unlike the original 
counterexample, they are possessor- dependent - they can be had by some actual thing 
without being had by every actual thing. 
2If it's possible to make sense of local intrinsicality (HUMBERSTONE 1996, pp. 206, 
227 -228) - of a property being intrinsic -to this object, hut extrinsic -to that one - then 
being such that there is a cube is intrinsic -to some things, namely, the cubes. But it is 
extrinsic -to all the non- cubes, and, plausibly, the intrinsic properties are those which are 
necessarily intrinsic -to all their instances. 
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And we do not think it is disjunctive either. It does have a disjunctive 
expression: "being either a cube or accompanied by a cube" . But it is not 
obvious to us that this is a disjunction of natural properties. Being a cube is 
a natural property (let's suppose), but we have simply no idea whether being 
accompanied by a cube is natural. Even if it is, it seems no more natural than 
being such that there is a cube. (Though both are, we suppose, less natural 
than being a cube.) So our property is not disjunctive, by the lights of the 
definition above. 
Even putting our intuition that the counterexample property is no less nat- 
ural than its supposed disjuncts aside, there is a deeper problem here than a 
mere counterexample. For Langton and Lewis to defend their analysis, they 
need to appeal to fairly obscure judgements about the relative naturalness of 
properties3 but they don't have the resources to make these judgements. 
One of the virtues of their account is meant to be its robustness in the face 
of different ways of drawing the distinction between natural and unnatural 
properties. Langton and Lewis assert that most philosophers will be willing 
to help themselves to some or other version of the distinction, and that any 
such version will work when substituted into their account. But not every 
such distinction will provide what they need - the relative naturalness of 
being accompanied by a cube and being such that there is a cube are not a- 
mong the Moorean facts of naturalness that we expect any account of natural 
properties to explain. 
Nor do the needed facts about relative naturalness obviously fall out of the 
types of theory of naturalness Langton and Lewis suggest. If the sharing of 
natural properties makes for resemblance, for example, (as is suggested by 
°The obscure judgements about relative naturalness appear in examples that Langton 
and Lewis use themselves they appear, for example, to be committed to the view 
that being both red and accompanied by a red thing is more natural than the being not 
the only red thing, which they regard as disjunctive. (LANGTON AND LEWIS 1998, p. 
335n) Stephen Yablo has also complained about this example. His worry is that the very 
"clearcut" fact that being the only red thing is extrinsic ought not to be analysed in terms 
of the "controversial and (apparently) irrelevant" facts about relative naturalness. (YAar,o 
1999, p. 481) 
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at least one of the candidate theories of naturalness, Armstrongian realism 
about universals), neither property is any more or less natural than the other. 
Two things that are both accompanied by a cube don't seem to be any more 
or less objectively similar in virtue of that than two things that are both such 
that there is a cube. 
Alternatively, if the naturalness of properties is grounded in the importance 
of the role those properties play in our thinking, again the needed judgements 
about relative naturalness are unforthcoming. There seems to be no reason 
to hold that being accompanied by a cube plays a more important role than 
being such that there is a cube. 
So, the Langton /Lewis analysis of "intrinsic" faces two problems. The first 
is a straight counterexample - if you believe our weak intuition that being 
accompanied by a cube is no more natural than being such that there is a cube, 
their analysis will make the latter intrinsic. The second is that there doesn't 
seem to he any particular theoretical reason to overthrow that intuition. If 
the Langton /Lewis analysis of "intrinsic" is to resist our counterexample, 
it will need supplementation with a theory of naturalness that is, as yet, 
unarticulated.4 
4Thanks for comments on and discussion of this paper go to Toby Handfield, Lloyd 
Humberstone, Frank Jackson, Daniel Nolan, Michael Ridge, Peter Roeper, and Daniel 
Stoljar. 
Appendix E 
The A- theory 
Unpublished paper entitled "A- theory for B- theorists" (PARSONS 
2001A) 
Because the notes to this appendix are quite lengthy, I have gathered 
them at the end of the appendix, rather than placing them at the 
foot of the page they belong to. 
The debate between A- theory and B- theory in the philosophy of time is a 
persistent one. It is not always clear, however, what the terms of this debate 
are. A- theorists are often lumped with a miscellaneous collection of heterodox 
doctrines: the view that only the present exists, that time flows relentlessly, 
or that presentness is a property (WILLIAMS 1996); that time passes, tense 
is unanalysable, or that earlier than and later than are defined in terms of 
pastness, presentness, and futurity (BIGELOw 1991); or that events or facts 
(as opposed to language) are "tensed" (MELLOR 1993). B- theorists then 
argue that the A- theory is incoherent, using variants on J.M.E. McTaggart's 
argument for the unreality of time. (MGTAGGART 1927, ch. 33) 
While I am a card - carrying B- theorist, it strikes me that there is something 
unfair about this procedure. We should be very surprised to find a single 
doctrine (as opposed to a large system) incoherent in itself, especially one 
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as popular as the A- theory. In this paper, I argue that the A- theory can be 
distinguished from the miscellaneous doctrines with which it is often asso- 
ciated (section E.1); and that, once so distinguished, it is not shown to be 
incoherent by the standard arguments (section E.2). 
Finally, I argue, assuming the A- theory, for a comprehensive theory of time 
that also includes two important doctrines that are more usually held by 
B- theorists: realism about the past and future, and an indexical analysis of 
tense (section E.3). This is the comprehensive A- theory that should be most 
plausible by the lights of a B- theorist; the "A- theory for B- theorists ". Since, 
as I will argue, it is plausible that ordinary language contains an implicit 
commitment to the A- theory, it is a strong contender for the "folk theory of 
time": the comprehensive theory of time implicit in ordinary language. 
E.1 What is the A- theory? 
According to the A- theory of time, there are intrinsic and monadic properties 
such as pastness, presentness, and futurity, and it is in virtue of having such a 
property (an "A- property ") that things in time are past, present, or future. 
Because things are past and future to many different degrees (Aristotle is 
more past than Kant, for example) there are, according to this theory, many 
such properties, corresponding to the different degrees to which things can 
be past or future. 
This idea orginates in the philosophical literature with McTaggart, from 
whose "A- series" and `B- series" the terms "A- theory" and "B- theory" were 
subsequently derived. McTaggart says: 
I shall give the name of the A series to that series of positions which 
runs from the far past through the near past to the present, and 
then from the present through the near future to the far future, or 
conversely. The series of positions which runs from earlier to later, or 
conversely, I shall call the B series. (MCTAGGART 1927, s. 306) 
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McTaggart's usage makes it clear that he intends the A- series to be, by 
definition, irreducible to the B- series. To believe that the A- series positions 
the A- properties, that is) reduce to B- series ones, is to believe in only a 
B- series and not an A- series. This is why the A- properties are, by definition, 
intrinsic and monadic: it rules out a reduction to the relations that are used 
to generate the B- series.' 
Some A- theorists hold that these "B- relations ", earlier than, later than, and 
simultaneous with, should be defined in terms of the A- properties in the way 
that the relation taller than can be defined in terms of individual heights. 
However, it's possible to believe in A- properties and reject this reduction, or 
simply take no position on it. The A- theory doesn't say anything either way 
about B- relations. 
I will use the term `B- theory" to mean the denial of the A- theory. The 
B- theory is the view that there are no A- properties of the kind A- theorist 
believes in. 
A- properties are had by anything that is in time. I wish to remain as neutral 
as possible about such issues as the nature of events, whether relationalism 
or substantivalism is true about time, and so on, but I take it that if there 
are events (as distinct from substances) or moments of time (as distinct from 
substances or events occupying those moments) then all these things will be 
capable of having A- properties. Though McTaggart spoke of the things that 
have the A- properties as "events ", by this he meant simply the "contents of 
any position in time" (MGTAGGART 1927, s. 306) so, in allowing anything 
that is in time to be the instance of an A- property, I am simply following 
him 
E.1.1 The Orthogonality of the Debate 
It is terribly important to distinguish the A- theory, thus described, from any 
other theory of time that might be endorsed by someone who believes the 
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A- theory. Just as not everything believed by any given scientist is science, 
not everything believed by any given A- theorist is A- theory. The failure to 
attend to this point has been responsible for much confusion in the literature, 
of which a typical instance is Clifford Williams' article "The Metaphysics of 
A- and B- time ". 
Williams considers a number of distinctions between different comprehensive 
theories of time: for example, the distinction between comprehensive theories 
that assert that time passes "relentlessly" (WILLrAms 1996, p. 378) versus 
those that deny this; or that between comprehensive theories that assert that 
only the present exists, versus those that deny this. He also considers the 
distinction I have drawn above, between theories that assert that there are 
A- properties versus those that deny this. 
He concludes that there is, in the end, no distinction between A- theory and 
B- theory: but what he is looking for in the A- theory is a comprehensive 
theory of time that asserts that time passes "relentlessly" and that only 
the present exists, and that there are A- properties. This is made clear by 
his criticisms of the view that the A- theory is the doctrine that there are 
A- properties: 
The most common way to think of A -time is to think of it as events 
possessing properties that events in B -time do not possess, namely 
pastness, presentness and futurity... 
[T]his way of differentiating the two theories... makes A -time just 
as spread out as B -time. In order for an event to have a property it 
must exist in some sense. So the picture we obtain of A -time is one 
in which past, present, and future events are equally real in some 
sense... 
[lit is not evident how the shift of presentness from event to event 
in A -time differs from the transition from occurence to occurence in 
B -time. (WILLIAMS 1996, p. 379 -380) 
Williams' objection to the "common way of thinking of A- time" is that it 
is not equivalent to other doctrines that might be believed by individual A- 
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theorists: that only the present is real, and that time passes in some sense 
supposedly denied by B- theorists. But why should this inequivalence show 
that there is no distinction between the A- theory and the B- theory ?2 
The moral of Williams' mistake is that we should understand the A- theory 
/ B- theory debate as orthogonal to these other issues. If we conflate the 
A- theory with the view that time passes, only the past exists, or that tense 
is unanalysable, we will end up in the same position as Williams, unable to 
distinguish A- theory from B- theory, as there are recognisable A- theories and 
self- ascribing A- theorists who deny these other theories. 
E.1.2 Motivating the A- theory 
The attraction of the A- theory is that it makes the question of which time 
is present - that is, of what time it is - into an question about a ordinary 
matter of fact. To an A- theorist, the fact of what time it is is just like the 
fact of what time contained dinosaurs. The dinosaurs might have been at a 
different time; and likewise, says the A- theorist, the present might have been 
at a different time. 
The A- theory can allow that which time is present is contingent; and that 
there are true and non -trivial counterfactual conditionals such as "if it were 
5 o'clock, I would be at the dentist." The B- theory has trouble with the 
semantics of "if it were 5 o'clock, I would be at the dentist ", because, on the 
B- theory, the antecedent of that sentence doesn't correspond to a way the 
world might be. On the standard semantics for counterfactual conditionals, 
this counterfactual is true just if all the nearest possible worlds where it is 
5 o'clock are worlds where I am at the dentist. According to the B- theory, 
however, it doesn't make sense to speak of a world where it is 5 o'clock, so 
the standard semantics cannot be applied. 
Moreover, the A- theory can allow that which time is present changes - that 
not only could it have been a different time, but that it will be a different 
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time in the future; and that it was in the past. That which is present will be 
past, and has been future. Again, it's not clear what sense the B- theory can 
make of this. 
The A- theory has ramifications for the interaction between the metaphysics 
of time and some ethical issues. In a example of Derek Parfit's, you are asked 
to imagine that you awake in a hospital ward with amnesia. You are reliably 
informed that you are either a patient whose long and painful operation was 
performed yesterday, or a patient whose short and less painful operation will 
be performed tomorrow. Which would prefer to be the case? Most people 
would rather be the first patient, even though the first patient suffers more, 
ceteris paribus, than the second. It is hard for a B- theorist to resist the 
conclusion that this is irrational. (PARFIT 1984, s. 64) The A- theorist, 
however, can adopt a very simple solution to this puzzle by holding that 
future pains are intrinsically worse than past ones, merely in virtue of being 
future. 
These considerations are not intended to be knockdown arguments, but only 
motivations. As I said, I am not an A- theorist, so I will leave arguments for 
the A- theory (as opposed to defence of it from criticism I regard as unsound) 
to those who actually endorse it 
E.2 The Trouble with the A- theory 
Standard objections to the A- theory are all variants of Mc Taggart's famous 
argument for the unreality of time. McTaggart presents a reductio argument 
against the existence of A- properties. Its conclusion is clear enough: 
Past, present, and future are incompatible determinations. Every 
event must be one or the other, but no event can be more than 
one.... The characteristics, therefore, are incompatible. But every 
event has them all. (MCTAGGART 1927, s. 329) 
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The contentious aspect of McTaggart's argument is whether this contradic- 
tion can in fact be reached from the A- theory. In the following three sections, 
I discuss three ways to understand McTaggart's argument for this conclusion: 
as a version of the problem of intrinsic change (section E.2.1); as a problem 
to do with tense (section E.2.2); and as a problem to do with the passage 
of time (section E.2.3). I argue that none of these pose a problem for the 
A- theory. 
E.2.1 The Problem of Change for A- properties 
It's tempting to interpret McTaggart by subsuming his argument into the 
problem of intrinsic change, or of temporary intrinsics. This latter problem 
is the problem of explaining how it can be that one object has incompatible 
properties at different times, as seems to be required by intrinsic, or not- 
mere- Cambridge, change in objects. 
For example, a poker cools down. At time t1 it is hot, at t2 it is cold. For this 
to count as an intrinsic change in the poker, it must be the same poker at 
both times. If I have two pokers, one which exists at t1 and is permanently 
hot, and the other of which exists at t2 and is permanently cold, neither 
poker changes as regards temperature. On the other hand, it also seems that 
it can't be the same poker at both times for no one poker can be both hot 
and cold. If I told you I had a poker that was both hot and cold, I would be 
contradicting myself. 
The problem asks us what's wrong with the inference from 48 and 49, below, 
48 The poker is hot at tr. 
49 The poker is cold at t2. 
to the inconsistent pair 48' and 49': 
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48' The poker is hot. 
49' The poker is cold. 
This problem has standard answers: one idea is that, strictly speaking, pokers 
aren't wholly hot or cold. Rather they are partially hot or cold. It is no 
contradiction for me to have a poker that is both partially hot and partially 
cold. It could be hot at the end that was resting in the fire, and cold at the 
handle. The answer to the problem of intrinsic change for poker temperature 
is to extend this idea to time. The tip of the poker and the handle of the 
poker are distinct spatial parts of the poker. We can think of the hot "poker" 
at ti and the cold one at t2 as distinct temporal parts of the poker. Though 
the poker might seem wholly hot at ti, it is not - it has later parts which 
are cold. So the contradiction can be resolved by the acceptance of temporal 
parts of persisting objects.3 
The effect of this solution is that the inference from 48 and 49 to 48' and 49' is 
valid, but 48' and 49' are themselves ambiguous between a reading that makes 
them an inconsistent pair, and a reading that makes them compatible. If we 
read "hot" and "cold" as "partially hot" and "partially cold" respectively, 
neither 48' and 49' nor 48 and 49 are inconsistent. And it is only this reading 
of 48 and 49 (according to the solution under consideration) that is required 
in cases of change. 
The problem of intrinsic change for temperature has an analogy for A- 
properties. A- properties are, like temperatures, intrinsic properties, and dif- 
ferent A- properties are had by persisting objects at different times. And, as 
McTaggart reminds us, past and future, are, like hot and cold, incompatible. 
So the problem I have just described arises for them. 
Suppose we add to the previous example the claim that t1 is a past time, 
and t2 a future time. Since the poker is at a past time, namely t1, the 
poker exhibits the A- property of pastness (if there are any such properties). 
However, the poker is also at a future time, t2, so it exhibits the A- property 
of futurity. We can set up two sentences analogous to 48 and 49: 
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50 The poker has pastness at t1. 
51 The poker has futurity at t2. 
Because these sentences are analogous to 48 and 49, there is an analogous 
problem about whether they entail the inconsistent pair 50' and 51'; 
50' The poker has pastness. 
51' The poker has futurity. 
This problem has an analogous answer. When McTaggart says that being 
past and being future are incompatible properties, of course he means being 
wholly past and being wholly future. There is no contradiction in one thing's 
being partially past, and partially future, and indeed partially present - 
these properties are compatible, and all three are had by the poker in my 
example.4 
Though the problem of intrinsic change is a very serious one, and I don't 
pretend that I've conclusively solved it here, my point is not that it poses no 
problem to the A- theory. Rather, it poses exactly the same problem for the 
A- theory as for everyone else. Stock solutions to the problem of change which 
B- theorists happily help themselves to work in exactly the same way for A- 
theorists. The problem of intrinsic change, therefore, cannot be regarded as 
a reductio against the A- theory in particular. 
E.2.2 McTaggart's Paradox 
In any case, the problem of intrinsic change is not what McTaggart had in 
mind. The reason that. McTaggart actually gives for thinking that each event 
must have every A- property is not that events persist from the past through 
the present and into the future, having different A- properties at different 
times, but that the A- properties an event has at future or past times are not 
those that it will have, or did have, at those times: 
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If M is past, it has been present and future. If it is future, it will be 
present and past. If it is present, it has been future and will be past. 
(McTAGGART 1927, s. 329) 
McTaggart is not saying here that present persisting things are (partially) 
past and future but that present things will, in the future, be wholly past. 
There is a way of making this point that departs a little from McTaggart's 
way of stating it, but which makes it very clear that there is a problem here 
that is additional to the problem of intrinsic change. The problem of intrinsic 
change was solved by showing that, while there is a contradiction between 
one thing's being wholly past and wholly future, there is none between one 
thing's being partially past and partially future. But consider a time before 
the poker of the previous section ever came into existence. Then, the poker 
was wholly future, including, even, all of its temporal parts. Now consider a 
time after that very poker has been destroyed. At that time, the poker will 
be wholly past, including, even, all of its temporal parts. 
For this reason the very same poker seems to be both wholly past and wholly 
future, properties which are genuinely incompatible (unlike the properties of 
being partially past and being partially future). 
The crucial part of McTaggart's argument is his move from past and future 
tensed sentences such as 
52 M was wholly future. 
53 M will be wholly past. 
to the grammatically present tense (though presumably tenseless) 
52' M is wholly future. 
53' M is wholly past. 
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While 52' and 53' contradict one another, 52 and 53 don't obviously do so. 
The move from 52 and 53 to the inconsistent pair 52' and 53' is licensed by 
McTaggart's analysis of tense: 
When we say that X has been Y, we are asserting X to be Y at 
a moment of past time. When we say that X will be Y, we are 
asserting X to be Y at a moment of future time. When we say that 
X is Y (in the temporal [ie. the present tense, as opposed to the 
tenseless] sense of "is ") we are asserting X to be Y at a moment of 
present time. (MGTAGGART 1927, s. 331) 
What McTaggart is doing here is offering an analysis of tense in tenseless 
terms, against the background of the A- theory: 
X will be Y iff 
there is some future time tf such that X is Y at tp 
X is -now Y iff 
there is some present time t,,, such that X is Y at t,, 
X was Y iff 
there is some past time t,, such that X is Y at t,, 
McTaggart can thus analyse 52 and 53 as 
52* M is wholly future at a past time. 
53* M is wholly past at a future time. 
He then infers the inconsistent pair, 52' and 53', from 52* and 53 *. 
On my reconstruction, McTaggart's argument that A- properties involve a 
contradiction has two steps. The first step is the move from the tensed 
sentences 52 and 53 to the tenseless, but time - indexed 52* and 53 *. The 
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second step is the step from the time -indexed sentences to the inconsistent 
pair 52' and 53'. Doubts might he raised about both of these steps - since 
I believe that it is the first step that is interestingly invalid, I will discuss 
them in reverse order, second step first. 
The second step: McTaggart's move from 52* and 53* to 52' and 53' is 
something we have met before. It is the same inference that played a role in 
the problem of intrinsic change for A- properties. Here, as before, an inference 
is being made from a time -indexed predication (50, 51, 52 *, or 53 *) to an 
unindexed predication (50', 51', 52', or 53'). 
One might doubt the validity of this inference on the grounds that it leads 
to the problem of intrinsic change. However, as 1 showed above, a standard 
solution to the problem of intrinsic change can be construed as accepting the 
validity of the inference from 50 and 51 to 50' and 51'. The solution consisted, 
not in denying the validity of this inference, but in exposing an equivocation 
between a reading of 50' and 51' which makes them an inconsistent pair, and 
one which makes them compatible. 
By contrast, because of the word "wholly" in 52 *, 53 *, 52', and 53', this 
equivocation is not present in those sentences. Each pair is, therefore, un- 
ambiguously inconsistent McTaggart's second step seems valid. 
The first step: The first step in McTaggart's argument is the application 
of the analysis of tense described above to 52 and 53, which produces the 
tenseless sentences 52* and 53 *. This is a point at which many A- theorists 
reject McTaggart's reasoning by holding that tense is unanalysable. 
The unanalysability of tense, is, however, no part of the A- theory itself. An 
A- theorist can analyse tense if she wishes, not in McTaggart's way, but in 
terms of the tenseless counterfactual conditionals I mentioned earlier5 which 
the A- theory can distinctively make sense of: 
E.2 The Trouble with the A- theory 243 
X will be Y iff 
there is some future time tf such that were it t f, X would be Y 
X is -now Y iff 
there is some present time t.,. such that were it tn, X would be Y 
X was Y iff 
there is some past time tp such that were it t,,, X would be Y 
Since the counterfactual corresponding to "X is -now Y" has a true anteceden- 
t, it can be simplified to 
X is-now Y iff 
X is Y 
Let us call this the Counterfactual Theory of Tense. Given the Counterfac- 
tual Theory, it does not follow from the fact that certain things will be past 
that they are past at any time - or from the fact that certain things were 
future that they are future at any time. An A- theorist ought to analyse 52 
and 53 as 
52, There is some past time such that, were it that time, M would be 
wholly future. 
53, There is some future time such that, were it that time, M would be 
wholly past. 
From these, needless to say, 52' and 53' do not follow. For familiar reasons, 
these counterfactuals can be non -trivially true without M itself being wholly 
past or wholly future at any time. Indeed, M might be an instantaneous 
event taking place wholly in the present, and 52, and 53, could still be true. 
If my reconstruction of McTaggart's argument is correct, then it does not 
produce a contradiction from the A- theory alone, but only in conjunction 
with McTaggart's analysis of tense, which the contradiction itself gives any 
A- theorist good reason to reject. 
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E.2.3 Passage and the A- theory 
If what I have said so far in this section has been correct, the A- theory 
can be defended from the traditional McTaggart- inspired objections if the 
Counterfactual Theory of tense can be. But there is yet a third way of 
reading McTaggart, which can be used as an objection to the Counterfactual 
Theory. The objection will be that the Counterfactual Theory cannot make 
sense of time's passage. Moreover, it can be claimed that it is exactly time's 
passage that McTaggart is appealing to with the quote mentioned above:6 
If M is past, it has been present and future. If it is future, it will be 
present and past. If it is present, it has been future and will be past. 
(MCTAGGART 1927, s. 329) 
According to the Counterfactual Theory, the truths expressed by the sen- 
tences above don't imply any change in the kind of rich dynamic sense 
that has been held to be required for the passage of time. They merely 
express modal truths about other possible worlds, where the distribution of 
A- properties is different to the way it actually is. 
52, and 53, do not imply that M changes as regards its A- properties, any 
more than the counterfactual, "If my poker were hot at t2, I would burn my- 
self" implies a change in the poker. The objection is that we need something 
more like McTaggart's analysis of tense to capture the rich and dynamic 
passage of time expressed by 52 and 53. 
The answer to this twofold. First, It's not clear to me that believing in the 
Counterfactual Theory of tense rules out believing in the passage of time. 
If the Counterfactual Theory is true, then it seems that . the mere truth 
of "Whatever is future, will be present" doesn't entail that time passes in 
an appropriately rich and dynamic sense. But it doesn't follow that, if the 
Counterfactual Theory is true, then time doesn't pass. So, if you are attached 
to the passage of time, that's not in itself a reason to deny the Counterfactual 
Theory. 
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Second, an A- theorist isn't, qua A- theorist, committed to passage. The A- 
theory just says that there are A- properties. Whether time passes is a further 
question. There are some arguments, apparently independent of McTaggart 
argument to the conclusion that it doesn't: the regress of temporal dimen- 
sions discussed by J.J.C. Smart (SMART 1963, p. 136) and D.C. Williams 
(WILLIAMS 1966, p. 296) for example.? If these arguments, or McTaggart's 
Paradox, construed as an argument against the passage of time, are sound, 
then so much the worse for passage. Our reasons for believing the A- theory, 
as described in section E.1.2, remain. It is possible to believe in the A- theory 
without believing in passage - if there are decisive objections to passage, 
then that's what someone who takes these reasons seriously should believe. 
If we reject passage, it can't be an objection to the Counterfactual Theory 
that the reading it gives of "Whatever is future, will be present" does not 
entail that time passes. 
For the purposes of this paper, I want to remain neutral about whether time 
passes. 
E.3 Realism, Indexicalism and the A- theory 
The conclusions of the previous sections have been mainly negative. We have 
seen how to define the A- theory in such a way that it is distinct from any 
claim about the analysis of tense or the passage of time, and seen how to 
resist various readings of, or arguments inspired by, McTaggart's Paradox. 
I now aim to do something more constructive. It seems to me that the A- 
theory can be used to argue for some positions in philosophy of time that are 
distinct from it: realism about the past and future, and what maybe loosely 
called "indexicalism ": the view that there is an indexical element in tense. 
While these positions are not commonly held by A- theorists, we must bear 
in mind what I said earlier (section E.1.1) about the dangers of conflating 
the A- theory with other doctrines that might happen to be held by people 
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who believe the A- theory. The comprehensive theory of time I am defending 
is an A- theory, for all that it accepts many of the trappings associated with 
the B- theory. 
The argument for this comprehensive theory of time is broken into four sec- 
tions: first, I argue for realism about the past and future in general terms, 
independent of the A- theory (section E.3.1). Then, I consider an argument 
which shows that the combination of realism about the past and future with 
the A- theory leads to implausible results unless there is an indexical element 
in tense (section E.3.2); finally, I argue that the A- theorist has specific rea- 
sons to accept realism about the past and future (section E.3.3), and reply 
to a final objection (section E.3.4). 
E.3.1 General Arguments for Realism 
By "realism about the past and future", I mean metaphysical realism - the 
thesis that a certain domain of entities, past and future entities in this case, 
exist and are mind -independent. (DEViTT 1984, pp. 11 -21) I don't mean 
semantic realism - the thesis that certain kinds of sentences, which would 
in this case be past and future tense sentences, are truth -apt. 
The distinction is important here, because theories of time which accept se- 
mantic realism about the past and future, but deny metaphysical realism 
about the past, and especially the future, are commonplace, and often asso- 
ciated with the A- theory. Even my own proposal could be understood in this 
light: the Counterfactual Theory might suggest a way to assign truth values 
to past and future tensed sentences without requiring that there actually be 
any past and future events. Julius Caesar doesn't have to exist for "Were it 
50 BCE, Caesar would be bald" to be truth -apt, and that counterfactual is 
all that we are asserting, according to the Counterfactual Theory, when we 
say "Julius Caesar was bald in 50 BCE ". 
In the form I have presented it, the Counterfactual Theory quantifies over 
past and future times, which is perhaps contrary to metaphysical anti -realism 
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about the past and future. It would not take too much work, however, to 
remove this commitment - perhaps by making the quantification substitu- 
tional or possibilist; perhaps by redescribing the anti -realist position so that 
it is compatible with there being past or future times, provided nothing ex- 
ists at these times. In any case, as I will argue in section E.3.3, there is a 
more substantive argument from the Counterfactual Theory to metaphysical 
realism about the past and future. 
Semantic realism about the past and future seems to me to be an unexcitingly 
true doctrine8 - or at any rate, given the Counterfactual Theory, whatever 
arguments there are to he had about it are instances of arguments about the 
correct semantics of counterfactuals, which goes far beyond the scope of this 
paper - so, henceforth, I will use "realism" to mean metaphysical realism. 
Realism about the past ought to appeal to anyone who is not an anti -realist 
across the board. We know that past objects exist for the same reason we 
know extra- mental objects exist. We've seen them! Perceptual processes take 
time: it follows that if we are perceiving in the present (or even a little bit 
into the future) then we are perceiving things that happenned some time ago, 
in the past. Look into the night sky, and you see can see events transpiring 
millions of years into the past. Realism about the past thus seems to be part 
and parcel of realism about the common -sense entities that we take ourselves 
to be observing. 
Past entities are also indispensible in causal explanation, since, again, causal 
processes take time. So even unobserved past objects have an important role 
to play in explaining present phenomena, implicating realism about the past 
in scientific, as well as common sense, realism. 
Anti- realists about the past sometimes claim that causation can be recon- 
structed as a relation that holds between contemporaries. At any given 
time the causal relation holds between properties... each of which is present 
and is presently instantiated. These properties may include things like the 
property of being burdened with a certain sort of past, or (as Leibniz put it) 
pregnant with a certain sort of future." (BIGELOW 1996, p. 47) The cause 
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of, for example, a match's now having the property being alight might be 
regarded as the match's now having the property having been struck. 
This latter property has to he understood in a way that makes a match's 
having it compatible with the non -existence of the past. I am not sure that 
there is any such way; but supposing that there is, my point still stands. An 
anti- realist about the past may be able to give a causal explanation of the 
match's being alight, but cannot give the causal explanation we do give in 
our scientific and ordinary practice, in terms of a past striking of the match 
(or in terms of any past event). 
Realism about the future is a little harder to defend, at least for an A- 
theorist. A usual argument is that given realism about the past, to posit 
such an intrinsic difference between past and future as would be required 
to be a realist about the past but not the future would be anthropocentric. 
This argument is not available to an A- theorist, who must hold that intrinsic 
differences between past and future are either not anthropocentric or not 
objectionably so. 
There are other arguments, though, analogous to those for the existence of 
the past. Our ability to act in the future is analogous to our ability to 
perceive the past. Action, like perception, takes time, so insofar as we know 
that we are capable of influencing external objects by means of acting, we 
know that there are future objects, because it is those that we influence. 
In addition, if there were no future, it would tend to undercut our confi- 
dence in causal explanation. If, sometimes, striking a match (in appropriate 
circumstances) was insufficient to cause a subsequent flame, we would be 
unsatisfied with citing the striking of past matches as a causal explanation 
of past or present flames. But, inevitably, if there is no future, there will be 
failures of causal sufficiency for every cause whose effect would take place in 
the future. 
Finally, if, as may be the case, backwards causation is needed for the causal 
explanation of certain processes described by quantum mechanics (PRICE 
1996), future entities will be as obviously causally indispensible as past ones. 
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E.3.2 The Epistemic Argument for Indexicalism 
There is an argument which purports to show that an A- theory of the kind 
I have defended must reject realism about the past and future. According 
to realism about the past, Julius Caesar exists; and according the A- theory, 
he's intrinsically whoIIy past. So the following proposition is true; 
54 Julius Caesar is (wholly) past. 
If realism about the past is true, and the A- theory is true, so too is 54. But 
implausible results flow from 54: 
But Caesar does realise the truth of 9 - he believes that he's present. Caesar, 
it would seem, is the subject of a hideous metaphysical delusion - he believes 
that he is present, but yet he is past. Moreover, present people are in no 
better epistemic position than he is. What makes us think that we are the 
lucky ones who are right in our belief that we are present? If, by chance, we 
were, we could hardly be justified in our luckily true belief.' 
Think about what a non -A- theorist would say about 54. Not that it is false! 
54 is surely true, if any statement to the effect that something is wholly 
past can be true. What generates the problem is Caesar's thought that he is 
present, which seems to be true and incompatible with 54. Actually, we can 
shortcut the question of whether it really is incompatible by imagining that 
Caesar entertains 54 itself. If he did, he must have rejected it immediately; 
and rightly so. What seems to be the problem with 54 is that it is true in 
our mouths, and false in Caesar's. 
The B- theorists have a ready diagnosis of the changing truth value of 54 
--- they can say that it contains a hidden indexical element. Being past, 
perhaps, is just a matter of being earlier than a certain indexically denoted 
time - to say "Caesar is past" is to say "Caesar is earlier than this time ". 
Such an analysis of "is past" is incompatible with the A- theory, however, 
since being earlier than a certain time is not an intrinsic property. 
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There is no reason, however, that an A- theorist cannot avail herself of an in- 
dexical element in the semantics of "is past ", provided she continues to hold 
that things are past in virtue of having an intrinsic, monadic property of past - 
ness. Recall that there are many, many different A- properties (at least one 
for each time) corresponding to the many different degrees of pastness and 
futurity. The A- theorist should hold that which determinate A- property we 
denote by the word "presentness" and express by the predicate "is present" 
depends, indexically, on the time of utterance. 
Thus, Caesar, uttering the sentence "Caesar is present" (or its equivalent in 
Latin), expresses an A- property he actually has; while when we utter that 
sentence, we express an A- property he does not have. Similarly for 54, except 
that pastness is a large disjunction of determinate A- properties, rather than 
a determinate A- property itself. 
My proposal that the predicates which express A- properties should be re- 
garded as indexical will no doubt meet with objections. We must remind 
ourselves again of the danger of conflating the A- theory with other doctrines 
widely believed by A- theorists (discussed in section E.1.1). That "past ", 
"present" and "future" are covertly indexical is almost uniformly denied by 
traditional A- theorists (I know of one exception, E.J. Lowe10 (LowE 1987A)) 
but this does not make it incompatible with the A- theory. 
It may be thought that this proposal deprives the A- properties of any real 
metaphysical role; or makes them mere haecceities of times (the property each 
time has in virtue of being that time). On the contrary, the A- properties have 
a very important role to play in explaining what it is for it to be a certain 
time at a world. It is precisely because times other than the present could 
have lacked the degree of pastness or futurity they actually have (while they 
could not fail to have their own haecceities) that it makes sense to say "it 
might have been 50 BCE" and to speculate about what would have been the 
case were it 50 BCE. 
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E.3.3 The Groundedness Argument for Realism 
I have argued that the A- theory is compatible with realism about the past 
and future. Not only is it compatible, though: f will now argue that an 
A- theorist positively ought to believe in the past and future. 
Roughly speaking, my complaint against anti -realism about the past and 
future is that it cannot furnish grounds or truthmakers for past and future 
tense truths. This is a common complaint. Put this way, however, it is 
unclear just what is being asked of the anti -realist. What is it for a truth to 
have a ground or a truthmaker? Why should we think that past and future 
tensed truth need them? It is open to anti -realists to simply deny that truths 
require truthmakers.' The Counterfactual Theory of tense, however, gives us 
a way to shortcut that problem, by putting the complaint about groundedness 
in a way that does not involve appeal to any contentious truthmaker principle. 
The first step in this argument is from the A- theory proper to the Coun- 
terfactual Theory of tense, as described in section E.2.2. This move is not 
deductive, as the Counterfactual Theory is only one among many theories 
of tense, and is not entailed by the A- theory. It seems, however, to provide 
the best explanation of tense against an A- theoretic background, so there 
is at least an abductive inference from the A- theory to the Counterfactual 
Theory. 
According to the Counterfactual Theory, many ordinary truths about the 
past or future (such as 55, below) should be analysed as counterfactual con- 
ditionals (such as 55e): 
55 Julius Caesar was bald. 
55, There is some past time such that, were it that time, Julius Caesar 
would be bald. 
The truth of such a counterfactual itself calls for explanation. On the stan- 
dard semantics, what 55, says is that there is some past time, 50 BCE, say, 
252 The A- theory 
such that, in all the nearest (ie. the most similar) to actuality possible worlds 
where 50 BCE is present, Caesar is bald. Let us call worlds where 50 BCE 
is present and Caesar is bald, Caesar worlds. What needs to be explained 
is the close similarity between the Caesar worlds and the actual world. This 
similarity, I think, can only consist in the existence of a counterpart of the ac- 
tual present at the Caesar worlds, and of a counterpart of the Caesar worlds' 
presents in the actual world. 
Suppose that there are a mixture of presentist worlds (worlds that are wholly 
present), and realist worlds (worlds with a past and future) in the cosmos. 
If the actual world is a presentist world, then a presentist Caesar world has 
very little in common with it. In fact, the only thing it has in common is 
the A- property of presentness. If there is a presentist world where 50 BCE 
is present, and Caesar is hirsute - a hirsute world - there seems to be no 
reason for that world not to be at least as similar to the actual world as any 
Caesar world. But then 55, would be false, which it is not. 
In any case, there will be worlds much more similar to the actual world than 
either a presentist Caesar world or a hirsute variant on it. A non -presentist 
Caesar world containing a future counterpart of the actual present will have 
more in common with the actual world than a presentist Caesar world - 
it contains a part qualitatively identical to the actual present, except for 
its A- properties. We should, therefore, regard the closest worlds where the 
antecedent of 55, is true as non- presentist worlds, furnished with a real past 
and future. 
The actual world must also be a non -presentist world. If the actual world is a 
presentist world, there will still he nothing to choose between a non -presentist 
Caesar world, and a non -presentist hirsute world. Both have exactly the 
same features in common with the actual world; namely, their respective 
counterparts of what is actually the present. The only thing that can make 
a Caesar world more qualitatively similar to the actual world than a hirsute 
world is if the actual world contains an actual Caesar who is actually bald. 
An actual past Caesar is required to ground the truth of 55,, and similar 
E.3 Realism, Indexicalism and the A- theory 253 
arguments apply, mutatis mutandis, to enough similar counterfactuals to 
require the existence of an entire past and future for the actual world. 
E.3.4 Tensed Properties 
According to the Counterfactual Theory of tense, when we say that Caesar 
was bald, we assert a certain counterfactual conditional, which, I have sug- 
gested, should be analysed by means of the usual possible worlds semantics. 
It may be objected, though, that this makes sentences like 55 into sentences 
not about the actual Caesar, but some other -worldly Caesar counterpart; or 
at best, not about the actual world but some other world also containing 
Caesar. 
Insofar as this objection speaks against the semantics for counterfactual con- 
ditionals, rather than against my proposal to analyse tense by means of 
counterfactuals, a reply to it would be beyond the scope of this paper. I 
do however have a reply for the objector who finds this problem especially 
difficult in the case of tense. 
If it makes it easier, we can think of 55 as ascribing a property of having 
been bald to Caesar (our, actual, Caesar). This property is a "tensed prop- 
erty"; Caesar has it iff the tensed sentence "He was bald" is true of him. 
We have met tensed properties before, in the context of my disccusion of the 
anti -realist idea that the causal realtion holds only between contemporaries 
(section E.3.1) - there the example was having been struck. Tensed prop- 
erties are often thought to be mysterious, but the Counterfactual Theory 
shows how to assimilate them to something quite familiar 
A thing is fragile iff, were it struck in a suitable way, it would break; it is 
soluble iff, were it placed in a suitable solvent, it would dissolve Similarly, a 
thing has the property of having been bald iff, were a suitable time present, 
it would be bald. Tensed properties are dispositional properties according to 
the Counterfactual Theory. Just as the solubility of a sample of sugar has 
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a categorial basis in the sugar's molecular structure, Caesar's having been 
bald has a categorial basis in Caesar's actually being bald at some past time 
(as I argued in section E.3.3). 
Just as Caesar may never find himself in the appropriate circumstances to 
manifest his disposition to be bald (i.e. never find himself at a present time) 
in the actual world, so a sample of sugar may never find itself in appropriate 
circumstances to manifest its disposition to dissolve (i.e. never find itself in 
a suitable solvent). Rut it should not follow that "Caesar was bald" is not 
about Caesar, any more than "This sugar is soluble" is not about this sugar. 
E.4 The Status of the Theory 
If all that I have said is correct, there is a coherent comprehensive theory of 
time that combines the A- theory with indexicalism and with realism about 
the past and future. I have argued for the conditional conclusion that, if the 
A- theory is true, then we ought to believe this comprehensive theory. The 
comprehensive theory is not, however, part of the A- theory, nor is it entailed 
by it. Crucial steps in the argument were abductive: the Counterfactual 
Theory appears to be the best explanation of tense available to the A- theorist; 
realism the best explanation of the truth of the counterfactual conditionals 
required by the Counterfactual Theory. Indexicalism was needed to explain 
the changing truth value of "Caesar is past" . 
The conditional conclusion we have reached cannot tell us the status of this 
comprehensive theory. All that we can say is that it is at least as plausible 
as the A- theory itself. As I have mentioned, I am a R- theorist - I deny the 
antecedent of the conditional conclusion, and thus have no reason to believe 
the comprehensive theory I have been arguing for. 
But the appeal of the A- theory has never been as a matter of naturalistically 
minded speculative metaphysics. It is not as if A- theorists have ever imagined 
that physicists will sometime come to acknowledge A- properties together 
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with charge, rest mass, and spin among the fundamental properties of things 
in time. Indeed, it looks as though relativistic physics has already falsified 
the A- theory, as it is hard to make A- theory compatible with the relativity 
of simultaneity.12 
A- theorists have always appealed to the A- theory as a matter of descriptive 
metaphysics, conceptual analysis, or phenomenology; and here I think it is 
quite plausible, provided we do not imagine that what is implicit in some 
aspects of ordinary language, folk theory, or phenomenological feel is an 
infallible guide to the nature of the universe. In particular, I think that the 
idea that what time it is is an ordinary fact about the world, as discussed in 
section E.1.2, provides some support for the A- theory, construed in this way. 
Associated with this idea is the passage of time. Since it seems that passage 
cannot be recovered from the hopeless problems of regress discussed in sec- 
tion E.2.3, this cannot directly lend any support to the A- theory. However, 
contingency is the next best thing to change and the Counterfactual The- 
ory of tense shows how to accomodate the intuition that it will be a different 
time, and that this reflects a difference in an ordinary matter of fact. 
I have not tried very hard here to argue for the intuitions that support the 
A- theory. The literature is already very full of such arguments, in any case. 
My suggestion is that, insofar as such arguments are compeIIing, they may 
be taken to support an A- theory of time which is not so very far from what 
the B- theorists believe already.l3 
Notes 
1McTaggart explicitly allows that the A- properties could be relational. (MCTAGGART 
1927, s. 326) His reasons are, however, obscure, and no A- theorist has followed him in 
holding that A- properties consist in being related to some object outside of time, so we 
may safely ignore this option. 
'For a more detailed response to Williams along these lines, see (NUNN 2000). 
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3T don't mean to claim that temporal parts are the only way to solve the problem of 
intrinsic change, or even the best way. All that T am going to say in the language of 
temporal parts, however, can be translated into the language of distributional properties 
(PARSONS 2000) which does not presuppose the existence of temporal parts. I have used 
temporal part talk here because it will be more familiar to most readers. 
'William Lane Craig, who holds that Mc Taggart's Paradox is a "special case" of the 
problem of intrinsic change, has argued that this answer will not work in the case of 
A- properties. (CRAIG 1998) Craig points out that McTaggart's Paradox can arise for 
things which do not persist, and which, therefore, do not have temporal parts. So there 
are cases of McTaggart's Paradox which can't be solved by appeal to temporal parts. To 
put this another way, Mc Taggart's Paradox poses problems over and above those posed 
by the problem of intrinsic change (as I will he arguing myself in the next section). So 
Craig's argument against temporal parts solutions undercuts his own attempt to subsume 
McTaggart's Paradox into the problem of intrinsic change. 
5This suggestion is similar to Bigelow's (BIGELOW 1991), except that he analyses tense 
directly in terms of the possible worlds semantics, without mentioning the counterfactuals. 
My way of putting it has the advantage of not appearing ad hoc - it is the very distinctive 
advantage of the A- theory that it can make sense of these counterfactuals with seem 
sensible in ordinary usage. 
'Thus, for example, D.H. Mellor paraphrases this passage of McTaggart as "Past, 
present and future tenses are mutually incompatible... But because they are forever chang- 
ing everything has to have them all." (MELLOR 1993, p. 51) (my emphasis) 
'For a defense of passage against these arguments, see (MARKOSTAN 1993). 
5For a dissenting view, see (DUMMETT 1978B). 
9Compare David Lewis's argument against the absolute theory of actuality: "What a 
remarkable bit of luck for us if the very world we are part of is the one that is absolutely 
actual... What reason could we ever have to think it was so? How could we ever know ?" 
(LEWIS 1986, p. 93) 
10Lowe writes: "it is helpful to accentuate a feature of A- series expressions... namely, 
their indexicality... 'e is present' means, of course, `e is happening now', and `now' may 
usefully he compared with other indexical expressions like `here' and `I'." (LoWE 1987A, 
p. 65) 
'Nor would this be totally ad hoc. Even those who take truthmakers very seriously 
have trouble finding enough to make true totality truths, such as "Those are all the ravens 
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there are" - or worse, "Those are all the truthmakers there are." For one discussion of 
this problem, and a sample solution, see (ARMSTRONG 1997, pp. 196 -201). 
I2Hilary Putnam gives an argument for the B- theory from the relativity of simultaneity 
in (PuTNAM 1967). Though Putnam's argument is directed against the view that only the 
present is real, it will also work against the view that only the present has the A- property 
of presentness. For a bold attempt to answer this line of argument, see (Toor,EY 1997, 
ch. 11). 
13I am grateful for comments on this paper from Heather Dyke, John Heil, Nathan 
Oaklander, Denis Robinson, and the participants at the Time and Ethics 2001 conference 
at Otago University. 

Appendix F 
Distributional Properties 
Unpublished paper entitled "Distributional Properties" 
F.1 Introduction 
In metaphysical discussions of properties, people use examples such as the 
properties of being red, being 1kg in mass and so on. But these are not the 
sorts of properties had by the ordinary objects of our acquaintance. For 
example, what does it take for a tomato to have the property of being red. 
Must it he red all over? Or just mostly red? Or even red at some point on 
its surface? This question seems hard to answer. 
In this paper I try to explain and solve the puzzle that is implicit in this 
question. The splution, as it seems to me, concerns a type of property that 
I call "distributional" (section F.2). Some distributional properties have an 
important and interesting feature: uniformity (section F.4). Finally, this 
feature lends us some help in understanding change (section F.5). 
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F.2 A puzzle about determinables 
Can an object be coloured without having a colour? Surely not. But what 
about the surface of a chessboard? Or the surface of a painting or photo- 
graph? These things don't have a particular colour. But they are coloured. 
The parts of chessboards and paintings have colours. Each square of a 
chessboard has a colour and each brushstroke of a painting has a determi- 
nate colour. There is no problem about the squares and brushstrokes being 
coloured. But a chessboard is not a single square, and most paintings are not 
single brushstrokes. Even if every part of every chessboard or every painting 
has a colour, the puzzle that chessboards and paintings are coloured without 
themselves having colours does not go away. 
Let's put the puzzle in a more theoretical framework: being coloured is what 
is often called a determinable property. Every determinable property comes 
with a set of determinate properties. To have the determinable is simply 
to have one of the determinate properties from that set. In the case of being 
coloured, the determinates are normally thought to be being red, being mauve, 
being fuchsia, and so on, corresponding to each of the colours. 
What the puzzle about chessboards and paintings shows is that, in a world 
of spatially extended objects, things are not nearly so simple. It looks as 
though either being coloured is not a determinable property after all, or its 
set of determinates is larger than we thought. 
If we want to continue to make sense of the determinable / determinate 
distinction, I think we should choose the second option. The determinate 
properties belonging to the determinable being coloured includes not only 
the properties of being uniformly red, mauve, fuchsia, and so on, hut also 
the all the properties of having such and such a colour distribution: being 
checked, being polka dotted and so on. 
Two comments about this: 
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1) Being checked is itself a determinable property. Among its determinates 
is, for example, having 5 cm red and black checks. This is nothing new: 
being red is also determinable, among its determinates being being scarlet 
and being crimson. 
2) I am assuming that being red is the same property as being uniformly 
red. Perhaps this is not the case - perhaps being red is a property only a 
point -like object could have. In that case, since it is usually thought that 
microscopic objects are too small to be coloured, nothing would be red, which 
seems odd. 
To put point 2 another way, I am assuming that colours are a kind of colour 
distribution, namely, the uniform colour distributions. If this is right, then 
the determinates that belong to being coloured are all colour distributions. 
To be coloured is not to have a colour, but to have a colour distribution. 
Of course, there is nothing special about the role of colour in all this. We 
can intelligbly talk about mass distributions, charge distributions, saltiness 
distributions. If you don't find this talk intelligible, there's not much more 
that I can do except point out that it makes sense to me, and it solves 
the puzzle about chessboards and paintings. I call the properties having 
such -and -such mass distribution, having such -and -such a colour distribution, 
being polka- dotted, being uniformly red, and all their their ilk distributional 
properties.1 
'Some other authors have come close to the concept of distributional property that I 
intend to use here. Grelling and Oppenheim's "Gestalt qualities" (SIMONs 1987, pp. 354- 
360) are similar, except that the concept of a Gestalt carries with it a lot of psychological 
and epistemological baggage that I want to avoid. Also Gestalt qualities are supposed to be 
had only by complex objects, whereas I think that a simple object's having a distributional 
property is an important conceptual possibility (see section F.3). Another closely related 
concept is that of a "structural property ", much discussed in Australian metaphysics 
(ARMSTRONG 1997, pp. 34 -38). Structural properties are, however, again only had by 
complex objects - by objects with structure and the canonical examples are had by 
objects with a discrete structure, such as a methane molecule. It is hard to see how to 
apply structural properties to solve the problem of determinables discussed in section F.2. 
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F.3 Analysis 
Some people find it very natural to analyse distributional properties in terms 
of the parts of objects that have the distributional properties, the spatial 
relations between those parts, and the properties of those parts. For example, 
some will say that to have 5 cm red and black checks is just to have a number 
of square parts, each 5 cm across, some red, and others black, arranged in 
space in a certain kind of way. 
I think that to attempt an analysis of distributional properties in this way 
is a mistake. One reason is that, if I am right that colours are themselves 
colour distributions, then being red and being black are themselves colour 
distributions, so the proposed analysis does not in fact analyse distributional 
properties in terms of something else. 
Another is that it seems to me to be conceptually possible that objects should 
be multiply located in time and space. Looking at a chessboard, I see that it 
has a certain kind of colour distribution, but I don't see that it has certain 
kinds of parts. To see that, I have to look much closer at the chessboard, to 
determine what type of material it's made out of. An other -worldly chess- 
board might be made out of special Aristotelean matter that fills up space 
without having any parts. Of course, one way to have the colour distribution 
that chessboards usually do is to have certain kinds of parts arranged in a 
certain kind of way; but that is only a sufficient condition for having the 
colour distribution, not a necessary one. 
Even if you don't agree with me here, another seeming conceptual possibility 
is also incompatible with the analysability of distributional properties. It 
seems to be conceptually possible that things be made out of an indefinitely 
divisible, atomless material sometimes called "gunk ". Gunky objects have 
no unextended parts. If a gunky object has a distributional property, then, 
while this can be explained in terms of the parts of the object, these parts 
will always be extended, and so their properties will always be just more 
distributional properties. 
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This problem is particularly vivid if you imagine a piece of gunk the colour 
distribution of which is a continuous spectrum, like a rainbow. It's true that 
the colour distribution of such an object would supervene on the properties 
and spatial relations of its parts - but the properties in question will always 
be continuous, non -uniform, colour distributions, just like the one you are 
trying to analyse. 
I don't want to make a big deal out of these objections here, as I think 
it is interesting enough to explore the consequences of taking distributional 
properties to be unanalysable, regardless of how well my reasons for thinking 
so stand up. 
F.4 Uniformity 
Some distributional properties are uniform and others are not. The colour 
distribution of the surface of a ripe tomato is uniform; the colour distribution 
of the surface of a chessboard is not. We can also describe objects as being 
uniform with regard to certain determinables. The surface of a ripe tomato 
is uniform with regard to colour; the surface of a chessboard is not. 
We might try to define uniformity this way: an object x is uniformly 0, iff, for 
some determinate 0 belonging to 0, for all regions of space s that x occupies, 
xisz/iats. 
This won't work unless we restrict V), however. Suppose that we want to 
decide whether an object coloured in garish stripes of blue and green is uni- 
formly coloured using this definition. If is allowed to be the dístributionaI 
property of having blue and green stripes, then this object will count as uni- 
form. If my argument of section F.2 was correct, then having blue and green 
stripes is as respectable a determinate of being coloured as being blue all over 
is. We need some other reason to discount it; and it's hard to imagine what 
reason we could have that wouldn't beg the question. 
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This problem is analogous to a well studied problem about resemblance. We 
might try to say that an object x resembles an object y with regard to 0 iff 
for some determinate i/ belonging to 0, x is ip and y is ip 
. 
Do a blue sapphire 
and a green emerald resemble one another with regard to colour? If is 
allowed to be the property of being blue or green, yes. For the sapphire is 
blue or green, and the emerald is blue or green. 
I don't want to try to solve this old problem in a new way, just to suggest 
that we should treat the problem about defining uniformity similarly. If we 
want to believe that there is objective resemblance in the world, we will need 
to hold that there is an objective distinction between those properties that 
"make for resemblance" (such as being blue) and those that do not (such as 
being blue or green). Just so, if we want to believe that there is objective 
uniformity in the world, we will need to hold that there is an objective 
distinction between those properties that can be a respect in which an object 
is uniform (such as being blue all over) and those that cannot (such as having 
blue and green stripes). 
Here is where people who wanted to analyse distributional properties of ob- 
jects in terms of the properties and spatial arrangement of the parts of those 
objects will object again. If we could analyse distributional properties that 
way, then we could also analyse uniformity. We could say that an object 
is uniform with regard to 0 if all its parts resemble each other with regard 
to 0. I won't go over my reasons for rejecting the analysis of distributional 
properties again here. I acknowledge, though, that there is something to this 
objections. Uniformity and resemblance to seem to be closely allied concepts, 
and an analysis of one in terms of the other is attractive. 
There is a connection to be found, even if we reject the analysis of distribu- 
tional properties. Given the resources of classical mereology (SIMONs 1987, 
p. 37), we can say that an object .r, resembles another y with regard to some 
uniform respect 0 if the mereological sum of y and y is uniform with regard 
to 0. This falls a little short of an analysis, because it doesn't have anything 
to say about what makes two object resemble each other with regard to a 
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non - uniform distributional property. 
F.5 Change 
I think that change is simply the temporal analogue of non - uniformity. This 
view is dependent on a substantive assumption in the philosophy of time: I 
am assuming that time is, more or less, like space. I won't argue for this 
assumption here. But if we accept it, then the relationship between change 
and uniformity is just one more that we can add to a long list of analogies 
between space and time. (TAYLOR 1992, p. 69) 
Just as the surface of a chessboard can have a non -uniform colour distribution 
over space (being red here, and black there) an object that changes its colour 
has a non- uniform colour distribution over time (being red then, and black 
now). Think of, for example, a red ripe tomato sitting in the sun for some 
days, drying up, and turning black. 
If we think of duration on the model of extension, we should think of the 
change the tomato undergoes, from being red to being black, on the model of 
a non -uniform colour distribution. It's just as if the tomato were red at one 
end, and black at the other except that the ends in question are times, 
not places. 
Just as uniformity is a concept that can be applied either to distributional 
properties or to the objects that have those properties, so too is change. The 
colour distribution of the tomato in my example is a changing one (that is 
to say, a temporally non -uniform one). The tomato itself is a changing thing 
because it has a changing property: its colour distribution. 
There is an important objection to this theory of change. Allegedly, the 
theory I have just described eliminates change, rather than analysing it. 
Consider the tomato changing colour. To say that it changes is to say that it 
has a certain kind of colour distribution - one that is non -uniform over time. 
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But the tomato has that colour distribution eternally. Therefore, it does not 
change with regard to it. The distributional properties theory of change 
"trade[s] in the changing temporary properties for the permanent intrinsic 
property of having such -and -such history of change." (LEWIS 2001) 
This objection, however, is assuming something quite foreign to the distribu- 
tional properties analysis namely that to change with regard to a property 
is a way of having that property, which is to be contrasted with having that 
property permanently, or eternally. According to this assumption, "perma- 
nently" and "temporarily" are like adverbial modifiers. When you say that 
a tomato is temporarily red, you say something about the relationship be- 
tween the tomato and redness; when you say that the tomato is permanently 
red you say something different (and incompatible) about the relationship 
between that very object and that very property. 
According to the distributional properties view, the distinction between chang- 
ing and being changeless with regard to a property is not a distinction be- 
tween two ways of having that property. Rather it's a distinction between 
two kinds of properties: the changing ones and the non -changing ones; and a 
parallel distinction between two kinds of things, those that have a changing 
property, and those that don't. When you say that a tomato is permanently 
red, you say that it has one property; when you say that it is temporarily 
red, you say that it has a different (and incompatible) property. 
The property of being temporarily (or changingly) red is one property, and 
the property of being permanently (or changelessly) red is another. You can't 
have the first property permanently, or the second temporarily. It doesn't 
follow from the fact that an object has a property eternally that that property 
is not a changing one. 
Perhaps this point can be made clearer by showing how an analogous ob- 
jection would fail in the spatial case. The objection would go like this: to 
say that a chessboard is non - uniform in colour is to say that it has a certain 
kind of colour distribution one that is non -uniform over space. But the 
chessboard has that colour distribution, as it were, at every point at which 
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it is located. Therefore, the chessboard is uniform with regard to the colour 
distribution. The distributional properties account of non - uniformity trades 
in having colours non -uniformly for uniformly having such- and -such a colour 
distribution. It has eliminated non - uniformity. 
Of course this objection fails because it does not follow from the colour 
distribution's being had by the chessboard at every point that that colour 
distribution is a uniform one. Checkered colour distributions are essentially 
non - uniform - there is no way to have them uniformly. 
F.6 Conclusion 
If all I have said so far is correct, then a little reflection on the properties of 
ordinary spatially extended objects produces a surprisingly interesting new 
field of investigation in the metaphysics of properties. The insights thereby 
acquired also help us understand change. 
I don't pretend to have done more than scratch the surface of the phenomena 
related to distributional properties, uniformity and non -uniformity. These 
are clearly, however, powerful concepts it would be interesting to see 
them put to work in areas other than those I have touched on here. 
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